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THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF MANDATES

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Few, if any, political experiments of recent years have provoked such widespread interest as the régime of international mandates. A large body of technical writings on the subject has already appeared;¹ almost every day the international press reviews some of its current aspects.² It is commonly acknowledged that the measure of success achieved by the system is due largely to the efforts of the Permanent Mandates Commission, which has served from the beginning as the pivot of the entire institution.³ The present study is an effort briefly to analyze the principles which it follows, the methods which it employs, and the results which it has attained.⁴

I

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

The mandates system, it will be recalled, originated at the Peace Conference of 1919 as a compromise between two conflicting points of view. By a series of secret agreements made during the War, the Allies, in anticipation of victory, had parceled out

¹Among the more important books are D. F. W. Van Rees, *Les Mandats Internationaux* (2 volumes, 1927-28), and Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (1930).

²For example, the situation in Palestine has lately aroused world-wide comment.

³Cf. Henri Rolin, "La Pratique des mandats internationaux," *Académie de droit international, Recueil des cours* (1927), 14.

⁴For a more extended examination, see S. D. Myres, Jr., *The Permanent Mandates Commission: A Study in International Administration* (Ph.D. Thesis, Library, The University of Texas, 1929).

among themselves the more important colonies of Germany and Turkey.⁵ Later, however, in statements of war aims, their leaders had publicly announced that self-determination and native well-being were principles to be followed in disposing of enemy possessions.⁶ To give effect to this liberal policy, President Wilson had incorporated into his second draft of the Covenant a plan of international supervision proposed by General Smuts of South Africa.⁷ A violent struggle ensued at Paris when Lloyd George, seconded by the prime ministers of the self-governing Dominions, proposed the annexation of the German territories as spoils of war. Wilson fought single-handed against them, his opposition preventing the success of the imperialistic program.⁸

Negotiations which followed resulted in a detailed arrangement for the distribution and government of the lands in question. Germany and Turkey surrendered all their rights and titles to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,⁹ who, in turn, acting through the Allied Supreme Council, allocated the territories to the several states agreeing to assume control.¹⁰ The latter, however, were not granted the holdings in fee. They were given the power to administer without the right of ownership, occupying a position analogous to that of a trustee or guardian in private law.¹¹

⁵F. S. Cocks (Ed.), *The Secret Treaties and Understandings* (1918), *passim*; H. W. V. Temperley (Ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 volumes, 1920), II, 220-26; VI, 1-22.

⁶Temperley, *op. cit.*, I, 191-97. A brief account of the influence of liberals in England and America on the question of colonial claims is found in P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1926), 474-78. See also Sch. Milkonowicki, *Das Mandatsystem im Völkerbund* (1929), 7-15.

⁷*The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (1918), 12-23. Wilson's indebtedness to Smuts is clearly shown by P. B. Potter, "Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations," 16 *American Political Science Review* (Nov., 1922), 263-83.

⁸D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (2 volumes, 1928), I, 112-14. For the demands of the Dominions, Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan, see R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement* (3 volumes, 1922) I, 260, 272-75.

⁹Germany relinquished ownership in Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles. The unratified Treaty of Sèvres (Article 132) contained a similar provision, conferring title on the Principal Allied Powers. The Treaty of Lausanne, which superseded the unratified agreement, made the transfer from Turkey in Article 16.

¹⁰On the process, which was very intricate, cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, 34-63, and Van Rees, *op. cit.*, I, 25-30.

¹¹Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, 375-90, and A. M. Margalith, *The International Mandates* (1930), 35-49.

The extent of authority to be exercised over the territories was determined broadly by classifying them into three groups. The A mandates consist of the former Turkish colonies, which "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."¹² The B category are in an intermediate position; in each case, "the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will" protect the interests of the natives and the economic rights of other Members of the League.¹³ Finally, the C type are those which "can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory," subject to safeguards "in the interest of the indigenous population."¹⁴

The obligations assumed by the Mandatories are more fully set out in the respective mandate charters prepared under authority of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and ratified by the Council of the League.¹⁵ Thus no portion of the A territories shall be "ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign power." Their inhabitants are to be guaranteed freedom of conscience and religious worship. Provision is to be made for the protection of their citizens abroad and for the maintenance of local order and security. Steps are to be taken to institute appropriate governmental institutions. Discriminations against citizens or companies of any State member of the League in matters of taxation, commerce, or navigation, in the management of industries or the exercise of professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft, are forbidden. Since much variation exists in the texts, a full under-

¹²League of Nations Covenant, Article 22, par. 4. On origin of Art. 22, see Miller, *op. cit.*, I, 101-17. Syria was placed under the control of France, Palestine and Iraq, of Great Britain.

¹³Art. 22, par. 5. The Cameroons (divided between France and Great Britain), Togoland (also divided between France and Great Britain), Tanganyika (Great Britain), and Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium).

¹⁴Art. 22, par. 6. South-West Africa (Union of South Africa), Samoa (New Zealand), Nauru (Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, with Australia administering), German islands in the Pacific south of Equator, except Samoa and Nauru (Australia), German islands in Pacific north of Equator (Japan).

¹⁵For a careful account of action in drafting the mandates, see Wright, *op. cit.*, 47-48, 109-19.

standing of their provisions requires that they be considered separately.¹⁶

In each of the B mandates, the Mandatory is held "responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and social progress of its inhabitants." Limitations are placed on the utilization of the territory or its man-power for military purposes.¹⁷ Slaves are to be emancipated and slavery eliminated; the slave trade is to be suppressed; forced or compulsory labor, except for essential public works and services, is to be prohibited; native labor contracts and the recruiting of labor are to be carefully supervised; a strict control over the traffic in arms and ammunition and the sale of spirituous liquor is to be maintained; land laws and regulations against usury are to be enacted. Commercial equality is to be guaranteed all nationals of States members of the League; general monopolies, except for fiscal purposes, are to be forbidden. Freedom of conscience and worship is to be protected. The area under mandate is to be administered as an integral part of the Mandatory's territory, subject to the above restrictions.¹⁸

The C territories are likewise incorporated into the administrative régimes of the mandatory Powers, which may apply their laws with such modifications as local conditions require. The material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants are to be promoted to the utmost. The guardian States are charged with seeing that the slave trade is prohibited; that compulsory labor is limited to essential public works and services and that it is duly remunerated when so employed; that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled; that the supply of intoxicants to the native is forbidden. Military training is to be permitted only for police and defense purposes; no military or naval bases or

¹⁶Provisions are found in each dealing with distinct local problems. See Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, with supplementary agreements and renewals, League of Nations Document, C. 216. M. 77. 1926. VI. Also Cmd. 3627. Mandate for Palestine, League Document, C. 529. M. 314. 1922. VI. Mandate for Syria, League Document, C. 528. M. 313. 1922. VI.

¹⁷Article 3 in the French mandates for Togoland and the Cameroons make certain concessions to the Mandatory in the event of a "general war." Cf. Miller, *op. cit.*, I, 115-16.

¹⁸The B mandates are similar, though not entirely exact, in terms. Cf. French Mandate for Togoland, C. 449 (1) (d). M. 345 (d) 1922. VI., and British Mandate for East Africa, C. 449. (1) (a). M. 345 (a). 1922. VI.

fortifications may be established in the territories. Freedom of conscience and worship is to be guaranteed.¹⁹ In all three categories of mandates, the indigenous populations are deemed to require constant aid and guidance; certain "advanced nations" have therefore assumed their protection and development as "a sacred trust of civilization."²⁰

In making such commitments, the mandatorys pledged themselves to a policy noteworthy for its altruism. But it was well understood by the originators of the mandate system that mere professions of noble aims would not suffice. Similar undertakings had failed in the past because no adequate means were provided to hold nations accountable for the discharge of their responsibilities.²¹ The framers of the League Covenant recognized the necessity of international supervision and included in Article 22 two provisions setting up the framework of a system of control. The first of these reads, "In each case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."²² The second is to the effect that "A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatorys and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."²³

¹⁹The five C mandates are *mutatis mutandis* in the same terms. Cf. Mandate for South-West Africa, League Document, 21/31/14.D., and Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific north of the Equator, 21/31/14.E. For comparison of terms of the several mandates, see M. F. Lindley, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law* (1926), 250-62; Rolin, *op. cit.*, 25ff.; Margalith, *op. cit.*, 93-144.

²⁰Article 22, pars. 1 and 2. On the theory of trusteeship over backward peoples, see A. H. Snow, *The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations* (1919), *passim*; F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), *passim*.

²¹For example, the Berlin Act of 1885. Cf. F. B. Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration* (1919), 82-83, and R. L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (2 volumes, 1928), II, 415-54.

²²Par. 7. According to D. H. Miller, these two provisions seem to have had their origin in the British Draft Convention regarding Mandates. Articles 4 and 6 provided for the reports, while Article 7 dealt with the question of a Commission to consider them and make recommendations thereon to the Council. *Op. cit.*, I, 107, 112.

²³Par. 9. "If there were no Permanent Commission, it might be said that the mandates would exist only on paper, and this would, in a measure, justify the opinion of the skeptics who saw in the mandates system nothing but a veiled annexation." W. E. Rappard, *Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (hereafter, *P. M. C.*) I, 6.

While the plan of national administration with international oversight thus established is unique in some respects,²⁴ it is not without precedents. Within the British Empire, for example, the government of certain native communities had been entrusted to the Dominions, whose officials had been made accountable to the Colonial Office in London.²⁵ The Act of Algeciras of 1906 had placed France and Spain in control of Morocco for the discharge of certain tasks. They were regarded by President Roosevelt and Secretary Root as "the mandatory of all the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining order and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of them."²⁶ The mandate system under the League of Nations is an outgrowth of and improvement on such experiments. Its practical value is immediately apparent. By leaving the local administration of each territory to a single Power, it provides against the indecisions, conflicts, and abuses of joint government;²⁷ in providing for review of national policies by an international agency, it tends to prevent official excesses, to protect the interests of other States, and to advance the welfare of the natives. Under the mandate system, Governments are not free to pursue such policies as caprice may suggest. Their duties are fixed by international agreement, and they must render annual account to competent international organs for a proper discharge thereof.²⁸

It was essential at the outset that the "permanent Commission" which was to serve as the immediate agency of control should be properly constituted and endowed with adequate powers. The Council of the League undertook this task with due regard to its importance. The first step was taken on August 5, 1920, when M. Hymans, the Council *rapporteur*, offered a recommendation

²⁴M. Hymans, who presented the first report of the Council on the mandates system, declared, "We are face to face with a new institution. Legal erudition will decide as to the extent to which the older juridical notions can apply to this institution." *Official Journal of the League of Nations* (hereafter, *O. J.*), No. 6, 1920, p. 339.

²⁵Temperley, *op. cit.*, II, 236, especially on the government of Papua.

²⁶Potter, *op. cit.*, 278-83; Wright, *op. cit.*, 20-23; L. H. Evans, "Some Legal and Historical Antecedents of the Mandatory System," *Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of Southwestern Political and Social Science Association* (1924), 1-19.

²⁷On the weaknesses of condominium, see R. L. Buell, *International Relations* (1929), 489-93.

²⁸Cf. Van Rees, *op. cit.*, I, 11, and P. T. Furakaki, *Les Mandates Internationaux de la Société des Nations* (1923), 385.

to the effect that the Commission "should include amongst its members a delegate from each mandatory Power," who, however, should not "take part in a vote upon a report from the State or Empire which he represents." Further, "in order to ensure the impartiality of the recommendations made by the Commission," it should "be completed by asking other members superior in number to those nominated by the mandatory Powers." These additional members and "a certain number of private individuals, who would be instructed to sit upon the Commission as members," should be appointed by the Council. In naming them, preference should be given to experienced nationals of colonial Powers which were not Mandatories.²⁹ It will be noted that the initial report emphasized the desirability of both mandatory and non-mandatory nations being represented on the Commission, with the latter predominating, and urged that it should be non-partisan and expert in character.

In a second report, made October 28, 1920, M. Hymans submitted a more detailed proposal. He suggested that the Commission should consist of fifteen members, seven to be appointed by States having mandates and eight to be named by the Council from the non-mandatory Powers. None should be representatives of Governments; all should be chosen "by reason of their standing and qualifications." Members from mandatory States should not vote on reports presented by such States. Each member could be assisted by not more than two technical advisers. The Commission should sit at Geneva. During its meetings, an allowance should be granted to its respective members. The expenses of the Commission should be shared by the League and the mandatory Powers.³⁰

Having given some preliminary consideration to the question,³¹ the Council carefully reviewed these resolutions in its meeting of November 14, 1920. Mr. Fisher, the British representative, and M. Tittoni, the delegate from Italy, thought that it would be better to reduce the size of the Commission from fifteen to approximately five members. The Secretary-General of the League spoke in favor of a large body such as M. Hymans advocated, since a smaller group would have difficulty criticizing the administra-

²⁹*O. J.*, 1920, No. 6, p. 339ff.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 1920, No. 8, pp. 30-31.

³¹*Procès-Verbal of the Eighth Session of the Council*, 41, 43; *ibid.*, Tenth Session, 191.

tions of the territories, the responsibility of each member being greater. M. Bourgeois of France wished to have the mandatory Powers name three members of the Commission and the non-mandatory States four, with one of the three representing the Mandatory directly interested in the deliberations of the Commission.³² After further deliberation, the Council decided on November 26 that the Mandates Commission should consist of nine members, the majority of whom should be nationals of non-mandatory Powers; that all of them should be selected for their personal merits and competence; and that they should not hold any office which would put them in a position of direct dependence on their Governments.³³ Three days later the "Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission," which regulates the organization and procedure of this body in their broader aspects, was adopted.³⁴

At its meeting of February 22, 1921, the Council invited the following persons to become members of the Commission: M. J. B. P. Beau of France, former Governor-General of Indo-China and former Ambassador of France to Berne; Mme. A. Bugge-Wicksell of Sweden, Docteur en Droit; Mr. W. Cameron Forbes of the United States, former Governor-General of the Philippines; M. A. Freire d'Andrade of Portugal, former Governor-General of Mozambique and former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore of Great Britain, member of the House of Commons; M. Pierre Orts of Belgium, former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; M. D. F. W. Van Rees of Holland, former Vice-President of the Council of the Dutch East Indies; the Marquis A. Theodoli of Italy, former Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Colonies; and M. Kunio Yanagihita of Japan, former Secretary-General of the Chamber of Peers.³⁵ All agreed to serve, except Mr. Forbes,³⁶ whose place was taken by M. Ramon Pina of Spain, former Under-Secretary of State in the

³²*Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, 5-6.

³³*Idem.*, 13-14.

³⁴*O. J.*, 1920, No. 8, 87-88. This document allows the International Labor Office a representative on the Commission, provides for the sending of official representatives to the Commission's meetings, and regulates other important matters. It is supplemented by the Commission's rules of procedure. See League Document, C. P. M. 8 (1), *P. M. C.*, XII, 199.

³⁵*O. J.*, 1921, No. 7, 644; Van Rees, *op. cit.*, I, 73-74.

³⁶For Mr. Forbes' letter declining the appointment, *O. J.*, 1921, No. 7, 644-45.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador to Rome. Since its establishment the size of the Commission has been increased from nine to eleven, four coming from mandatory and seven from non-mandatory States.³⁷ The present membership consists of the Marquis Theodoli of Italy (Chairman), M. Van Rees of Holland (Vice-Chairman), Mlle. Dannevig of Norway, Lord Lugard of Great Britain, M. Merlin of France, M. Orts of Belgium, M. Palacios of Spain, Count de Penha Garcia of Portugal, M. Rappard of Switzerland, M. Ruppel of Germany, and M. Sakenobe of Japan.³⁸

II

THE MANDATES COMMISSION AS AN ORGAN OF CONTROL

The Council, the Assembly, and the Permanent Mandates Commission are the chief international agencies supervising the execution of the mandates.³⁹ The Council officially determines the attitude of the League respecting the administration of the various territories.⁴⁰ The annual reports of the Mandatories are addressed to it, and all recommendations to the Governments are made in its name and under its authority. The task of examining the reports, however, is delegated to the Mandates Commission, which advises the Council "on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates." The conclusions of the Commission are regularly discussed by the Council in the presence of a member

³⁷In recognition of his services as Director of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat and his general ability, M. Rappard was named an "additional" or "extraordinary" member with full powers. *O. J.*, 1925, No. 2, 234. A member of German nationality was added to the Commission with Germany's admission to the League. *Ibid.*, 1927, No. 10, 1132.

³⁸*P. M. C.*, XVIII, 9. Besides the persons named, the Count de Ballobar of Spain, Dr. Ludwig Kastl of Germany, and M. Chiyuki Yamanaka of Japan have served as regular members. M. H. Roume of France was a substitute member during the eighth session.

³⁹Among the more important organs directly affecting mandate administration are the Mandates Section of the Secretariat (M. Vita Catastini, Chief of Section), the International Labor Office (represented before the Commission by Mr. H. A. Grimshaw and subsequently by Mr. C. W. H. Weaver), the Health and Legal Sections of the Secretariat, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the order of their importance to date.

⁴⁰The Council assumed control at the outset, concluding that it should "examine the question of the whole administration" of the respective territories. *O. J.*, 1920, No. 6, 334-41.

of the Commission, usually the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, and representatives of any of the mandatory Powers who may be interested in the proceeding. Resolutions are eventually adopted, asking the Mandatories to supply additional information, to give their opinions on matters of policy or problems of administration, or to take certain action suggested by the Commission.⁴¹ The sanctions which the Council possesses as the legal agent of control are necessarily limited. As now constituted, it has no power to coerce the mandatory States; it can merely urge them to follow a given course.⁴² Its authority lies principally in its ability through investigations to bring facts to light, through conference to secure their consideration, and through the channels of publicity to insure their observance.⁴³ While supervision of this type can never be absolute, thus far it has been remarkably effective.⁴⁴

Although Article 22 of the Covenant gives the Assembly no authority with regard to mandates, Article 3 provides that it "may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." The more representative body of the League exercises a certain indirect influence over the mandates system. It annually gives some attention to the problems arising in the territories, adopting appropriate resolutions bearing on the work of the Council and the Mandates Commission.⁴⁵ While often merely formal in character, the discussion of mandate questions by the Assembly may prove to be of considerable significance. A striking illustration occurred during its third session when M. Bellegarde, the delegate from Haiti, called attention to the extreme measures adopted by the Government of South Africa to suppress the Bondelzwarts rising in South-West Africa. As a result, a resolution was ap-

⁴¹The Council has decided that it should carry out the recommendations of the Commission, except when political considerations render such a course impossible. *Ibid.*, 1924, No. 2, 385.

⁴²Cf. Henri Rolin, "Le système des mandats coloniaux," *Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée* (1920), 352; Paul Pic, "Le Régime du mandat d'après le traité de Versailles," *Revue générale de Droit international public* (1923), 344.

⁴³On the influence of public opinion on the mandates system, see Wright, *op. cit.*, 64-98, 216-218. Likewise, statement of M. Rappard, *P. M. C.*, V, 10.

⁴⁴E. V. Maanen-Helmer, *The Mandates System in Relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands* (1929), 42-43; Van Rees, *op. cit.*, I, 39. Cf. *P. M. C.*, XIV, 60-67.

⁴⁵That part of the Council's report which bears on mandates is referred to the Sixth Committee of the Assembly, whose *rapporteur* leads the debate.

proved asking the Mandates Commission to conduct an investigation,⁴⁶ which was done in conformity with the request.⁴⁷ The Assembly serves as a world forum where public opinion may be aroused in support of the principles underlying the mandate régime.⁴⁸ The broad basis of its organization, the liberal views of its membership serve to counterbalance the more conservative Council, which tends somewhat to reflect the attitude of the Mandatories.⁴⁹

Legally considered, the Mandates Commission is only a consultative organ; it exists merely to render advice to the Council. Actually, however, it exercises authority far in excess of that strictly granted. So far as the League is concerned, the Commission wields a predominating influence in all that relates to the administration of mandates.⁵⁰ This condition is due to several factors: to the prestige and ability of its membership, to the tact and thoroughness with which it conducts investigations, to its objectivity and practicality in dealing with administrative problems. The Council has in general been quite willing to allow it a free rein, doing little more than endorse its recommendations and ask the Mandatories to comply with them.⁵¹

From the beginning, the Commission has construed its administrative powers broadly. During the first session, a decision was reached that "it was entitled either to advise on definite matters to which its attention should be directed by the Council, or to express its views on its own initiative."⁵² Its members have agreed that their official competence should not be defined but should remain sufficiently elastic to permit the performance of all duties incumbent upon them.⁵³ While the Commission accepts certain general principles as the basis of its supervision, these have

⁴⁶*Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, I, 81, 152-66.

⁴⁷*P. M. C.*, III, 8-9, 62.

⁴⁸J. Stoyanovsky, *La Théorie générale des mandats internationaux* (1925), 130-31.

⁴⁹Wright, *op. cit.*, 88-89.

⁵⁰Van Rees, *op. cit.*, I, 40-41.

⁵¹Only a few exceptions have arisen, Council members expressing the opinion that the Commission has over-stepped its powers. Cf. Wright, 150-51. See especially *O. J.*, 1926, No. 10, 1, 233-34, and *ibid.*, 1926, No. 12, 1, 647-53.

⁵²*P. M. C.*, I, 20.

⁵³*Ibid.*, V, 142. The Commission is not a mere tool of the Council but an independent constitutional organ established by the Covenant. See discussion of this question in *ibid.*, X, 14.

evolved slowly and rest on actual experience rather than on abstract opinion.⁵⁴ It has steadfastly guarded against doctrinaire decisions. It regards itself, and may be regarded, as a body of colonial experts, charged with dealing with actual conditions in the mandated territories. This fact was emphasized by M. Merlin, the French member, when he said that

The Commission was neither an institute of moral and political science charged with studying the problems from a theoretical point of view, without considering the result of the truths they unveiled, nor a tribunal having to judge the case according to the dictates of heart and conscience without considering the possible consequences of the sentence. It was a gathering of persons who had acquired some experience of conditions in far countries.

The members of the Commission should always remember, when taking a decision, that they were, so to speak, operating upon a living body which was extremely alive and which reacted very readily. They were not then free to lay down the law and the strict truth, but they ought to take the utmost account of the consequences of their work and their decisions.⁵⁵

Since the Commission is essentially a technical organ, it has consistently avoided questions which it regards as political in character. As early as the first session, a resolution was adopted to the effect that "The Permanent Commission holds that it is not its duty to express any opinion concerning the terms of the Mandates, and that its attributions are limited by the last paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provides that the Commission shall receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and shall advise the Council in all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates."⁵⁶ In all cases, it has refused to go behind the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles or the terms of the mandate charters, holding that such action can be taken only by the Council and the Assembly.⁵⁷ It has likewise resisted all temptation to usurp the authority of the local administrations. The responsibility of governing is on the Mandatories, not on the Commission. The latter will not undertake to decide which type

⁵⁴See statements of the Marquis Theodoli, M. Merlin, M. Orts, and M. Van Rees, *ibid.*, IX, 133-34.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, XIII, 187.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, I, 20.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, V, 97-99, 166-73; VI, 83-84; VIII, 49; XI, 164. It also declined to express an opinion on the political aspects of adding a German member to the Commission. *Ibid.*, XI, 134, 200.

of government is best suited to a given territory,⁵⁸ or to determine the details of policy to be followed therein.⁵⁹ Illustrative of the Commission's attitude are the rules which it adopted regulating the admission of petitions setting up complaints against the mandatory Powers:

(a) Any petition is regarded as inadmissible if it lays before the Commission a dispute with which the Courts have competence to deal or if its author appeals from a decision regularly pronounced by a Court (properly constituted).

(b) If a petitioner protests against an act of the mandatory Power in regard to which he has no judicial remedy, the Commission will have to consider whether this act is in conformity with the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant and of the mandate in question.

(c) It may happen that in a legal action the plaintiff against whom the decision has been given may be duly entitled to appeal to the Commission to ask it to determine, not whether the Courts whose decision has gone against him have correctly interpreted the legislation of the mandatory Power, but whether this legislation itself is in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and the mandate.

(d) It is also possible that the absence of legislation on a given matter may render a petition admissible if the principles of the Covenant and of the mandate called for such legislation and if the Mandatory's failure to legislate on this point may have the result of depriving a petitioner of rights which he could legitimately claim under the terms of the Covenant or the mandate.⁶⁰

Should the Commission continually intermeddle with local affairs, the results would be most serious. While itself lacking power to govern, its action might easily discredit the authorities on the spot, inviting unrest and disorder.⁶¹ Under all normal conditions, therefore, the Commission has stood squarely behind the Mandatories.⁶²

But it is not to be implied that the supervision which it exercises is perfunctory. Its control has been vigilant and thorough,

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, XV, 179; XVI, 17, 30-33, 138-42.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, XI, 26-27; XVI, 117, 165, 167, 170, 202. The Commission may, however, suggest a general policy in keeping with the terms of the mandate. In this connection, see especially the recent discussion of the situation in Palestine. *Ibid.*, XVII, 35-43, 48-49, 51-58, 78, 143-46.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, VI, 168-69. For the Council's delegation of authority to the Commission with respect to petitions, see *O. J.*, 1923, No. 3, 200.

⁶¹This truth was emphasized by disturbances in Syria and Western Samoa. *P. M. C.*, VIII, 64; XIV, 57.

⁶²Such is evident from the large number of petitions rejected. Cf. *ibid.*, X, 189-91; XII, 204-05; XIII, 230-232; XIV, 137-38; XV, 287-88, 295-98; XVI, 172; XVIII, 174-75.

and the results which it has achieved, as will presently appear, have been considerable. Its authority rests essentially in its ability to marshal facts and bring their influence to bear on the mandatory Powers. Under the terms of the Covenant, the latter are obligated to submit annual reports with reference to the respective territories committed to their charge. The mandate texts require that such reports shall contain "full information" to be rendered "to the satisfaction of the Council." Moreover, the Administrations are required to submit to the Commission for its scrutiny copies of all laws and decrees applicable in the areas subject to mandate.⁶³ Information particularly desired by the Commission is elicited by means of questionnaires, through requests made directly to mandatory representatives, or in observations prepared for the Council.⁶⁴ During its opening session, the Commission decided that it could take official notice of all matters relating to the mandates system.⁶⁵ The Mandates Section of the Secretariat regularly circulates among members of the Commission, books, parliamentary minutes and journals, and dossiers of newspaper and magazine articles dealing with general or special phases of mandate administration.⁶⁶ While observations drafted for the Council are thus based on information from many sources, a difficulty has arisen in the Commission's inability to verify the facts before it.⁶⁷ This condition leads to embarrassment when controversial issues develop, sometimes seriously impairing the value of the Commission's work.⁶⁸

This shortcoming, however, is considerably mitigated by the practice of examining official reports in the presence of representatives of the mandatory Powers submitting them.⁶⁹ These individuals commonly hold positions of high authority in the Ad-

⁶³*Ibid.*, II, 82, 84; *O. J.*, 1924, No. 10, 1,286-87.

⁶⁴For typical lists of material considered by the Commission, *P. M. C.*, XIV, 231; XVI, 178-81.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, I, 28. For use to which non-official publications may be put, see examination of criticisms of R. L. Buell, *ibid.*, XV, 17, 241-49, and L. H. Evans, *ibid.*, XVIII, 64-67.

⁶⁶See statement of Director of Mandates Section at the opening of each session of the Commission.

⁶⁷Much consideration has been given to this problem. See especially *P. M. C.*, III, 115-16; IV, 178-79; VII, 35, 124-28, 164, 180; VIII, 51, 156-68, 200; XV, 293, 300-301; XVI, 124, 207-208.

⁶⁸See Commission's report on Palestine disturbances and British reply, *ibid.*, XVII, 137 ff.

⁶⁹Par. (b) of the Commission's Constitution and Art. 8 of its By-laws.

ministrations of the respective territories and are thus able to submit first-hand information to, as well as to receive direct suggestions from, the Commission.⁷⁰ Since discussions with administrators take place in secret and in an atmosphere of cordiality and confidence, every reason exists for a frank exchange of views.⁷¹ The attitude of the Commission toward the mandatory Governments was succinctly stated in its eighth report to the Council: "The task of the Commission is one of supervision and coöperation. It is its duty, when carefully examining the reports of the mandatory Powers, to determine how far the principles of the Covenant and of the Mandates have been truly applied in the administration of the different territories. But at the same time it is its duty to do the utmost that lies in its power to assist the mandatory Governments in carrying out the important and difficult tasks which they are accomplishing on behalf of the League of Nations, and on which they render reports to the Council."⁷² Representatives of the Mandatories have frequently expressed confidence in the Commission and appreciation of its efforts to aid them in their undertakings. Thus, Mr. Gys R. Hofmeyer, Administrator of South-West Africa, declared during the fourth session, following soon after a very searching investigation of conditions in the mandated territory: "We look upon the Commission as a co-worker in connection with the important duties we have to perform in South-West Africa, and we welcome with the greatest respect any resolution of the Commission which is of a constructive character and which will help us to improve on the methods we are adopting in connection with the difficult task we have to perform."⁷³ Again, Sir James Parr, High Commissioner for New Zealand in London, stated that "His conception of the relationship between the Mandates Commission and the mandatory Governments was one of partnership. There should be, and there would be between them, so far as he was able to control the matter, complete frankness and candor and a disclosure of all the facts with regard to the territory in question."⁷⁴

The results attending the Commission's activities have been due in a large measure to the intimate relationships thus maintained

⁷⁰Lists of official representatives are to be found in the initial pages of the Commission's *Minutes*.

⁷¹On the subject of secret meetings, see *P. M. C.*, III, 50; XII, 59ff.

⁷²*Ibid.*, VIII, 200-201.

⁷³*Ibid.*, IV, 42.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, XIII, 97. See also *ibid.*, IX, 109, 128; XI, 25; XIV, 57, 115.

with the administrators of the several territories. In the regular discussion of the annual reports, it has constantly kept before them the provisions of the Covenant and the mandate charters and the obligations imposed thereby. While not hesitating to criticize them when they fall short in the performance of duties,⁷⁵ the Commission has more often had occasion to commend them for their work.⁷⁶ The sanctions which it, as advisory body to the Council, employs are those which international organization under existing circumstances affords—conference, discussion, persuasion, publicity. The effect with which these have been applied may now be briefly examined.

III

THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION—NEGATIVE ASPECTS

The Mandates Commission is charged with seeing that the Mandatories discharge their obligations of a dual character: on the one hand, that they do not appropriate for their peculiar purposes the mandated territories or the resources thereof; on the other, that they foster the moral and material well-being of the inhabitants, directing administrative effort toward the ultimate goal of self-government.⁷⁷ The supervision exercised is thus both negative and positive in character, restraining certain tendencies while encouraging others. In a word, the Commission's duty is to guide the several Administrations along a path not always too clearly chartered by the Covenant and the mandate texts, pointing out dangers here, indicating possibilities of progress there.⁷⁸ With what degree of success has its work been performed? The variety and complexity of the subjects with which it has dealt during its eighteen sessions render generalizations exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, a study of its proceedings convinces one, in spite of the unevenness of the general impression received, that the Commission has discharged its functions most effectively. This conclusion is reached with regard to both negative and positive aspects of its supervision.

With respect to the former, the Commission has rendered an important service in resisting the tendency on the part of man-

⁷⁵See notes 121-26.

⁷⁶Examples are numerous. See Commission's reports to the Council, *passim*.

⁷⁷See statement of John H. Harris, quoted in *P. M. C.*, III, 217.

⁷⁸*Cf. Ibid.*, V, 17-18.

datory Governments to consider as their own property the territories entrusted to them.⁷⁹ Thanks to its efforts, a very clear distinction has been made and is being maintained between mandates and ordinary colonies.⁸⁰ From the beginning, it has scrutinized administrative arrangements in the territories to see that the principle of juridical and actual separateness is being observed. Thus, during its seventh session, it investigated the new customs union between Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo to make sure that the mandated territory was not being annexed to the Belgian colony.⁸¹ More lately, it has reviewed a projected union between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika to determine whether it would infringe the terms of the mandate.⁸² The Commission has also been alert to prevent the appropriation by the mandatory Powers of physical resources belonging to the territories. During the second session, for example, attention was directed to a decree, applicable to the Cameroons and Togoland under French administration, to the effect that vacant tracts of land would be regarded as the *domaine privé de l'Etat français*.⁸³ After a study of the issues involved, the Commission concluded that France was not sovereign, consequently that she could not assume ownership of the holdings in question.⁸⁴ The French Government agreed with this interpretation, stating that the phrase "domain of the state" would be taken to mean "land of the territory."⁸⁵ Another illustration arose in the course of the sixth session. A law had been passed by South Africa declaring that the railways and harbors of South-West Africa belonged to the Union "in full dominium." Members of the Commission were of the opinion that the pro-

⁷⁹South Africa has given the most trouble. It has been unusually reluctant to admit that the territory entrusted to its care is not an outright annexation. See *ibid.*, II, 92; VI, 59-61; X, 82-85, 182; XIV, 66; XV, 77-78; XVIII, 12, 204.

⁸⁰Its constructive influence is reflected in the ever-growing recognition that wherever sovereignty over the territories may reside it does not rest exclusively in the mandatory powers. See Wright, *op. cit.*, 338-39.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, VII, 55-56, 215. See also 1925 *Rapport du Ruanda-Urundi*, 7, 111-12.

⁸²P. M. C., XV, 103-07, 169-79, 201-04. The matter is still pending, *ibid.*, XVIII, 27, 201-02.

⁸³*Ibid.*, II, 23-25, 88-90.

⁸⁴See especially the memoranda of M. Van Rees, *ibid.*, III, 216-27, and of the Legal Section of the Secretariat, *ibid.*, IV, 163-68.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, IV, 22-23, 36-37; 1923 *Rapport du Cameroun*, 43; 1924 *Rapport du Togo*, 38.

vision violated the terms of the mandate charter and recommended that it be changed.⁸⁶ Tedious discussions with the Mandatory followed.⁸⁷ The Commission gradually stiffened its insistence,⁸⁸ and the act was finally amended as desired.⁸⁹

A further step in opposition to the political absorption of mandated territories has been taken by securing for their inhabitants a distinct national status. The importance of the matter was recognized at an early date,⁹⁰ the consensus of the Commission being, to employ the language of the Marquis Theodoli, that "it would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and the fundamental principles on which the institution of mandates is based, that the inhabitants of the areas in question should unconditionally be assimilated to the citizens or subjects of the mandatory Power."⁹¹ As a result of observations on the subject by the Commission,⁹² the Council adopted the following resolutions:

(1) The status of native inhabitants of mandated territory is distinct from that of the nationals of the mandatory Power and cannot be identified therewith by any process having general application.

(2) The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested with the nationality of the mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended to them.

(3) It is not inconsistent with (1) and (2) above that individual inhabitants of the mandated territory should voluntarily obtain naturalization from the mandatory Power in accordance with arrangements which it is open to such Power to make, with this object, under its own law.

(4) It is desirable that native inhabitants who receive the protection of the mandatory Power shall in each case be designated by some form of descriptive title which will specify their status under the mandate.⁹³

The Commission has been careful to satisfy itself that these principles are being observed. Little difficulty has arisen in respect to the A mandates. The people of Iraq are regarded as the sub-

⁸⁶1922 *Report on South-West Africa*, 1-2; *P. M. C.*, VI, 59-63, 178.

⁸⁷The Government of South Africa declared that it was impracticable to amend the act on account of the peculiarities of Roman-Dutch law. *Ibid.*, IX, 34-35, 42-44; XI, 176-77.

⁸⁸*Cf. Ibid.*, XIV, 72-78, 275; XV, 76-78, 275.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, XVIII, 130, 204. The Council has endorsed the Commission's attitude on sovereignty. *O. J.*, 1927, No. 7, 1,119-20.

⁹⁰*P. M. C.*, I, 45-46.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, II, 86-87.

⁹²*Idem.*, 65-74, *passim*.

⁹³*O. J.*, 1923, No. 6, 567-72, 604. These resolutions differed somewhat from the suggestions of the Commission but were essentially the same in principle. *P. M. C.*, III, 9.

jects of their own king;⁹⁴ the inhabitants of Syria⁹⁵ and Palestine⁹⁶ are accorded a similar, though somewhat inferior, position. As to the B and C territories, it appears that the rulings of the Council are generally accepted.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, a number of problems have recently arisen in connection with their application, leading the Commission to conduct a thorough review of the issues involved.⁹⁸

The Commission has also been instrumental in safeguarding the fiscal integrity of mandated territories. It has decided that in each case the finances of the mandate and of the Mandatory must be kept distinct.⁹⁹ Its fifth report to the Council declared that "if, as a result of incorporating the mandated territories with its neighboring colonies, the mandatory Power found it impossible to submit a report which would enable the Commission clearly to appreciate the nature and character of its mandatory administration, and in particular the work done to ensure the well-being of the populations under the mandate, such incorporation would *ipso facto* be incompatible with the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant."¹⁰⁰ To obviate this difficulty, separate budgets are maintained for most of the territories; where such cannot be conveniently drawn up, a system of computation has been devised to serve the same purpose.¹⁰¹ The financial administration of mandates must be disinterested. The views of the Commission in the present connection were tersely expressed by M. Rappard when he stated that "everyone agreed that a guardian could not use any of the wealth of the person under his charge in order to enrich himself."¹⁰² The Mandatory may not take advantage of its position to reap a profit from the trusteeship; only indirect ad-

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, X, 46, 50-51. For Iraq nationality law, see 1925 *Report on Iraq*, 162-65.

⁹⁵*P. M. C.*, VIII, 14; XVIII, 120-29. 1925 *Rapport de la Syrie*, 44-45.

⁹⁶*P. M. C.*, XIII, 41; 1925 *Report on Palestine*, 154-62.

⁹⁷See memorandum prepared by M. Van Rees, *P. M. C.*, XV, 276-79.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, XIV, 80-81, 274; XV, 25-27; XVI, 88, 128-32, 187-88. The Commission has also given much attention to the problem of military service in the territories. It has opposed the enlistment of native troops except for local defense purposes, thus emphasizing their distinct status. Van Rees, *op. cit.*, II, 170ff.

⁹⁹*P. M. C.*, I, 22-24; II, 14, 35-38, 45. See especially discussion concerning the Cameroons and Togoland under Great Britain, *ibid.*, III, 149, 160-61.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, V, 30, 190.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, X, 106; XVI, 99, 101; XVIII, 202.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, IX, 82.

vantages may be enjoyed.¹⁰³ Revenues collected from governmental enterprises within the territory must be credited to the local budget.¹⁰⁴ Conversely, the mandate may not be burdened with indebtedness which the mandatory Power should assume.¹⁰⁵

In keeping with the principle that the Mandatories may not utilize their authority unduly to further their interests in the territories, the A and B mandate texts contain provisions guaranteeing the open door—commercial and industrial equality, freedom of transit, equal treatment in the granting of concessions—to all member States of the League.¹⁰⁶ The Commission has undertaken to see that these principles are respected. During the third session, for instance, its members criticized a decree applying to the French Cameroons which appeared to accord preferential treatment to goods imported from France.¹⁰⁷ In deference to the opinion of the Commission, the objectionable parts of the measure were suppressed.¹⁰⁸ Later, an ordinance issued for Syria, levying a lighter duty on imports from France than from countries bordering on Germany, was amended on the recommendation of the Commission to conform to the terms of the mandate.¹⁰⁹ In the course of the ninth session, the Chairman called attention to an ordinance of Tanganyika which gave coasting vessels preferences over ocean-going vessels, and asked the accredited representative for explanations. He assured the Commission that nationals of all countries could engage freely in the coasting trade. Under these circumstances, the Commission decided that the principle of economic equality was not being violated.¹¹⁰ Action has also

¹⁰³Cf. statement of the Marquis Theodoli, *ibid.*, III, 174.

¹⁰⁴This principle has frequently been defended. For example, the investigations concerning the phosphate industry in the islands under Japanese mandate. *Ibid.*, III, 83-84; V, 15, 45-46, 195; XII, 52; XIV, 201-02, 242-43. Also as to South-West Africa, *supra*, notes 86-89.

¹⁰⁵*P. M. C.*, XI, 42; XII, 37, 138, 158-59. The Commission has also watched the loan policies of the Mandatories to prevent veiled annexation through this well known process. Cf. *ibid.*, III, 33-35, 60, 76-78, 197-99, 311-12; V, 178-80; VI, 156-58, 171-72; XI, 189-93.

¹⁰⁶See Benjamin Gerig, *The Open Door and the Mandates System* (1930), *passim*.

¹⁰⁷*P. M. C.*, III, 27, 314.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, IV, 20.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, V, 187. 1924 *Rapport de la Syrie*, 74. Discrimination in administration of tariff regulations is also being watched. *P. M. C.*, XIII, 172-74, 227; XV, 31-32, 185.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, IX, 147.

been taken to insure equal privileges in the matter of concessions. While provisions on the subject are found only in the mandates for Syria and the B territories, the Commission has investigated conditions in other regions to guard against abuses which would result from monopolies.¹¹¹ Recently, attention has been directed to the general question of discriminations to the advantage of the Mandatory in postal rates and in the purchase of public supplies for the territories. While no official conclusions have yet been reached by the Commission, the weight of opinion appears to be that present practices do not prejudice the rights of other States.¹¹²

IV

THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION—POSITIVE ASPECTS (POLITICAL)

It may thus be said that the Commission has drawn a clear line between mandates and colonies and has served as a barrier against appropriation of mandated territories or their resources by the mandatory Powers. Inquiry may now be made regarding the supervision of the Mandatories in the discharge of their positive obligations of trusteeship. Such obligations may for convenience be classified into two types—political and social.¹¹³ The former relate to the proper government of the territories, the latter to the general well-being of the inhabitants thereof. The Commission has held the Mandatories accountable for the administration of the mandates. It has insisted first of all that adequate staffs be employed to govern the territories. On several occasions, attention has been drawn to the importance of this requirement and the evils resulting from failure to respect it. Investigation of the revolt in Syria, for example, led the Commission to conclude:

The active and dominating rôle assumed by the mandatory Administration in the government of native states required, if collisions were to be avoided, that the officials who had to carry it out should possess high professional qualifications and intimate acquaintance with the

¹¹¹Cf. *ibid.*, III, 142-43; IV, 20; V, 144-45, 85; IX, 179-80; XII, 49, 156-57; XV, 83-84; XVIII, 80.

¹¹²On postal rates, see *ibid.*, XII, 67-69; XIII, 171-72; XVI, 131-33, 191-95, 201. On purchase of supplies, see *ibid.*, XII, 66-67, 169; XIII, 94-95; XVI, 148-56, 200-01.

¹¹³This classification, which must be somewhat arbitrary, has recently been employed by the Mandates Commission. *Ibid.*, XVII, 142.

country. But the staff which was at the disposal of the mandatory Administration for the most delicate and highest duties, even for those of state governors, did not constitute, owing to the diversity of its origin, a sufficiently coherent and experienced body of officials. This, again, appears to be beyond doubt, and the Commission is compelled to record it, though it is in no way blind to the difficulties of constituting a complete administration with a staff drawn from different sources, whose cohesion and unity have not been established by common traditions and common principles.¹¹⁴

These observations prompted an improvement of the administrative organization.¹¹⁵ The staff maintained in New Guinea has given the Commission some concern. During the examination of the 1923-1924 Report, members of the Commission noted that the local Administration appeared to be merely temporary, but they were assured that a permanent civil service was being established.¹¹⁶ Some time later, disorders broke out in the territory.¹¹⁷ An examination revealed the inability of the staff to deal with the situation, and led the Commission to insist that reorganization take place.¹¹⁸ Inadequacy of the military force in Palestine was an important factor in the Arab rising against Jews during August, 1929. The Commission had previously warned the Administration of the danger in excessive reduction of troops.¹¹⁹ A special investigation conducted by the Commission during its seventeenth session led to sharp criticism of the Mandatory for its failure to afford protection to life and property of persons under its care.¹²⁰

Not only must administrative staffs be sufficiently large and well trained; they must remain alert and active, taking whatever steps are necessary to maintain law and order in the territories. Even extreme measures should be used if conditions require them. Thus, it was said concerning the Syrian disturbances:

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, VIII, 206-07.

¹¹⁵*Cf.* 1927 *Rapport de la Syrie*, 32ff.

¹¹⁶*P. M. C.*, VI, 86-87, 179-80.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, XV, 45-49.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, XVIII, 52-53, 203.

¹¹⁹See especially, *ibid.*, IX, 217.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, XVII, 141-42. The Council has endorsed the Commission's report on the Palestine troubles. *Journal de Genève*, 9 Sept., 1930. Similar action has been taken by the Assembly. *Journal of the Eleventh Session of the Assembly*, No. 19, p. 375. The British Government has provided against the recurrence of disorders. *P. M. C.*, XVII, 143-44.

The Commission thinks it sufficient to point out that it is part of the duty of the mandatory Power to maintain order in the mandated territories. Although the execution of this duty may oblige it to adopt measures which are particularly painful when they are taken by a guardian against his ward, such measures are only defensible in so far as they are necessary for the restoration of peace and do not create unnecessary suffering or arouse justifiable resentment. In other words, it is desirable in Syria as in other mandated territories that the governing consideration in the conduct of operations of this kind should be to preserve moral authority of the mandatory free from all blemish and to do nothing which may compromise the future success of its policy.¹²¹

Laxness on the part of the Administration of Western Samoa in dealing with disorders caused by certain agitators has lately arrested the notice of the Commission. Commenting on the situation, M. Rappard remarked that "The mandatory Power was in the position of a tutor. A tutor who did not punish his ward when the ward was obviously insubordinate was not only too good a tutor, but was a bad tutor; he was not doing his duty."¹²² In reporting the matter to the Council, the Commission stated that it was "of the greatest importance that it should be clearly understood that the mandatory Power alone is responsible for maintaining law and order in accordance with the mandate."¹²³ When the question was reviewed further, members of the Commission found occasion to criticize the indecisive policy being followed and to emphasize the need for energy in dealing with those defying authority.¹²⁴ Apparently, the Administration is profiting from the Commission's recommendations.¹²⁵ Responsibility for the August, 1929, disturbances in Palestine has recently been placed directly upon the Mandatory. In a very bold report, the Commission has censured the Administration for pursuing a policy of inaction which prompted racial feelings, and for failure to adjust Arab-Jewish differences centering about the Wailing Wall which led to the outbreak.¹²⁶ Great Britain seemingly has accepted the

¹²¹*Ibid.*, VIII, 206.

¹²²*Ibid.*, XIII, 136.

¹²³*Idem.*, 230.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, XIV, 37-47, 274.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, XVI, 111, 119, 208.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, XVII, 137-46. The Mandates Commission rejected certain basic findings of the British Commission of Enquiry headed by Sir Walter Shaw. Cf. Cmd., 3,530 (March, 1930).

verdict with good grace and is inaugurating a more positive policy in the territory.¹²⁷

Effective government further demands guarantees against excesses of persons in authority. While the Commission favors "indirect administration" wherever possible¹²⁸—that is, government through native leaders—it insists that Mandatories exercise strict control over them to prevent abuses. During the first session, for instance, apprehension arose that district headmen in French Togoland were being allowed to exercise dangerous powers.¹²⁹ The Commission was subsequently assured that safeguards existed against arbitrary acts.¹³⁰ Again, in reviewing the 1928 Report on Tanganyika, M. Orts asked the accredited representative if chiefs, who seemed to possess very extensive authority, were adequately supervised. He was told that such was the case.¹³¹ The Commission has warned especially against allowing chiefs arbitrary powers to tax and to punish their subjects.¹³² Moreover, it has insisted that European officials in the territories be made fully accountable for their conduct. On several occasions, it has criticized arrangements which have appeared to allow irresponsible conduct on the part of administrators. Thus, the powers exercised by members of the South Seas Bureau in their control over the islands allocated to Japan have provoked discussion. During the fifth session, M. Palacios and the Marquis Theodoli observed that Bureau Chiefs were empowered to define and punish certain offenses. Might not oppression result from this practice?¹³³ The 1925 Report on the islands removed the apprehensions raised; it indicated that restraints were imposed on administrators and that the accused could, if he desired, demand a formal trial.¹³⁴ Likewise, broad legislative competence conferred on the Administrator of South-West Africa led members of the Commission to inquire into the manner of its exercise. It was shown that he

¹²⁷In spite of a pointed official reply to the Commission's criticisms (*P. M. C.*, XVII, 148-54), the British Government accepted them in good faith when the matter was considered by the Council and the Assembly. *Supra*, note 120.

¹²⁸*Cf. P. M. C.*, V, 27-28; IX, 140-41; XVIII, 25.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, I, 25; 1921 *Rapport du Togo*, Ch. VI.

¹³⁰*P. M. C.*, XI, 38.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, XV, 113-14.

¹³²*Cf. Ibid.*, XV, 69-70, 143-44, XVIII, 25.

¹³³*Ibid.*, V, 12-13; see also III, 80.

¹³⁴Pp. 26, 34.

always secured the consent of the Union Government before issuing proclamations, a provision which insured responsibility.¹³⁶ At a later date, the question was put whether local magistrates, who possessed considerable discretion in penal cases, could discriminate between natives and whites in assessing punishment. The Commission was told emphatically that such would not be allowed.¹³⁶ When administrative safeguards appear to have broken down, the Commission reserves the right to intervene and call administrators to account for their acts. The first resort to this procedure occurred during the third session when an inquiry was made of the Bondelzwarts revolt in South-West Africa. Although members of the Commission could not agree as to the justification of the severe action taken to suppress the outbreak, they did recommend remedial measures,¹³⁷ which were duly adopted.¹³⁸ The entire eighth session was devoted to a study of disorders in Syria and the policy of France in putting down the rebellion. The authority of France in the territory was upheld, but the failure of administrators to deal consistently and tactfully with the problem was condemned.¹³⁹

While maintaining stable government and insuring just treatment of indigenous populations, the Mandatories are obligated to develop native political institutions. Members of the Commission have repeatedly pointed out that the purpose of the mandates system is to prepare backward peoples ultimately to stand alone.¹⁴⁰ It has been agreed that their evolution should take place within the framework of their tribal organizations, which are gradually to be purged of imperfections and adapted to the needs of modern life.¹⁴¹ Training in self-government can best be given by permitting their leaders, so far as possible, to participate in administration.¹⁴² The extent of such participation, of course, must vary among the several territories according to local conditions. Thus since the inhabitants of the islands entrusted to Japan are quite

¹³⁶*P. M. C.*, III, 102; XV, 62-63.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, IV, 80. For similar investigations, *ibid.*, III, 93-94; IV, 95; IX, 96-98; XIV, 52-53; XV, 33, 143-45.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, III, 117-25, 183-87, 203.

¹³⁸1924 *Report on South-West Africa*, 21; *P. M. C.*, IV, 52-55; VI, 62.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, VIII, *passim*, especially 200-08.

¹⁴⁰This objective is stated in Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

¹⁴¹*P. M. C.*, V, 66-67; IX, 61, 140-41.

¹⁴²F. D. Lugard, *op. cit.*, Chapters X and XI; R. L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, I, 717 ff.

backward in their development, their chiefs are allowed to perform inferior clerical duties only.¹⁴³ Likewise, the natives of New Guinea are on a low plane of civilization; their leaders therefore have been delegated very limited powers in the villages.¹⁴⁴ In Nauru, the native adult population is permitted to elect chiefs, who are entrusted by the Administration with the maintenance of order, the performance of tasks connected with local government, and the punishment of offenses of a minor character.¹⁴⁵ Among the islands under mandate, Western Samoa has the widest range of native self-government. Councils of chiefs, or Fonos of Faipules, have been given legislative status to deal with matters of purely native interest.¹⁴⁶ In South-West Africa, race contact has undermined indigenous institutions. But inspired largely by the solicitude of the Mandates Commission, the Mandatory is making efforts to draw together the scattered tribal remnants and bring them again under the sway of their chiefs.¹⁴⁷ In Tanganyika, a beginning has also been made toward the restoration of tribal life, clans with their own courts and treasuries having been organized.¹⁴⁸ The Cameroons and Togoland under British and French supervision have councils of notables, or chiefs, associated with the respective Administrations and exercising considerable tribal authority.¹⁴⁹ Ruanda and Urundi, with their native sultans wielding extensive powers, afford an example of indirect administration at its best.¹⁵⁰ Because of opposition by the Arabs of Palestine to what they consider half-way measures proposed by the British,

¹⁴³"It is the intention of the Government to appoint natives to higher positions as they advance in knowledge and experience." 1925 *Report on Islands under Japan*, 100-01. See also 1926 *Report*, 20-21; 1927 *Report*, 13; *P. M. C.*, III, 81, and VII, 78.

¹⁴⁴1921-22 *Report on New Guinea*, 40; 1926 *Report*, 7; 1927 *Report*, 28-29; *P. M. C.*, III, 170; V, 131; IX, 23; XI, 46.

¹⁴⁵1927 *Report on Nauru*, 30-31; *P. M. C.*, XI, 20.

¹⁴⁶1924 *Report on Western Samoa*, 4; 1925 *Report*, 8; 1926-27 *Report*, 3-4. *P. M. C.*, X, 23; XII, 112.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, III, 103; IV, 80; V, 18-19; VI, 58-59, 63; VII, 8; XI, 93. 1925 *Report on South-West Africa*, 109; 1927 *Report*, 43-44.

¹⁴⁸1925 *Report on Tanganyika*, 6-16; 1927 *Report*, 8-13, 95ff. *P. M. C.*, XVIII, 17.

¹⁴⁹Cf. 1927 *Rapport du Togo*, 40-41; 1927 *Rapport du Cameroun*, 30-31; 1927 *Report on British Togoland*, 6-17; 1927 *Report on British Cameroons*, 7-23.

¹⁵⁰1925 *Rapport du Ruandu-Urundi*, 6-16; 1927 *Rapport*, 8-13, 95 ff. *P. M. C.*, IX, 103.

the national government of that country remains in the hands of the High Commissioner and his official staff.¹⁵¹ However, village councils are named by the inhabitants and exercise some important local powers.¹⁵² An autonomous government has been set up in Transjordan.¹⁵³ The French in Syria, after long delay and numerous set-backs, have recently promulgated an Organic Law in keeping with the terms of the mandate. It is, of course, problematic whether the new arrangements will be adapted to the demands of the people and the needs of the country.¹⁵⁴ Iraq, with its native king and parliament, who are merely assisted by British advisors, is politically the most advanced of the mandated territories.¹⁵⁵ Steps toward granting it complete independence and admission to the League are now being taken.¹⁵⁶

V

THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION—POSITIVE ASPECTS
(SOCIAL)

In addition to the political responsibilities assumed by the Mandatories are obligations which may be described as social in character. Article 22 of the League Covenant requires the mandatory Powers to promote "the well-being and development" of peoples "not yet able to stand alone" who have been placed in their charge. Through the influence of the Mandates Commission, this injunction has been reduced to concrete terms and made to apply in the several territories.¹⁵⁷ Its members have frequently

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, V, 65; VII, 110-12; XV, 79; 1920-21 *Report on Palestine*, 47-50; 1927 *Report*, 96. The Commission has recently been very insistent that institutions of self-government be established. *P. M. C.*, XVII, 142-43.

¹⁵²1925 *Report*, 91-92. Certain reforms are contemplated. *P. M. C.*, XV, 86-87. The basic difficulty in respect to developing governmental institutions for Palestine is the rivalry of Arabs and Jews and especially the intransigence of the former. Cf. *ibid.*, V, 56, 97-98, 121-22; XIV, 247, 276.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, XIII, 42-45, 48-49, 226; XV, 101, 262-72.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, XVIII, 120-28 for statement of M. Henri Ponsot, the High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon. On the problem of establishing satisfactory government in Syria, see *ibid.*, V, 105-06, VIII, 174-78; XI, 140-45; XIII, 183-84.

¹⁵⁵1923-24 *Report on Iraq*, 5-28; 1927 *Report*, 7-21; *P. M. C.*, X, 45-54; XVI, 23-29.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, XVI, 31-32, 137-42, 144-48, 203; XVIII, 11-12, 170-74.

¹⁵⁷For implications of the principle, see statement of M. Yanaghita, *ibid.*, III, 279-88; Wright, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII; Van Rees, *op. cit.*, II, Deuxième Partie, Ch. III.

pointed out that local officials must not content themselves with merely maintaining law and order in the regions administered, but they must also advance the moral and material welfare of the natives.¹⁵⁸ Among the more significant questions with which the Commission has dealt are the following: (1) The guarantee of native land titles and tribal integrity; (2) The protection of natives from slavery and unjust conditions of labor; (3) The elimination of evils arising from the liquor traffic, and the promotion of public health; (4) The extension of educational opportunity in keeping with the requirements of each people.¹⁵⁹

No aspect of the trust obligation assumed by the Mandatories is of greater importance than that of safeguarding native land interests. The existence of any sort of tribal society is obviously dependent on a stable land régime.¹⁶⁰ Fully aware of abuses existing in the past, the Commission has carefully scrutinized conditions in the several territories to make sure that similar evils do not arise within them.¹⁶¹ During the third session, M. Van Rees submitted a detailed memorandum analyzing regulations in representative B and C mandates. He found, in general, that adequate protection is afforded natives respecting both ownership and alienation of their holdings.¹⁶² Special problems, however, have appeared in certain of the territories. Thus, during the fourth session, Sir Frederick Lugard noted that the Tanganyika Land Ordinance of 1923 apparently endangered native titles.¹⁶³ The matter was discussed again during the ninth session, leading

¹⁵⁸See criticism of *laissez faire* policy in the British Cameroons, especially comments of the Marquis Theodoli, M. Rappard, and M. Van Rees, *P. M. C.*, V, 19; VII, 42. Also M. Rappard's very pointed comments on lack of positive policy for the natives of South-West Africa, *ibid.*, XIV, 101-04. During the sixth session, the Commission had various official representatives state their programs, which, for the most part, evidenced full understanding of their mission. *Ibid.*, VI, 21-27, 75-77, 84-85. It is customary for such representatives to open the examination of their reports with a statement concerning general policy followed during the year.

¹⁵⁹For fuller discussion, see Van Maanen-Helmer, *op. cit.*, Chapters VIII and X; Wright, *op. cit.*, Chapter XV; Rolin, "La Pratique des mandats internationaux," cited.

¹⁶⁰G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Peace Conference* (1923), 27, 35-37; Lindley, *op. cit.*, 338 ff; Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, I, 750 ff.

¹⁶¹On exploitation of native lands see E. D. Morel, *The Black Man's Burden* (1920), Chapter IX; Lindley, *op. cit.*, Chapters II-IX.

¹⁶²*P. M. C.*, III, 227-36.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, IV, 106-08.

to amendment of the ordinance in compliance with the Commission's desires.¹⁶⁴ Again, the lease of native holdings in Nauru to the British Phosphate Company provoked serious apprehensions in the Commission. An investigation, however, revealed that the interests of the indigenous population were being respected.¹⁶⁵ The danger of encroachment by white planters upon the holdings of natives in certain territories has recently given the Commission much concern.¹⁶⁶ While apparently approving systems of reserves, as found in South-West Africa, it has insisted that they shall not serve as a cloak to further white colonization to the detriment of the natives.¹⁶⁷ A solution of this problem is of pressing importance.¹⁶⁸ Of especial value respecting the maintenance of tribal integrity have been the results achieved by the Commission in rectifying frontiers of several territories to prevent the breaking up of clans and families. The best-known example was the adjustment at the instance of the Commission of the boundary between Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Uganda in order that people of the Batutsi and Bahutu races who had been divided by the Orts-Miller agreement of 1921 could be reunited.¹⁶⁹ In several other cases, similar steps have been taken in behalf of the natives.¹⁷⁰

Aided by a representative of the International Labor Office, the Commission has attacked the problems of slavery and unfair conditions of labor in the territories. An initial survey of condi-

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, IX, 151; XI, 83-85; 1926 *Report on Tanganyika*, 84; 1927 *Report*, 69-70.

¹⁶⁵1924 *Report on Nauru*, 12-13; *P. M. C.*, V, 146.

¹⁶⁶In New Guinea, *ibid.*, XI, 204; XVIII, 65-76. In Tanganyika, *ibid.*, XVIII, 18, 22, 202. In Ruanda-Urundi, *ibid.*, XIV, 128, 134-35, 272. In the French Cameroons, *ibid.*, XV, 141, 148. The problem of Jewish immigration and land settlement in Palestine is one of the most difficult of all those confronting the Mandatories. See *ibid.*, V, 58, 78-79; VII, 167-68, 176-77; XI, 130-32, 207-08, 212; XVII, 142.

¹⁶⁷On the question of native reserves, *ibid.*, IV, 63-64, 91, 113; VI, 30, 178; IX, 76-77, 136; XI, 83-85; XV, 54.

¹⁶⁸Several other matters have been dealt with by the Commission in relation to this general question—for example, individual ownership of lands by natives, and improved agricultural production.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, I, 29; II, 96-100; VII, 65. Second Report of the Commission to the Council, 5-6. The negotiations of Belgium and Great Britain are recorded in Cmd. 1974 (1923).

¹⁷⁰The British and French mandates on the west coast of Africa, Tanganyika and Kenya, South-West Africa and Angola, and others.

tions in B and C areas, made by Mr. Grimshaw of the Labor Office, indicated that the slave traffic was strictly forbidden under severe penalties in all. But the institution of slavery, especially of the domestic type, existed on a wide scale. He recommended that there should be no official recognition of its status and that Governments should adopt measures gradually to bring about its abolition.¹⁷¹ The Commission has kept the question before the administrators, who from the outset have confronted it conscientiously and effectively.¹⁷² The labor problem has involved greater difficulties. With respect to labor requisitioned for public services, the Commission has been faced with the task of reconciling the terms of the mandate charters with needs and practices in the territories. Exhaustive studies have been made by Mr. Grimshaw and M. Van Rees, who, while not agreeing on all points at issue, have concluded that abuses must be avoided.¹⁷³ The tax or prestation system of French Togoland and the French Cameroons,¹⁷⁴ labor levies imposed in Syria¹⁷⁵ and Ruanda-Urundi,¹⁷⁶ and compulsory labor exacted by native chiefs in various territories¹⁷⁷ have been surveyed to determine their legality and their effect on native workers. As yet, differences of view among members of the Commission have prevented the adoption of guiding principles, except of a very general character.¹⁷⁸ However, the work of the Committee of Experts on Native Labor, appointed by the Labor Office and containing members of the Mandates Commission, and the resulting convention on forced labor may be regarded as a much-needed step toward the establishment of authoritative standards.¹⁷⁹ The Commission has also devoted much attention to the question of private contract labor, dealing with a wide range of subjects in this connection. Thus, it has examined conditions of recruitment to see that adequate regulations exist to

¹⁷¹*P. M. C.*, IV, 148-50. See also *ibid.*, V, 181-184.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, III, 44, 156, 164; V, 19-22, 182-83; VI, 67, 129, 176; VII, 39; IX, 65, 104, 217.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, VII, 154-56; X, 118-19, 164-72.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, VI, 16-21, 173.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, VIII, 26-30, 122-23, 199; XIII, 177.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, VII, 65-68, 216; IX, 104-06, 219; XII, 148.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, VII, 42-44, 215; IX, 142-45; X, 97-100; XII, 77-78.

¹⁷⁸See, for instance, debate reported in *ibid.*, VI, 47-50; VII, 197-207. It is agreed that excessive demands must not be made on the native labor supply, but the application of the principle must vary with local conditions. *Ibid.*, XIV, 132, 272; XV, 61, 136.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, XII, 186-89.

protect the workers.¹⁸⁰ It has studied requirements for compulsory cultivation found in certain territories to make sure that they do not involve evil consequences.¹⁸¹ Hours of labor and conditions of employment have been questions of recurring interest.¹⁸² The need for enacting labor codes, especially in the A territories where the industrial system is just beginning to appear, has been emphasized.¹⁸³ The Commission's work in regard to labor conditions, while not marked by striking accomplishments, due largely to uncertainty concerning principles to be applied, has nevertheless discouraged abuses and stimulated liberal policies.

One of the most difficult tasks confronting the Commission has been to define the clauses of Article 22 and the mandate charters relating to the liquor traffic. After long and tedious study, it has arrived at interpretations reconciling conflicting principles and has devised a nomenclature which apparently meets both legal and practical requirements.¹⁸⁴ Through its efforts, liquor smuggling, particularly from the French into the British mandates of the west coast of Africa, has been reduced.¹⁸⁵ Lately, it has pointed out the danger of increased imports into B and C territories, leading to a redoubling of efforts of control.¹⁸⁶ Besides combatting the evils of alcoholism, the Commission has promoted better health conditions among the natives. Attention has frequently been called to the presence of sleeping sickness, tropical fever, venereal diseases, and other ailments which threaten to wipe out large sections of the populations, and administrators urged to take proper preventive measures.¹⁸⁷ A good illustration of the value of this procedure occurred during the fourth session when the 1923

¹⁸⁰For instance, practices in New Guinea have recently been studied and found to be generally satisfactory. *Ibid.*, XVIII, 64-71, 203. The recruitment of Chinese laborers for Western Samoa has been carefully watched. *Ibid.*, XIV, 53. The problem in South-West Africa is one of great difficulty. *Ibid.*, XIV, 104-05, 274, 278.

¹⁸¹As in Ruanda-Urundi, *ibid.*, VII, 65, 216; IX, 105; XII, 147.

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, III, 174; V, 14, 184; VII, 82-83; IX, 14, 71.

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, VII, 117-19; VIII, 28-29; IX, 176-77; XI, 125, 154; XII, 39-41; XV, 194; XVI, 40; XVIII, 117.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*, III, 256-61; IV, 145-47, 180-81; VII, 87-91, 154, 205; X, 79-82, 175-76, 181-82; XIII, 213.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, II, 25; III, 76; IV, 134-38; V, 24, 37, 191; VI, 31-34, 107-09; VII, 46; XII, 95; XIII, 214; XV, 150-51, 152.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, XI, 30-31, 37, 202; XII, 155-56; XIII, 85; XIV, 273, 280; XV, 126, 150; XVI, 86, 206; XVIII, 99-100.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, III, 311; IV, 105-06; V, 39-40, 191; XVI, 48-50.

Report on South-West Africa was examined. It appeared that a very heavy mortality rate existed among the Ovambos in the diamond mines of Luderitz.¹⁸⁸ In its report to the Council, the Commission drew attention to conditions and asked for additional information.¹⁸⁹ At the sixth session, further investigation ensued, and the Government of South Africa was criticized for its failure to act.¹⁹⁰ The commission's efforts soon bore fruit. The next session, it learned that through the adoption of remedial measures the death rate had been greatly reduced—from 120 per thousand in 1924 to 30 per thousand in 1925.¹⁹¹ Through the Commission's influence, increased sums are being expended on public health,¹⁹² and medical services are being expanded and improved.¹⁹³

The Mandatories are under a further obligation to advance the general culture of the natives. Only through the process of education can backward peoples be led ultimately to the point where they may stand alone. The Commission has contributed much to this undertaking, especially in respect to the B and C territories. Through its efforts, confusion of policies has been avoided and educational effort directed toward definite ends. In lieu of the old type of literary education which often created an élite class of misfits in the native community, it has brought about the introduction of practical methods to prepare students for every-day living.¹⁹⁴ In its ninth report to the Council, the Commission stated that it was "of the opinion that by character training and discipline, the teaching of agriculture, animal husbandry, arts and crafts, and elements of hygiene, the keynote of educational policy, the gradual civilization of the native populations as well as the economic development of the countries will be furthered in the best possible manner." It therefore commended this system of

¹⁸⁸1923 *Report on South-West Africa*, 58-59.

¹⁸⁹*O. J.*, 1924, No. 10, 1413.

¹⁹⁰*P. M. C.*, VI, 69-70, 178.

¹⁹¹*Ibid.*, VII, 146-47. Health conditions in the mines of South-West Africa have recently let to further investigation. *Ibid.*, XIV, 106, 274; XV, 71, 235; XVIII, 139, 204.

¹⁹²In some territories, present expenditures on health are apparently satisfactory; in others, the contrary is true. Cf. *ibid.*, XVIII, 39, 45, 75, 100, 119.

¹⁹³The problem of recruiting medical staffs for the territories has lately commanded considerable attention. *Ibid.*, XIV, 227-29, 265-67; XV, 238-39, 158-62.

¹⁹⁴See the memorandum of Mme. Wicksell, *ibid.*, IV, 183-84.

education to the Mandatories as "particularly suitable to the conditions of life among backward peoples."¹⁹⁵ The recommendation has been accepted and is being put into effect.¹⁹⁶ The Commission has also been concerned with the problem of extending educational opportunity as far as practicable. It has stimulated the opening of new schools and the enrollment of additional pupils.¹⁹⁷ It has dealt with the recruiting and training of teaching staffs to meet the needs of the various communities, a question which must be solved before desired headway can be made.¹⁹⁸ It has encouraged government aid to missions, which for many years have been doing pioneering work in native education.¹⁹⁹ Under its influence, curricula are being standardized, central control increased, and general administrative efficiency promoted.²⁰⁰ Through its efforts, increased sums are being appropriated for school purposes.²⁰¹ Measured by Western standards, the educational systems of the mandated territories remain backward; nevertheless, improvements which are being made afford reasons for encouragement.

The Permanent Mandates Commission emerges from this survey as a unique organ of great value and promise. Composed of impartial colonial experts drawn from eleven States members of the League, it is dealing comprehensively and effectively with the numerous problems relating to the government of the territories under mandate. The principle of trusteeship of backward races—a vague concept commonly utilized to cloak and justify sheer imperialism—is through the Commission's efforts becoming the basis of a system of international jurisprudence and administration which fully recognizes native rights and interests for the first

¹⁹⁵*O. J.*, 1924, No. 10, 1405.

¹⁹⁶*P. M. C.*, IV, 21; V, 51; VI, 24, 36, 90, 111, 174; IX, 93-94, 148; X, 114-15; XI, 28-29, 55; XII, 119-20, 203.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, III, 28; VII, 119; IX, 177; X, 102; XI, 102-03; XII, 78, 202.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*, V, 26, 92, 111, 191; VII, 25, 48, 69; IX, 88, 107, 219; XI, 103, 126; XVI, 45.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, VI, 132; VII, 69-70; IX, 148-49, 219.

²⁰⁰*Ibid.*, III, 29, 111; IV, 22; V, 139; VI, 72-73, 178; IX, 74, 218; XIII, 31, 229.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*, IV, 104; VI, 178; IX, 41, 88, 220; XII, 201-02; XIII, 73; XV, 126, 148-50; XVIII, 37, 72, 74, 118, 135-36, 141.

time. In its relations with the mandatory Powers, the Commission has clearly demonstrated the preponderating force of ideas in international affairs. Although constituted as a mere advisory body to the Council and lacking those sanctions rigorously required by lawyers of the Austinian school, its ability to discover, discuss, and publish facts has enabled it to exercise wide control over the entire mandatory régime. Armed only with information, it has required "sovereign" States to render full account respecting the discharge of their international obligations. The early years of its existence have served to develop principles and procedure and to test its authority. Under all normal conditions, the immediate future should witness an intensification of its activities and an increase of its influence.²⁰²

²⁰²The Commission's very energetic report on recent conditions in Palestine, which was duly endorsed by the Council, is evidence of its determination to take a more positive attitude toward the discharge of mandatory obligations, and of the increased respect with which future decisions may be received. *Supra*, note 120.

THE SOPHISTIC CHARACTER OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION¹

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Long ago Socrates used to contrast his own manner of thinking with that of the sophists. He stood for exact definitions, a detailed and searching analysis of things, and a positive knowledge of any program before it was acted upon. What he sought was the real meaning of things, sure knowledge that reached the form of certainty. In contrast with this the sophistic manner was that of the trickster. The sophists merely adopted the mannerisms and definitions of the public conventions, discovered the rules by which they operated, and propounded them to clever youths who could thereby exploit the public. Their criterion of truth was convention; their ideal of life was practicality; and their tool was eloquence. They saw at once the mighty magic of words, and they were not slow to make use of it. Socrates would be carried away neither by the magic of words nor by the persuasiveness of eloquence nor by the love of the immediately practical. He stood four-square for a searching definition of real truth, for a penetration beyond convention, and for an analysis beyond mere practicality. Neither the plaudits nor the censures of the multitude could shake him in the conviction that truth was more than popular agreement and that goodness was more than practical success.

But while he ploughed deep he did not rid the world of the sophistic manner. It has appeared in every age. Its characteristic method is to seize on some popular word, use it as an explanation of all things, and seek individual success under its banner. Thus the sophists of the Eighteenth Century made use of the word *nature*. Whatever one wanted to do in the way of revolution, acquisition of private property, etc., one could defend in terms of a natural right. In our own age the sophist has again become the teacher. In our education as in other fields of life, we are bewitched by catchwords. By them we explain all things, evaluate all ends, and judge all people. The first of these we shall call the notion of learning by doing.

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I

We Learn to Do by Doing

America is primarily a materialistic country. Its characteristic method of thinking is motor, and its criterion of success is physical comfort. The things we admire are the things that are pleasing to the eye, to the ear, and to the palate. Witness the vast interest in the automobile and the airplane, in the radio and the victrola, in the moving picture and the newspaper, and in games and athletics. This methodology of a material age is reflected everywhere in the school room. Education must have a practical reference; its method must be doing; and its material must be concrete. From the elementary school to the university the *credo* of educational philosophy is to learn by doing. The principles of civics must be learned by setting up and acting out a miniature court, legislature, assembly, or cabinet; geography by exploration of the countryside; economics by visits to factories; agriculture through hoeing the garden or caring for the pig; ethics through observation of student behavior. Now one might be facetious and inquire how under such a method one would learn about the assassination of Lincoln, the Whiskey Rebellion, or the Battle of Waterloo, but one would not thereby gain a point. What is needed is an inquiry into the nature of learning.

Learning by doing is essentially a trial and error learning.² Things learned in this manner are limited to the present. Such procedure is the starting point of all knowledge, but it should not be the place where it ends. In proportion as learning becomes efficient doing ceases. So the reverse of this method might properly be said to be true: that in so far as we are truly educated we learn by not doing—but substituting insight for action.

Like all catchwords, there is an element of truth in the "learning by doing" phrase. It is true that motor learning is the beginning of all knowledge; it is true that perception is the final test

²I am aware that the school of functional psychology gives a broad enough interpretation of motor learning to include what is called the abstract. It distinguishes between implicit and explicit motor behavior. This paper is not interested in the subtle and on the whole satisfactory distinctions of a small group of psychologists, but in the widespread application of a theory. The pedagogical application of the motor theory is to make it synonymous with learning by direct experience. It is in this sense that the phrase "motor learning" is employed.

of all knowledge. In a sense all reflective knowledge grows out of and refers back to immediate, motor experience. But a method of learning which is confined entirely to acting and to the concrete would be extremely narrow and unsatisfactory. The important things in life are not those that can be seen with the eye or felt with the hand. In a great trial before the Supreme Court of the United States, for example, it is not the visible machinery of the court,—its rules of order, its number of judges, its stenographers,—that is significant. The things that are important are the history and customs of people, their philosophy of law, the psychology of human nature. And these things can be apprehended only in the abstract. For their proper understanding insight, not activity, is demanded; for their learning principles, not objects, need to be presented. Education is really the business of learning not to do—of seeing relations that are not given, and of grasping meanings that are not present. Experience with the concrete and active is important but a thing may be important in one sense and not in another.

We may say that if it is the business of education to train people in those things which they are unable to learn themselves, then motor learning is unimportant. People acquire that sort of learning far better through their own experience than through formal teaching in the class room. On the other hand, he who would be truly educated, he who would understand not only what he perceives in the world but also what he can conceive—systems of law, principles of mathematics, theories of religion, philosophies of life—must be trained by the non-doing, abstract method so that his range of understanding may encompass the past, the present, and the future. He must learn to live in the Platonic realm of flight as well as in the cave.

The concrete doing method of learning is thus unsatisfactory for three reasons: (1) it fails to develop the intellectual and abstract side of life which can be developed only through formal instruction; (2) it spends endless time and energy on things which pupils already know (that is, things are monotonously repeated in school and college which students have already effectively acquired in their own experience); (3) it gives a false emphasis on the practical. It leads people to believe that the practical life can be divorced from the theoretical and treated by itself. It also encourages the notion that the only worth while practise in the world is motor action and thus would deprive us

of interest and enjoyment in those intellectual things which have no direct (i. e., motor) reference. The catchword is popular because it is easy to teach by the doing method, because it is easy to demonstrate one's ware's before one's employers, and because students have no difficulty in learning. At bottom it rests either on the theory that all worthwhile things are physical activity or on the supposition that an interest in and knowledge of intellectual things can be developed by a mere repetition of the motor from which they originate. Both assumptions are false. No individual, save an automaton, lives without theory. In so far as he plans at all—plans to go to school, to buy goods, to repair an instrument, to deliver a lecture, to entertain friends—he is a theorist. And these theoretical principles have rules, implications, and values of their own which can never be acquired by a mere repetition of the motor behavior from which they spring. They need to be studied in their own right, and in view of their importance, of the great pleasure and delight which they give, and of the difficulty of acquiring them, the business of formal education should be principally with them.

II

Personal Contact

No statement is more on the lips of educators than the notion that personal contact and socialization should pervade the school room.³ Recitations should be socialized, pupils should play coöperatively, and the relation between pupils and teachers and teachers and pupils should be a personal one. It is said that teachers do not know their pupils well enough; it is argued that recitations lack the personal touch; and it is believed that where there is no coöperation and no personal touch there is no sound learning. In a sentimental and flamboyant sort of way we get highly excited over these things, and even in a genuine philosophy of education they would be considered useful—with restrictions—but we must not confuse the Socratic with the sophistic attitude.

Social organization is a fact of life—just as is breathing. It is not necessary to teach it; we just experience it. The great question is, what sort of social organization is possible and desirable, what sort of values do we desire our social organization

³It is true that the personal contact phrase pervades the whole of American society, but this paper is interested in only the educational side.

to achieve? Even coöperative socialization does not settle the matter; for the principles and forms of coöperation itself need classification. For some decades now the most powerful economic systems in the world have been battling over this very point. Both capitalism and socialism assert that they believe in the greatest good for the greatest number, i. e., in a coöperative ideal. But one insists that this means that each should be let alone as much as possible, that each should be rewarded according to his ability to secure, and that the least possible social regulation should be had; the other insists that no one should be let alone, that each should be rewarded according to his needs or his services to society, and that maximum possible social regulation is the best. If one will read the literature of these two great rival theories carefully, one will learn well the lesson concerning the difficulty of defining ends and means with respect to social ideals.

It is a lesson, however, which recent educational philosophy has not learned. It seems to believe that personal contact and emphasis on social *form* is the end to be achieved. Now it is quite obvious that a high degree of *coöperative organization* is compatible with a very low degree of real coöperation. A great many business organizations advertise "service first," but they behave in another manner before their board of directors. The widespread cheap and gaudy socialization of business form and the equally widespread exploitation that accompanies it have been commented upon too often to be mentioned here. We have a formal socialization of our charities, of our sports, and of our law. But what happens? If we take our attitude toward law as an example, we are fundamentally a nation of hypocrites. In the name of society we forbid birth-control, but everybody practices it without shame. We speak of the duty of paying taxes and of rendering our property accurately, but everyone pays as little as possible. We talk of the self-determination of peoples, but we visit Nicaragua. It is not implied that birth-control, economy in taxes, and imperialism are wrong, but simply that they are at variance with a professed social form. On the other hand, an individual can have a back-slapping, hand-shaking, service-shouting intimacy with every individual in the country, can join all the clubs, sit on all the committees, wave all the flags, and still remain an egoist of the highest order. A community or a nation can do likewise.

It is also obvious that a low degree of coöperative form is compatible with a high degree of real coöperation. Genuine coöperation does not imply that people must always be together—joining clubs, sitting on meetings, and simulating an interest in everyone's intimate affairs. It does not require that the relation of each to the other shall be all inclusive. Privacy, meditation, and solitude are highly valuable, and the best of friends demand them on occasion. He who is intimate with everyone never secures these values. He is really intimate with no one—not even himself. Coöperation does not, therefore, imply togetherness. Neither does it signify sameness. It does mean that we should respect the wishes, tastes, beliefs, and philosophies of others even when they differ from our own. The gist of a coöperative principle would imply that people work out their ends themselves, and this means that we are frequently called upon to recognize and tolerate differences not only of tastes and opinions but of fundamental philosophies. The get-together spirit, the pep, the drive, the contact-man, while they may be desirable as means for the promotion of certain coöperative ideals for some people, are obnoxious and vulgar for others who have purposes just as idealistic.

It is true that a teacher should know his pupil sufficiently well to impart to him the information he is supposed to impart, just as a physician should know his patient to the extent that he can effect a cure. But neither the student-teacher nor the physician-patient relation is an inclusive one. Whatever intimacy or personal contact there is, extraneous considerations aside, depend entirely on their conduciveness to the particular and definite problem in question. In the case of a teacher, the ability to arouse an interest in the student for a subject never can and never should depend solely on the instructor. Instructional content should be that which a society admires and approves. If it takes a great pride in good speech and good literature, a boy who is reared in its environment will, simply by virtue of being there, be subjected to influence favorable to acquiring the desired qualities. A social environment through praise and condemnation, through imitation and competition, and the like, do far more to create an interest in what is taught in a school room than does an instructor. Hence the teacher is not alone responsible for what his pupil learns, and his relation to him is not inclusive. He is not required, as a teacher, to hobnob with him or to be on terms of intimacy with him. And if he carries his personal contact and

coöperative play and socialized recitation too far he is likely to disgust and harden the most sensitive and enlightened of his charges.

III

Making Things Interesting

Another catchword which is extremely popular today is the notion that only those things should be taught which can be made interesting. We shall call this the fad of "making things interesting." There are those who assert that we should study the child's native interest and teach only those things that draw them out. He should be permitted to expand. Full and complete development rather than repression is the aim, and the false assumption that the child is to be taught obedience for its own sake is to be forever abolished. He should be taught to obey spontaneously, or not at all. Moreover, the entire educational theory which presupposes the principle that the man is father to the child and which accordingly seeks to develop good citizens by inculcating adult ideals and methods approaches the problem from the wrong side. The child's nature should grow out of his native equipment, and his native equipment is interpreted as that which appeals to his interest. He is preëminently an end in himself, with a life of his own to live. He should be permitted to live that life, and the only supervision which should be exercised upon him and the only subjects which should be taught him would be only those that have an immediate appeal. Negatively, great care should be exercised in not introducing extra-childhood methods and ends. If it is found necessary to introduce any discipline or learning that prepares primarily for adult life, it should be of such a character as not to hinder the child's intrinsic development. The old school room discipline with its repressed quietness is gone. Now everything is noise and bustle; for every child is astir, carrying on his own activities and developing his own personality. The old uniform book problems, hard to solve and uninteresting to the pupils, have also gone. In their stead is substituted a variety of things calculated to appeal to the native interests of each particular child. Manual arts, concrete subjects, plays and games are far more appealing and instructive than the formal method of studying the three "r's"; talking, inquiring, laughing, and moving about are far more wholesome than uniform quiet,

produced by suppression. In short, the modern child finds in the school room a kingdom of heaven rather than a prison.

Now it is only in theory, not in practice, that the native interest argument has any force. And its theoretical power is not new, for many educational theories of the past have advocated it. Plato thought he was appealing to the native interest when he pointed to an intellectual aristocracy in which the majority of men would be mere toilers. The Stoic nature drew one aloof from the world to engage in rational contemplation. In Rome it was natural to be a good citizen of the Empire. In Germany Hegel argued that man discovered his natural self only when he freely submitted himself to the state. When history reveals such an astonishing diversity of ideals built one and all upon the same *natural* basis, it is a curious naïvete that motivates educators to seize so zealously upon the concept of nature. They argue, however, that they have found the real nature of the child; the others simply imposed their own notions and values upon him.

In studying the child modern pedagogy discovers almost nothing wrong with him and almost everything wrong with the environment. The latter, therefore, should be changed. No one, of course, except the extreme radical is so foolish as to think that a child should do absolutely as he pleases. Although the question of human motivation is a highly unsettled one, we do know enough to say (1) that individual wants, desires, or drives are in themselves self-destructive, (2) that no individual is ever absolutely certain as to what he wants. To appeal to nature is to appeal to a self-contradictory court. As a matter of fact, teachers who hold this view usually teach the things they themselves feel are desirable or which the *mores* sanction. In the first instance, whim and caprice are the guiding force; in the second, sentimentality. In both the natural basis is deposed.

Of late there has been a tendency to admit that if children were allowed to follow their natural interest entirely they would come to ill. The alternative, however, is not compulsion. Children begin very early to manifest signs of a capacity to reason, and discipline should be inculcated by means of that capacity. If a child commits a wrong, the principle underlying it should be explained to him. If he cannot understand it and accept it after an intelligent and sympathetic explanation, then there is something wrong with the principle, not with the child. What is

meant is that children should not be forced to encounter disciplinary experiences beyond their rational comprehension. It is poor psychology to indulge in such an undertaking; for what the child fails to comprehend he has no power to use and any irrational measures directed toward him are sure to go awry. Nowadays we are beginning to discover that children's morals and education must be based on children's experiences. They must have their own moral and pedagogical standards, and they may be disciplined when they violate these standards. These standards must, however, grow out of, and not be superimposed upon, child life. This involves the implication that negative morals must also come under the caption of the rational. Force, especially physical punishment, is a type of discipline that does not explain, but coerces. Hence it is ruled out of court. Only those "don'ts" and "shall not's" are to be introduced which the child is capable of understanding.

It will not be wise to deny this principle a valuable place in education, but its wholesale adoption seems to involve a questionable assumption. It assumes that moral principles are intrinsically rational and that the appeal to the learning of any act lies in the impulse-response of the individual. This sort of thing is true only if the teacher arbitrarily makes it so, only if he artificially selects those principles which do appeal to the child's reason. If, however, the facts of life are squarely faced, some of them will be found incapable of rational explanation. Moral principles are usually the product of the *mores*, which moves in a blind trial-and-error sort of fashion, obviously without the guidance of any rational principle. These moral principles exercise a compelling influence on children, whether they are interested or not; and the only rational factor about some of them is what might be called the rationality of necessity. This is undoubtedly a principle which adults can see better than children. Many adults stick by their guns, tacitly submit to the *mores*, and remain respectable citizens not because they think these actions are reasonable but because they have sense enough to know that such actions are demanded. The rational principle of child discipline and education would be feasible only on the supposition that the child can comprehend, through an appeal solely to his reason, the desirability of frequently acting contrary to his interests and of going through long periods of drudgery and monotony in everything worth while that he undertakes. The morals and values

and education of life work in that fashion all too frequently; and for educators themselves arbitrarily to set up moral and educational principles, and not to take them from actual experience, is to play the sophist. This type of education really plays on the trivial, the impulsive, and the anecdotal.

Still another effort has been made to save the child from the discipline of force and the learning of distasteful subjects. The point is that if on the whole childhood is made happy, manhood will be. There should be a maximizing of interest, an attempt to make the world alive, and an effort to create for the child as many points of interest as possible. If this is done, the child, grown to manhood, will be so accustomed to extracting happiness from the world that he will continue to do so. "If a person's childhood be kept interesting and happy, he is being every day practised in the art of extracting happiness from the world; and afterward he is able to 'stick' things, simply because he has got into the habit and acquired the skill to extract interest and happiness from whatever situation the demands of duty or the moral law decree he must be in."⁴ This will be true if the conditions remain the same—if the school room mirrors the world. Clearly the art of securing happiness under one set of conditions does not guarantee that it can be transferred to another. If the school arbitrarily selects the environment in which its charges are to be made happy, their power to extract happiness when they bump into the world is highly questionable. The world is no guardian; it exercises no benevolent supervision over the people who live in it. If children themselves are permitted to select their own environment, they might be given free rein—as is sometimes the custom—or they might be given freedom within the limits of accepted morality and learning. In the first case they might be happy as children, but they would almost certainly be disappointed as adults. In the second, they might be good children and develop into good citizens, but it is a question whether happiness would be theirs—in the sense in which modern pedagogy describes it.

Life, at best, can never be completely happy. Any sort of existence involves a great deal of boredom and monotony. Many great values come only after hard work, disappointment, and drudgery. The interest theory is supposed to make for efficient work and independent and original thinking, but it demands something

⁴J. W. Scott in *The International Journal of Ethics*, v. 35, p. 161 f.

which no experience in life can give: a guaranty in advance that a given experience will prove valuable.

IV

The strictures given above are not intended to deny value to certain present day educational principles; what we need to do is to adopt their spirit rather than their manner. Our educational philosophy is not determined by the whole body of educated people, but by specialists or experts. They determine not only the manner of teaching, but the content. They prescribe the certification of teachers, the curricula for the students, and the surveys for the public. Being possessed of the American desire for success, they entwine themselves into all sorts of sophistic tricks. Since they must be distinctive, they create something novel. They can rewrite or rephrase a curriculum, insert a new subject of study (although opportunities in this direction are rapidly being exhausted), develop a new method of studying, eliminate an old established course, or reinsert it under a new name, or do a thousand and one other things which any intelligent person can read about every day. Now all this is done in the name of scientific experiment; but it is as remote as it can possibly be from genuine experimentation. An experiment is carefully planned. It has a definite objective, an adequate control, and it is repeatable under the same set of conditions. It is relative to a particular purpose and cannot be applied *in toto* to experience in general. The school novelty is, like Mr. Hoover's "noble experiment," an experience; for it has no control. And its procedure and results are not very often determined by an unbiased, competent mind. Frequently it is declared successful in order to advance the interests of its promoter. So great has this fetish for the novel become that our schools change their methods and instructional content with lightning rapidity, and an air of restlessness and instability pervades the educational world.

This demand for success leads inevitably to the notion that the school must include as much content as possible. Any one who compares the school of today with that of yesterday is struck by the comprehensiveness of the former. It seems as if there is nothing that is not now taught in the schools. The papers reported not long ago that a certain western high school had introduced the subject of bridge as a part of its curriculum. The arts of housekeeping, play, trade, and the professions are included,

and also highly specialized departments of these. Teeth cleaning, shoe shining, house work, baby training, manners, nature study, games, savings, clothes, diet, and various subdivisions of these are well recognized fields of school activity. And this variegated program extends from the kindergarten to the graduate school. The theory seems to be to make the school as inclusive as possible. No doubt most of the things included are useful and should be acquired; but there are two questions to be considered: (1) whether the school is the proper place in which to acquire all of them; (2) whether the school recognizes that these things possess varying degrees of difficulty and value. In regard to the first, it is certainly not obvious that an educational institution should supplant all other places of acquiring information. It is a grave question whether any one institution can supervise or ought to supervise the learning of the majority of life's activities and principles. As it is now, we really have a dual system with much of the work of the school simply a repetition of that which is being acquired elsewhere. And it is a poor repetition; for school learning often becomes a dreary tautology of things acquired in other places. These tautologists crowd out those subjects which a student is not able to acquire elsewhere. Formal education and that learning which is characteristic of all experience are confused, and the pedagogue thinks that in order to be a success he must include the latter. With respect to the second question, it seems clear that the schools do not adequately recognize the difference in value and difficulty in the various things they teach. With the credit system prevailing the same effort is supposed to be expended and the same value is implied in a course on hog raising or button sewing as in a course in physics or calculus. Surely the former activities are important, but the question is concerning their *pedagogical* importance. Our school standard is thus a quantitative one: the more subjects a school can include the better that school is. Believing that he is making the school alive, the pedagogue really anaesthetizes it by a weak and feeble imitation of life itself—with regard to no criterion but the principle of inclusiveness. The easier and more obvious the things imitated the more successful is the school declared to be. Since life is a unity, the school must be a unity. It secures this unity through the largest possible *aggregation* of subjects.

It is, of course, obvious that people learn by doing, that personal contacts are valuable, that we do best those things in which

we are most interested, that experimentation is a necessity, and that life is in some sense a unity. But these concepts are not, like the products of a mail order house, all set up and ready to be put on. They are not, like enthusiasm at a football game, created by a pep and jazz spirit. Rather they are difficult philosophical problems which should offer a constant challenge to the best minds of any age. The sophist adopts their manner; but he does not have their spirit. For hard work, monotony, difficult problems, and abstract principles he talks glibly about learning by doing, appealing to interest, and pursuing the practical; for the enormously complicated and subtle problems of coöperation, social values and organization, experimentation, and fact-finding he makes a religion of hand-shaking, of service bulletins, of contact men, of writing letters, of gathering statistics, and of drawing graphs. He acts as if the qualities of originality, humor, and poise need only to be talked about in order to be generated. His, in short, is a philosophy of *declaration*, and if Socrates were living today he would probably meet the same scorn he incurred in Athens.

POST-MORTEMS ON THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN ELECTIONS

I

RETROSPECT ON THE BRITISH ELECTION

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The general election of 1929 promises to be a turning point in the history of British politics. The reaction against the Conservative Party was decisive, and the Labor Party found itself the largest party in the House of Commons for the first time in the thirty years of its history. What is even more important, the Labor Party is now within striking distance of a complete majority, and hence the achievement of its program. This represents a decided swing of the pendulum in Parliament, but as is often the case, it was not accompanied by a corresponding swing in the number of popular votes polled by the respective political organizations. This is shown in Table I, which gives the number of votes polled by each party and the number of seats secured in the House of Commons in the past three elections.

It is evident that there was a larger increase in the representation of the Labor Party than in the proportion of votes polled by its candidates. Indeed, although Labor won the largest number of seats in Parliament, the Conservatives rolled up a larger popular vote. The Labor Party profited in 1929 from the same defects of the English electoral system which enabled the Conservative Party to secure its huge majority in 1924. It will be noted, however, that both Labor and Liberal Parties made substantial inroads on the government. It is evident, therefore, that there had been a decided shift in the opinion of the electorate since the last general election.

The results were very disappointing to the minor parties. The Communists presented a larger list of candidates than ever before, only to lose the one seat which they had held in the last Parliament.¹ The Liberals were somewhat more fortunate. For the

¹Twenty-two of the twenty-five Communist candidates polled less than the required one-eighth of the votes in their respective districts and consequently forfeited their nomination deposits.

first time since 1915 they had energetic and united leadership. Their large campaign fund was widely distributed to assist their 513 candidates. For the first time since the War they faced the

TABLE I

Votes Polled and Seats Won by Principal Parties, 1923-1929*

Party	1923		1924		1929	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Conservative:						
Votes polled.....	5,538,824	38.0	8,039,598	48.4	8,664,243	38.2
Seats won.....	258	42.0	419	68.2	260	42.8
Labor:						
Votes polled.....	4,438,508	30.6	5,489,077	33.0	8,362,594	37.0
Seats won.....	191	31.0	151	24.5	287	46.6
Liberal:						
Votes polled.....	4,311,147	29.6	2,928,747	16.6	5,300,947	23.4
Seats won.....	158	25.7	40	6.5	59	9.6
Other Parties:						
Votes polled.....	260,042	1.8	182,857	1.0	311,333	1.4
Seats won.....	7	1.3	5	0.8	9	1.5
Totals:						
Votes polled.....	14,548,521	100.0	16,640,279	100.0	22,639,117	100.0
Seats won.....	615	100.0	615	100.0	615	100.0

*There are eighteen double-member constituencies and one constituency with three members. The votes in each of these are counted twice (or three times) in this table. A deduction, therefore, is necessary to give the number of electors casting ballots. These have been estimated as follows:

1923	14,880,500
1924	15,951,628
1929	21,694,100

H. F. Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes* (Chicago, 1930), 5. Even these figures fail to take into account the number of electors casting two ballots under the plural voting provisions of the Representation of the People Act of 1918. A further deduction, therefore, would be necessary to secure the number of individuals participating. There seems to be no satisfactory way of making an estimate which allows for this feature of the English voting system.

In the table the votes cast for "Constitutionalist" candidates in 1923 and 1924 are included with those cast for the Conservative Party. All other parties (Communist, Republican, Nationalist, Prohibitionist, etc.) are included under "Other Parties."

The table is based on data given in the *Constitutional Yearbook*, 1929, pp. 275-282 and *The Times House of Commons*, 1929, pp. 145-146. Throughout this paper the statistics in the latter publication are used in the analysis of the voting in 1929. There is a slight discrepancy between these figures and those given in the *Constitutional Yearbook*, 1930, p. 299, the *Liberal Yearbook*, 1930, p. 177, and the *Labour Yearbook*, 1930, p. 235. But lacking the official report in the *Parliamentary Paper*, and in view of the fact that none of these other sources agree with the others, the *Times* compilation has been utilized.

country with a well-considered program, the result of the indefatigable efforts of an important group of intellectuals in the party as well as of such leaders as Sir Herbert Samuel and Mr.

Lloyd George. Under these favorable conditions, the failure of the party to make greater progress is surprising, unless one remembers the traditional difficulties of third parties in England.

The Liberal Party did increase its proportion of the popular vote by more than one-third, but even so it was unable to reach the point it had held in 1923. Furthermore, this increase in the popular vote only gave them thirteen additional seats in the House of Commons, a much smaller number than was generally conceded to them in the preëlection prophecies, and only a tithe of the number they hoped to secure. In all cases but three² the new seats were in traditional Liberal constituencies and hence do not represent any real gains by the party. But in spite of its poor showing in the election results, the Liberal Party finds its position in Parliament considerably improved. Before the election the Liberals were an unimportant part of the opposition, now they hold the balance of power between the other two parties. Furthermore, the party has been purged of coalition members who were elected through local bargains with either Conservative or Labor organizations.³ The resulting gain in party unity is certainly important,⁴ but it hardly compensates for the small representation secured. Even during the campaign it became increasingly evident that the powerful publicity of the Liberal organization was fighting a losing battle, and that the real struggle was between Labor and the Conservatives. It is not altogether easy to account for Labor's victory in that struggle.

One can hardly attribute the downfall of the Conservative Party to the issues involved in the election. The English are noted for

²These were Dorset, Eastern; Hereford; and Kent, Ashford. The Liberal leaders hoped to secure about 150 seats, preëlection prophecies generally conceded them about 100, only 59 Liberals were elected.

³The number of seats won by the Liberals in constituencies where there was no Conservative or Labor candidate, or which were totally unopposed is shown in the following table:

Election	Liberal Seats Unopposed by			Total	Per Cent of All Seats Won by Liberals
	Labor	Conserv- ative	Both Parties		
1929	6	5	0	11	18.7
1924	0	22	3	25	62.5
1923	62	21	7	90	56.9

⁴See the address of Ramsay Muir to the Liberal Summer School at Cambridge, August 8, 1929, published in the *Liberal Magazine*, Sept., 1929, pp. 566-567.

their political mindedness, but it is doubtful if the mass of voters were swayed by a considered deliberation of the political problems of the hour. As is frequently the case, the rôle of issues seemed to be limited to providing reasons for voting one's prejudices. The failure of any of the issues to create real popular interest gave rise to frequent complaints of apathy on the part of the voters, complaints incidentally which were only partly borne out in the polling.⁵ In one sense the principal issue was really no issue at all—it was the Conservative slogan "Safety First." The returns may be taken to indicate that a large portion of the electorate was dissatisfied with the snail's pace of the cautious Conservative government.

A cardinal part of the Conservative program was the policy of safeguarding, which was defined as giving sufficient tariff protection to individual industries to enable them to compete in the international market. In 1923 the issue of protection dominated the election, but in 1929 little interest was taken in the safeguarding program. The Liberals were not in a strong position to attack it, for safeguarding was initiated by the Coalition Government in which they had participated. The Labor Party did combat it, but only in a subsidiary manner. A second feature of the Conservative appeal was the local government reform act (Derating Bill) which they had pushed through the last Parliament. This measure provided for a revision of the local rates, and it was claimed that the resulting reduction of taxes on industry would stimulate production and reduce unemployment. Both of the opposition parties realized that some such measure was vitally necessary, and their criticism of the particular provisions of the act was not especially effective.

The Liberal program centered around the two problems of unemployment and peace. The most discussed subject during the campaign was their proposal that the government construct roads and other public works on a large scale to give relief to the unemployed. The Labor Party was able to show that the principal features of this plan had been passed over by Mr. Lloyd George when he was Prime Minister in spite of repeated suggestions from the Labor leaders. The Conservatives, on the other

⁵The percentage of the electors voting was less than 1 per cent below the percentage voting in 1924. Except in London and Northern Ireland, little apathy was shown, and in the English counties and Wales the participation was fully as great as at the last election.

hand, claimed that the construction of public works would do little to relieve the basic difficulties in the unemployment situation for the reason that many of the skilled and semi-skilled workers, who are now without work, could not be utilized in road building. Their objections were embodied in an official "White Paper" prepared under the supervision of the ministry by civil servants and circulated with the approval of the government.⁶ The net effect of this discussion was to leave the voters in a confused state of mind on the whole problem, and consequently the Liberal program failed to provide a real stimulus to a great party turnover.

All parties professed an earnest desire for international peace. In the political meetings of each of the parties an appeal for international understanding was much more certain to secure applause than the ordinary patriotic oratory. The opposition parties deplored the government's failure to secure disarmament, criticized the construction of the naval base at Singapore, and centered their attack on the "blundering" policy of the Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, especially with respect to France and the United States. On the other hand, the Conservatives insisted that they were as zealously in favor of disarmament as their critics, and pointed to the declarations of Mr. Snowden, Labor's former Chancellor of the Exchequer, attacking the debt settlement with France, as hardly calculated to promote Anglo-French friendship.

The Labor Party appealed to the electorate on its general program rather than centering their campaign on a few spectacular issues. In this program Socialism played a considerable part. The Conservatives invariably called their opponents "Socialists" instead of "Labor." But the "Socialism" of the Labor Party had been so broadly defined, that the Conservative epithet lost much of its force. When one declares that Socialism is that form of social organization most conducive to the public welfare,

⁶The propriety of using civil servants for the preparation of a campaign document of this character was questioned by both Liberals and Labor. Mr. Baldwin's reply that the "White Paper" sold enough copies to pay for itself, seemed to miss the main point that the civil service was a nonpolitical body which should not be encouraged to participate in an acute partisan discussion.

it is difficult for the most conservative not to be socialistic.⁷ Little was said about Labor's specific collectivist projects for nationalization, it being well understood that even if they were victorious no sweeping changes in the economic order would be inaugurated immediately. The housing program of government was criticized by Labor on the ground that houses should be built for the poor rather than the middle class or the rich. This issue, however, aroused much less interest among Labor supporters than the question of pensions. The government had reduced certain of the social insurance pensions, especially for those over 65, and the pensioners felt that they were being deprived of benefits for which they had in part contributed. The widespread feeling of injustice which this inspired may have partially contributed to Labor's success.

The Unionists made much of Labor's support of the general strike. It is doubtful, however, if this helped their cause to any considerable extent. There seemed little likelihood of another such attempt, and the memory of the public is notoriously short in such matters. The trade unions, however, did not forget the drastic Trades Disputes Act which was passed shortly afterward. The coal miners were especially bitter against Mr. Baldwin who was blamed for personally engineering the coal stoppage.⁸ This animosity probably served to swell the tide of discontent with the government.

It is clear that the campaign lacked a great dominating issue. All three parties had much in common, and their differences on most questions either failed to interest the voters or else merely confused them. Some writers even accused the Labor Party of attempting to usurp the position of the Tories as the party of stability and conservatism. Certainly none of the issues mentioned, or indeed any combination of them, were sufficient to

⁷See the official program of the Labor Party entitled "Labor and the Nation" (London, 1928), pp. 7-8. A somewhat bolder statement of the same idea is to be found in "Fifty Points for Labor," No. 31. "The only complete remedy is Socialism which means the organization of industry to meet the needs of all." Through this formula the party hoped to appeal to the more radical Liberals without losing the enthusiasm of the emotional and doctrinaire collectivists.

⁸See the article by a defeated candidate, "Why I Lost," *English Review*, July, 1929, pp. 20-22.

account for the results of the election. The public was not interested in issues. They were little discussed in the press, with the exception of those journals which have had a long political tradition. The popular papers contained almost no political news, and political pamphlets were notoriously poor sellers. There was more interest in the coming Derby and the sensational disappearance of a prominent banker than in the questions of the hour.

As soon as the results were known, it was freely declared that the government had been defeated by the young women ("flappers") who had been permitted to vote for the first time in this election. The electorate had been increased by extending the suffrage to women between 21 and 30 years of age, an increase of more than one-sixth in those eligible to vote.⁹ A careful analysis of the returns, however, does not support the theory that the newly enfranchised women contributed greatly to the defeat of the government. In certain districts they undoubtedly swelled the strength of Labor, but in others the older women particularly seem to have been favorable to the Conservatives.¹⁰ But by and large this factor seems to have had much less influence than was anticipated.

Throughout the campaign it was evident that the newly enfranchised young women took as keen an interest in the political drama as did their older sisters. All parties made special efforts to enlist their support, the Unionists and Liberals each circulating novelettes in which the success of the hero in love was closely bound to the triumph of his party.¹¹ On polling day the young

⁹The law made certain other extensions of the franchise notably in England and Wales where husbands of women who occupied business property were enfranchised. This increase, however, was less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the entire electorate and is ignored in the computations in this paper. In addition to the new voters under the Equal Franchise Bill there were the normal additions to the electorate resulting from the increase in population. It is estimated that at least one-third of those on the registers had never exercised the suffrage in a Parliamentary election before.

¹⁰Sir John A. R. Marriott estimated that of the 12,000 "flapper" voters in his district, 10,000 voted Labor and 2,000 Conservative. "The Answer of Demos," *Fortnightly Review*, July 1, 1929, p. 12. Mr. Alfred Hopkinson argued that the younger women tended to vote Labor, but those over 25 were more Conservative. "The Election," *Contemporary Review*, July, 1929, p. 12.

¹¹Peter Vaughan, "Her Decision" (Liberal); "The Woman of Today and Tomorrow" (Unionist).

women were seen going to the election booths in large numbers and the returns indicate that they voted quite as freely as did the rest of the electorate.¹²

Unfortunately, no statistics were kept of the number of new voters who participated in each district, and of course no data is available giving the number voting for each party. However, the number of women added to the registers of each constituency under the new law can be approximately determined by comparing the registration statistics of 1929 with those of 1924. These statistics give the number of men and women in each district. By subtracting the increase in number of men registered in 1929 as compared with 1924 from the increase in women on the two registers, it is possible to arrive at a fair estimate of the number of newly enfranchised women in each constituency. This number varied from over 40 per cent of the 1929 electorate in Lonsdale, Lancaster, to 5 per cent in Ilford. The average constituency had about 16 per cent of its voters newly enfranchised young women.

In those districts having a large proportion of new voters, the Conservatives did fully as well, on the whole, as in those districts where the proportion was small. There was practically no correlation between the percentage of new electors and the Conservative losses.¹³ Another way of showing this is by exam-

¹²In fact, in the districts having the largest number of "flappers" the proportion of the electorate voting was slightly higher than in the other districts. The relation, however, was very small for the coefficient of correlation between the per cent of new women voters and the increase in per cent voting was found to be less than .1. This was true whether the correlation was computed for all the contested districts, or for only those having the same number of candidates in 1929 as in 1924.

¹³The coefficient of correlation between the percentage of new women voters and the number of votes lost by the Conservative candidates in 1929 as compared with 1924 was found to be $.26 \pm .03$. If one uses the per cent loss of votes, instead of the absolute number, the correlation was even lower, being but $.07 \pm .03$. An effort was also made to keep constant the factor of new Liberal candidatures, which might conceivably have reduced the Conservative vote. The correlation between the per cent of new women voters and the per cent losses by the Unionist candidate in the 336 districts where there were no new Liberal candidates in 1929 as compared with 1924, was only $.14 \pm .04$. The coefficients are obviously too small to indicate any real relationship between the two factors. Nevertheless, it would seem that if the "flappers" did have any effect on the result it was slightly in favor of the Conservatives rather than against them.

ining the results in the traditional Conservative districts in which Labor was able to elect a member. There were forty-four constituencies which had been Unionist at every election since 1922 but returned Labor members in 1929. In these districts, which were undoubtedly the decisive battlefields of the election, the average proportion of new electors was slightly less than for the entire country. This is shown in Table II.

TABLE II

Proportion of Newly Enfranchised Voters in Various Classes of Districts¹⁴

Class of Districts	Number of Districts	Median Per Cent New Voters Per District
Total of contested districts	597	16.7
Total of new districts gained by Labor	129	16.1
Traditionally Unionist districts gained by Labor	44	15.6
Traditionally Liberal and Independent districts won by Labor	7	16.3
Doubtful districts won by Labor	78	16.6
Total new districts gained by Conservatives	3	17.8
Total new districts gained by Liberals	31	15.6

Thus, whether one considers the effect of the flappers' votes for the country as a whole, or for those districts which gave Labor its victory, there is no evidence that the result would have been favorable to the Unionists under the old electoral law. Indeed, the newly enfranchised women seem to have voted Conservative slightly more often than did their brothers and sisters, but the resistance they offered to the tide of Unionist defeat was so slight as to be nearly negligible. The only conclusion which may safely be drawn from the returns is that Mr. Baldwin cannot blame the young women for the fall of his government.

It is possible that in some districts the apathy of the electorate contributed slightly to the defeat of the government. During the campaign the Unionists expressed considerable apprehension lest their supporters fail to vote, and the Labor Party felt that this lack of interest was decidedly to their advantage. The results of the election, however, showed that both parties overestimated the amount of public indifference. There was a much

¹⁴The University constituencies are excluded from this tabulation because of their special character. The average in each case is the median, thus avoiding the influence of exceptional cases which tend to exaggerate the arithmetic average and would lead one to think the young women even more strongly Conservative than was really the case.

larger participation than had been anticipated, the only districts where declines in the percentage voting were common being London and Northern Ireland (see Table IV). Since the Irish districts are solidly Conservative or Nationalist in any event, the small vote there did not affect the result. In the average constituency the proportion of the electorate which went to the polls in 1929 was less than 1 per cent lower than in 1924. This is a remarkable showing in view of the extension of the franchise and the large number of new voters on the registers. In certain areas, London for example, the decline in the percentage voting seems to have been to the disadvantage of the Conservative Party, but if we take the country as a whole, the results do not indicate that this was a serious handicap. There was very little relationship between the decline in voting and the losses of votes sustained by Conservative candidates. It is evident that such lack of interest as prevailed was fairly evenly distributed among the districts traditionally belonging to each of the three parties.¹⁵

TABLE III

Increase and Decrease in Voting, 1924-1929 by Classes of Districts¹⁶

Kind of District	Number of Districts	Median Increase or Decrease in Vote
Total districts contested, 1924 and 1929	565	-0.8
New districts gained by Labor, 1929	129	-1.1
Doubtful districts gained by Labor, 1929	78	-1.3
Traditionally Unionist districts gained by Labor, 1929	44	0.0
Traditionally Liberal districts gained by Labor, 1929	7	+5.8
New districts gained by Liberals, 1929	31	+3.0
Traditionally Unionist districts gained by Liberals, 1929	3	+4.0
New districts gained by Unionists, 1929	3	+0.8
Districts with Liberal candidate in 1929 but none in 1924	172	-0.5

¹⁵The coefficient of correlation between the losses by the Conservative Party (the difference between the percentage of votes polled by the Conservative candidates in 1929 and 1924) and the decline in percentage of the electorate voting was only $+ .22 \pm .03$ if the computation is made on the basis of all the contested districts. But if only those districts are taken where the same number of candidates were run in 1929 as in 1924 the coefficient was $-.02 \pm .04$.

¹⁶"The Increase or Decrease in Vote" represents the median change in percentage of registered voters casting ballots in 1929 as compared with 1924. See Note 14.

Table III shows that there was very little difference in the strength of the vote between those districts which Labor wrested from their opponents and the country as a whole. But since the constituencies in which Labor was able to gain seats formerly held by its opponents were undoubtedly the most bitterly fought, one might have expected a larger participation in them. Thus in those districts won by the Liberals from the other parties, the voting was especially heavy. It is quite possible, therefore, that a heavy vote in the districts gained by Labor might have been to their disadvantage.

Table IV shows the geographical distribution of this decline in voting as well as the gains made by the opposition parties at the expense of the Conservatives. It will be noted that the Labor Party made its chief gains in the English boroughs where the percentage of electors voting in 1929 was somewhat lower than in 1924. On the other hand the principal gains of the Liberal Party were in the English counties where there was an increase in the proportion of electors voting in 1929. It would appear, therefore, that a heavy vote slightly augmented the Liberal chances of success as well as the Conservative. This tendency, however, was by no means marked, and there were a great many significant exceptions to it. Furthermore, since both Liberals and Labor were in the opposition, one can hardly attribute the defeat of the government to either public apathy or its opposite.

TABLE IV

Increase and Decrease in Voting, 1924-1929, by Geographical Divisions

Geographical Division	Number of Seats	Median Increase or Decrease in Vote	New Seats Gained by		
			Labor	Liberals	Total Opposition
London boroughs.....	57	- 4.7	17	1	18
English boroughs.....	188	- 1.5	64	7	71
Welsh boroughs.....	9	+ 0.5	5	---	5
Scottish burghs.....	33	- 2.6	3	---	3
English counties.....	220	+ 0.4	30	16	46
Welsh counties.....	18	+ 2.9	4	2	6
Scottish counties.....	35	- 0.8	6	5	11
Ireland.....	5	- 6.0	---	---	---
Total of contested seats.....	565	- 0.8	129	31	160

Many Unionists attributed the defeat of the government to the reëntrance of the Liberal Party into the field with a full quota of candidates. Sir Herbert Samuel had agreed to accept a position of leadership in the Liberal campaign only on the condition

that the party put more than five hundred candidates in the field. Actually 513 Liberal candidates stood for election, with the result that there were a much larger number of three-cornered contests than at any previous election. Besides the Speaker's constituency there were only 6 uncontested seats, even the Deputy Speaker being forced to fight for reëlection. Altogether there were 1,723 candidates proposed for the 608 contested seats. In three-fourths of the districts each of the three parties waged an active campaign and in 22 cases 4 candidates stood for a single seat.¹⁷

Under these conditions it was inevitable that a large number of members would be returned with a plurality rather than a majority of the votes cast. The returns showed that 315, more than half, of the constituencies elected members who received only a minority of the total vote cast. The Conservative contention was that the Liberals, by invading territory generally conceded to be Unionist, enabled a Labor candidate to be elected who would have been beaten in a straight fight. There is no doubt that the Liberals did take many votes which might have gone to the Conservatives in a straight fight. It is even possible that more votes were taken from Unionist candidates than from the Labor candidates, although this is open to question and seems to have depended largely on the temper of the district and the vigor of the candidates involved.¹⁸ Table V shows the results in those districts in which the Liberal Party had a candidate in 1929 but did not have one in 1924. In about one-third of the constituencies Labor profited from the three-cornered contest, while the Conservatives profited in only one constituency. Furthermore, Labor wrested the district from the Conservatives with

¹⁷There were 458 constituencies with three-cornered contests besides the 22 with 4 candidates for each seat. In Dundee 5 parties were represented by 1 candidate each for 2 seats.

¹⁸There is, of course, no way of determining what might have been the result had the Liberals pursued a different policy. It is possible, however, to estimate the average loss which a Unionist and a Labor candidate suffered through the votes taken from him by a Liberal. The average Conservative candidate lost about 7 per cent of his popular vote to the entrance of a Liberal, while the average Labor candidate lost only about 5 per cent. Labor candidates in rural districts lost very heavily on the entrance of a new Liberal candidate. The bipartisan agreements which the Liberals had made with the Unionists in 1924 had worked decidedly to the advantage of the latter, and it was only natural that they should lose when new Liberals were put in the field and the agreement dissolved.

a minority of the popular vote in 44 cases, and in 13 of these the gains were in constituencies which had returned Unionist members at each election since 1922.

TABLE V

Result in Districts with Liberal Candidates in 1929 But None in 1924

Result	Number	Per Cent
Total districts with Liberal entry in 1929.....	172	100.0
No change in party winning district.....	118	68.6
Labor gain from Conservative.....	51	29.6
Labor gain from other parties or independent.....	2	1.2
Conservative gain from Labor.....	1	.6

It does not follow from these facts, however, that the Conservative defeat was due to the greater activity of the Liberal Party. If we might assume that the government would have carried each of the forty-four minority seats in a straight fight with Labor, it would still have lacked four seats of having a majority in the House of Commons. And it is very evident that the Unionists could hardly have hoped to win all these minority seats even if there had been no Liberal candidate. In the 73 straight contests which did occur between Labor and the Unionists, Labor came out victorious in 54 cases, or 74 per cent. The tide of public opinion was running so strongly against the government, that its defeat cannot be attributed to peculiarities of the electoral situation. The result was much too clear for that.

This is even more clearly shown if we analyze the results in all districts returning members by a minority vote, instead of only those in which Liberals placed a new candidate in the field. Table VI shows the results for the 315 minority seats. Although Labor won more seats than the Conservatives, more of the Unionists were chosen with a minority of the vote. It might thus appear that the Conservative Party stood to benefit rather than to lose by the entrance of the Liberals. This, however, puts the matter too strongly, for undoubtedly in a great many cases the Liberal candidates reduced a normal Unionist majority to a minority. Furthermore, since the trend of public opinion was so strongly toward Labor, their vote was not cut into by the new Liberal candidates as much as was the Conservative support, except in the predominately rural constituencies.¹⁰ In other

¹⁰Another possible exception was in the poorer districts of the industrial section, although this is purely conjectural. *New Statesman*, June 8, 1929, pp. 261-262.

words, there seemed to be a tendency for the third party, in occupying the center position between two other strong parties, to cut most deeply into the strength of the weaker. Liberal candidates injured the chances of the Conservatives because the government was already unpopular.

TABLE VI

Results in Districts Returning Members by a Minority Vote

Party	Result	Number	Per Cent of All Seats Won by Party
Labor:	No change from last Parliament.....	31	10.8
	Gained doubtful districts.....	59	20.6
	Gained traditionally Unionist seats.....	32	11.3
	Gained traditionally Liberal seats.....	3	1.1
	Total minority seats won by Labor.....	125	43.8
Conservative:	No change from last Parliament.....	146	56.1
	Gained new seats.....	3	1.1
	Total minority seats won by Conservatives	149	57.2
Liberal:	No change from last Parliament.....	13	22.0
	Gained new seats.....	27	45.8
	Total minority seats won by Liberals.....	40	67.8
Independent:	No change from last Parliament.....	1	11.1
	Grand total of minority seats.....	315	

This unpopularity of the government was partly the result of its long tenure in office during which it had made inevitably a great many enemies. It was also due to years of patient propaganda and organizing on the part of the opposition parties. The fact that the Liberals only carried fourteen seats in rural areas, while Labor did not win a single predominately rural constituency, shows where this propaganda bore fruit. Roughly speaking the election proved to be a struggle between the industrial North and West against the agricultural South and East. The contest, in its main outlines, followed the lines of battle so frequently drawn between the Liberals and the Unionists in the last half of the nineteenth century, but with Labor playing the rôle formerly taken by the Liberals.²⁰

All the usual methods of campaigning were employed. Speeches by the thousands were delivered, literature by the ton was dis-

²⁰Ramsay MacDonald's plea to Liberals at Free Trade Hall, Manchester, May 25 was based on this view.

tributed, and hundreds of canvassers called on their fellow electors urging support for one party or the other. In their broad outlines, however, the tactics of the three parties were not the same. The Conservatives relied largely on the press and the prestige of their aristocratic supporters. The Labor Party depended upon the oratory of its leaders and the strength of its trade union organization. The Liberals made greater use of books, pamphlets, electric signs, and other similar forms of publicity. In many respects the campaign methods were more like those used in the United States than like those of previous British elections. Even the Conservative slogan of "Safety First" was a rather inferior English equivalent to "Keep Cool with Coolidge" and Mr. Baldwin's praise of individualism reminded one strongly of Mr. Hoover's *American Individualism*. The Liberal Party, indeed, had sent a delegation to the United States to study American campaign methods in 1929. As a result they introduced a great deal of emotional material into their literature and attempted to simplify the issues to the two with the greatest popular appeal. Thus the question put by their own pamphleteers, "Can Lloyd George Do It?" was answered by a huge electric sign at Trafalgar Square, the ten-foot letters of which replied, "We Can Conquer Unemployment."

Mechanical inventions played a larger part in this campaign than in any previous one. The leading speakers of each party prepared gramophone records of the best parts of their speeches. In many outdoor meetings amplifiers enabled the speakers to address much larger audiences than had hitherto been possible. The radio, however, was considerably less widely used than had been the case in the United States. Broadcasting is under control of a government corporation, and the Conservative Party insisted that it should have as much time as both the parties in opposition together. Labor and Liberals naturally refused to consent to this, and after considerable discussion a compromise was finally agreed upon by which the Conservatives were given a preponderance of the broadcasting time in the early stages of the campaign, while each of the parties shared equally in the closing period. This was undoubtedly to Labor's advantage, for their own members could be depended upon to attend meetings, whereas by the radio they could send their messages into homes with a different political tradition.

There were a few complaints of unfairness in the election campaign besides the distribution of radio time. A number of Labor election agents declared that it was impossible to secure favorable sites for bill posting, because advertising companies were in sympathy with the Conservative Party. Although less generous use was made of the hoardings than in former campaigns, the posters of the Labor Party were fully as much in evidence as those of its competitors. Labor agents likewise declared that the use of automobiles to convey voters to the polls was to the disadvantage of their party. Their view was that since the Conservatives could command a much larger number of motor cars they could insure a large vote on the part of their supporters. As one member of the Labor Party expressed it, "Austen Chamberlain's majority of forty-six votes could easily have been beaten with the help of three more motor cars." It is doubtful, however, if the class from which Labor drew its chief support could be greatly influenced by the use of an automobile to convey them to the polls.

There was also some criticism of the use of governmental official emblems by the Conservative Party. Unionist posters frequently showed their candidates picture on a background of the Union Jack, a form of advertising which is more tolerated in England than in the United States. The use of the civil service to prepare the white paper on unemployment²¹ was vigorously attacked. Just before the polling Mr. Baldwin issued a personal appeal to the voters to support the government. This was printed on the official Downing Street stationery bearing the royal seal. The effect of this appeal was quickly neutralized by the storm of protest which arose against bringing the royal family into partisan politics. There were a few other instances of candidates having the bad taste to bring the King into the campaign, but these seem to have furnished more fuel to the opposition than strength to the candidate concerned. As was consistent with their constitutional position the royal family carefully avoided any appearance of influencing the result. Although the King had a relapse on the eve of polling day, the serious condition of his health was not made public until after the polls closed. This

²¹"Memoranda on Certain Proposals Relating to Unemployment" (1929), Cmd. 3331.

was done at his personal request in order to avoid any influence which his health might have on the voters.

With such a tangled skein of influences, it is very difficult to estimate the strength of the various factors which contributed to the Conservative defeat. Certainly the general dissatisfaction with the government played a large part. One can hardly say how far this dissatisfaction was augmented by the clever campaign tactics of the parties in opposition. It seems probable, however, that these tactics served to strengthen the adherence of the traditional supporters of the parties rather than to make new converts. Since the last election, Labor had conducted weekly propaganda meetings in every important center of population. These gatherings in trade-union halls, motion-picture houses, parks, or on street corners were undoubtedly more influential than the demonstrations held immediately prior to the election.²² Labor clubs combine both social and political activities, and have a much stronger hold on the voters than do the corresponding Unionist organizations, for in many instances they furnish the chief center for recreation in the entire Labor community.²³ These activities supplemented Labor's work in the trade unions and coöperatives and made their position well-nigh impregnable among their own people. By broadening their program and by emphasizing the nonsocialistic features they were able to make effective appeals to the middle class as well.

The policy of the government was undoubtedly unacceptable to the great bulk of the middle class. The years of coalition and compromise between the Liberal and Unionist Party organizations had tended to loosen the traditional party ties of this group. Thus in 1929 they turned from Conservatism not to the Liberal Party which they refused to trust, but to Labor in whose

²²Arthur Ponsonby, "The Election," *Contemporary Review*, July, 1929, p. 8.

²³This was especially true in those centers where Labor was most strongly entrenched. A splendid example is to be found in Sir Henry Slessor's constituency in Leeds (Southeast) where the election agent, Mr. Henry Sharp maintained a very powerful Labor club.

The Unionist organization was well built up and ably manned as far as the Central Office was concerned, but it was handicapped by the lack of a strong continuing organization in each constituency. Some of the best work of the Conservative organization was done in their associations for young people, the Junior Imperial League ("Imps"), which was enthusiastically supported and capably led by its organizing secretary, Mr. A. G. Mitchell.

moderation they had come to believe. Mr. Baldwin declared that the dominating question of the election was whether his administration was acceptable to the voters. The results give a clear answer to this question. Attempts to blame the newly enfranchised women, public apathy, or the large number of Liberal candidates for the result only ignore the obvious fact that the Conservative Party was defeated because its government had forfeited its popularity. The immediate resignation of Mr. Baldwin was evidence that he accepted the result as a vote of want of confidence on the part of the electorate.

II

THE SOCIALIST VICTORY IN GREAT BRITAIN

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Historians delight to trace the origins of institutions, the growth of parties and the fall of dynasties. It is, therefore, possible that future historians may look upon the British election of 1929 as epoch-making. It may perchance mark the practical disappearance of one great political party and the definite decline of another, while it is already clear that the election has a special significance in the evolution of the political power of the working classes.

Some Conservatives and Laborites seemed to sense the importance of the canvass from its beginning. One of the more outspoken representatives of the Left Wing of Labor, Mr. James Maxton, maintained during the campaign that it was "the most critical election in the history of the Labour Party." A spokesman for Scottish Conservatism, the *Glasgow Herald*, noted that "the coming election is a critical one. We are in midstream [as to economic reconstruction], and it would be the height of folly to change horses." That staunch representative of the progressive Conservatives, Mr. James L. Garvin, editor of the *Sunday Observer*, and the caustic spokesman of the ultraimperialist group, Mr. J. L. Maxse, editor of the truculent *National Review*, also voiced somewhat the same sentiments.

In a score of years this is the first election held under normal conditions. Since 1906 there had been no satisfactory referendum of the wishes of thoughtful people. The two elections of 1910

took place in an atmosphere made thoroughly electric by the great issues of land reform and the future position of the House of Lords. The election of 1918 was held in a nation still permeated with war hate. During this war, indeed, the activity of political parties had been largely suspended, although in its closing months the Laborites withdrew from the Coalition to broaden the basis of their party organization. The election of 1922 was hastily brought on by the Conservatives who had forced the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George. A year later Mr. Baldwin, who had but recently succeeded to the leadership of the Conservatives, precipitated an election in the hope of securing a mandate for moderate Protection and Imperial Preference as a possible cure for the crying evil of unemployment. No party having secured a majority, the Liberals assisted in placing the Laborites in office under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. His ministry lasted less than a year because the Liberals, as well as the Conservatives, becoming fearful of Mr. MacDonald's friendly gestures toward Russia, compelled him to dissolve Parliament. In the election itself the Russian bogey was used for all it was worth, and the Conservative cause benefited in a material way by a press "scoop" of the *Daily Mail*, which published a letter purporting to be that of the Russian leader, Zinoviev. This document, whose validity is still in doubt, set forth plans for undermining the loyalty of the British military forces. Its publication reacted powerfully against the MacDonald government and was in part responsible for the overwhelming victory of the Conservatives. Mr. J. H. Thomas, leader of the National Union of Railwaymen said, "in 1918 people voted in panic and in 1924 they voted in fear."

In his second ministry Mr. Baldwin was embarrassed by his top-heavy majority, as the "standpat" Tory element, the "Diehards," were not responsive to discipline and insisted upon drastic action against the Socialists. This faction was partly responsible for the inept way in which the premier handled the mining strike, which was allowed to develop into the General Strike, paralyzing England economically for a fortnight and arousing the greatest resentment against the Socialist leaders. It proved very expensive to the government, and also to the iron and steel industries, as the miners' strike continued, and ended in the complete discomfiture of the miners. The Diehards now demanded reactionary legislation against the political power of the trades unions. Although Mr. Baldwin did head off the more extreme suggestions,

his government passed, by invoking the *clôture*, the Trade Disputes Act in the face of the bitter opposition of the Laborites. For the future it required every trade union member specifically to "contract in" before the trade union levy for political purposes could be collected from his pay. This struck at the economic foundation of the Labor party, and the laboring classes accepted it as a gage of class warfare.

To the Conservative government the unemployment problem seemed insoluble. Despite its somewhat half-hearted efforts a million and a quarter of men and women were permanently without work, and the number tended to increase. Comparatively little was done to stimulate the improvement of transport facilities, imperial trade, the rationalization of industry, or the movement for industrial peace. Yet these things seemed vital if Britain was to compete in world markets with the "Colossus of the West," which has prospered so mightily since the war. Except the Trade Disputes Act, almost the only measure of importance passed in these years was the act extending the ballot to women between 21 and 30, the "Flapper" franchise.

The Conservative government started auspiciously in diplomacy. At Locarno, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary, joined with M. Briand and Dr. Stresemann to advance the peace of Europe. After this he apparently fell under the spell of the French chauvinist, M. Poincare. An attempt to reach an agreement with America on naval disarmament failed, largely it would seem, in the light of the Shearer investigation, through the activity of paid propaganda, which apparently imposed upon the credulity of American journalists. The failure was bad enough, but it was worse to appear to drift into the arms of France in the so-called Anglo-French "accord," whose significance was unquestionably exaggerated by being brought to public attention in a curious series of press revelations, part of which seem to have emanated from some one close to the French Foreign Office. The early months of 1929 were marked by the growth of Anglo-American antagonism, which frightened thoughtful people in both countries as the statements of Mr. John W. Davis, Mr. Garvin, and Dr. Flexner clearly indicate.

As Parliament drew towards the end of its five-year span of life the three parties groomed themselves for the contest. The Liberals seemed most active. Some months before the dissolution the Liberal Industrial Report was published, a meaty tome of

some five hundred pages. It was a carefully reasoned statement of the conclusions of a body of experts, which proved too profound for the average elector, so the gist of it was later published in a briefer and more palatable form. Under the leadership of Sir Herbert Samuel and Mr. Lloyd George the party machinery was overhauled and arrangements made to place some five hundred candidates in the field. This seemed an expensive program for a party with only forty members in the Commons, and was rendered possible by the Lloyd George political fund, which came into existence during the period of the Coalition. Originally a large sum, by means of fortunate newspaper investments it had increased like the widow's cruse. Mr. Lloyd George placed it in the hands of a party committee, which set aside £21,000 a year for three years for the upkeep of party headquarters and £300,000 to assist its candidates in the election.

The Labor party was decidedly bitter toward the Conservatives. It had as usual been carrying on a constant campaign of political education among the laboring classes, but it was galvanized into fresh activities by the threat against its life contained in the Trade Disputes Act. The General Strike had cost the Socialists popular sympathy, the miners' strike had lost them many members. These, together with the long continued economic depression and the Trade Disputes Act menaced its very existence. They had no money for the election, and no adequate press, in both of which particulars their opponents were well served. The Liberals, moreover, could depend somewhat on the friendly attitude of the two great press barons, as well as upon their regular organs. The Conservative party could raise any ordinary sum for political purposes and they had a number of most excellent papers in addition to the uncertain support of the ultra-popular press. The Laborites, therefore, with their backs to the wall, made up in house-to-house canvassing what they lacked for advertising. Each trade union was converted into a center for the spread of the gospel of Labor.

Feeling safely esconced in power the Conservatives took little heed of the impending election. Its leaders seemed to have lost touch with public opinion. Feeling secure in their own virtue, according to the irate editor of the *National Review* they became "so enveloped in self-complacency that their main occupation on the eve of their downfall were the posts they would respectively fill in a 'reconstructed' cabinet." The recurring by-elections did not disturb the even tenor of their ways. The fact that Labor

actually polled more votes than they did in the first three months of the year did much, however, to give new confidence to the Liberals and Socialists. Meanwhile the Conservatives solaced themselves with the thought that "the decision of March might be revived in May when activity replaced apathy."

The canvass had some peculiar and interesting features. A revamped Liberal party, equipped with an extensive programme of social reform and plentifully supplied with money, might be able to effect its own rejuvenation, particularly if it were able to secure the unqualified support of the press magnates, Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook. There was even a possibility of a pre-election pact between the two Celtic leaders to fight the election, a suggestion that was kindly received by certain leaders in both the Liberal and Labor parties. The number of candidates was 1757, which was 329 more than in any previous election. Only seven constituencies were unopposed, although usually there were thirty or forty. The number of women voters was increased by five million and a half, outnumbering the men by two million and a quarter. Who could tell how the "lip-stick and powder-puff" contingent would vote, or indeed whether they would vote at all? The flapper could decide the issue. But how? Seventy of the candidates were women. On account of slum clearance there had been a considerable shifting of population, particularly in Birmingham, until even the political expert had no idea how certain constituencies would vote. The steady increase in the number of "floaters" with each succeeding election made the work of the political prophet very difficult. As to leading political issues, the only thing of which they might feel reasonably certain was that unemployment would be the leading issue.

Before the canvass was scarcely under way, Mr. Lloyd George, with some incidental aid from Lord Rothermere, promulgated an extensive, detailed programme for the cure of unemployment which promised to end most of the exceptional unemployment within a year without cost to the Treasury. This pronouncement shocked people out of their political apathy. For nearly a decade the working people had faced the horrible spectre of a million and a quarter constantly out of work, and the number constantly threatening to increase. While the Socialists called for the nationalization of certain industries, all three parties demanded the reorganization (rationalization) of others. Emigration had failed as a cure for unemployment. The coal industry was in a sinking

condition, with an excess of a quarter of a million miners who might never again find work in the only craft that they knew. Agriculture continued to languish as more people deserted the rural areas for the towns. With much unemployment in the building trades it was still found impossible to make much headway against the slums.

Closely related to unemployment was the revival of trade upon which economic progress seemed to depend. The Conservatives had attempted to stimulate certain selected industries by Safeguarding, a mere euphemism to conceal Protection, which is a word hateful to so many Britishers. Some of the duties, notably those on buttons, lace, leather and fabric gloves, are really protective, amounting to 33½%. Indissolubly connected with the policy of Safeguarding is the question of Imperial Preference. The development of an economic unit inside the British Commonwealth, as well as M. Briand's more recent suggestion of an economic United States of Europe, has received considerable attention in the last six months as a result of a possible increase in the American tariff. The Liberals were definitely and unqualifiedly opposed to Safeguarding, but the Conservatives and Socialists were divided on the issue. The latter were taunted by both their opponents for straddling the question. The Liberal leader, Sir Charles E. Hobhouse wrote in the *Contemporary Review*:

The Labor Party dare not, therefore, face the issue of Free Trade or Protection. Like the liquor question it is taboo in Labor politics. There are many voices, but no opinion, much speech but no courage. There is no declaration, not even any hint of guidance, in the official statement of policy, as to whether Safeguarding is to be continued or abolished, whether food is to be taxed or free, whether Preference is to be encouraged or dispensed with.

An editorial in the Conservative organ of South Wales, the *Western Mail* (Cardiff) said,

If the Socialist party were a genuine Labor party it would have demanded Protection for British workers long ago; instead, the Socialist party, for some undisclosed reason, has actually opposed that measure of justice for British workers.

Finance was another problem that was certain to arouse the interest of English voters, who were groaning under a weight of taxation such as, perhaps, no free people has ever endured. Mr. Churchill's budget last spring gave little relief to the taxpayer, although by a complicated system of "derating," which proved too

complicated for the understanding of the ordinary layman, it sought to lighten the burden weighing down industry. Others complained because only 8% of the total amount of taxes was used for the reduction of the debt. The relation of the Treasury to the Bank of England was another much discussed question as it involved the whole problem of deflation and the discount rate. The industrialists, even in the ranks of the Conservatives, notably Lord Melchett, were decidedly of the opinion that the Bank took far too little heed of industrial expansion, which was sadly crippled by the lack of credit. Conservative organs, such as the *National Review*, felt that the Treasury was dominated by the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street, and it in turn by Wall Street. Labor made much capital out of the fact that the government paid only 2½% on savings bank deposits when the bank discount rate was 3% higher. Commercial and industrial circles generally felt that credit should be more fluid. Some thoughtful people criticised the government for its failure to extend credit facilities to internal improvements. Others insisted on attacking Mr. Baldwin's debt settlement with America as eminently unfair to Britain, and partly responsible for the burden of taxation under which England was staggering. Complaints were also heard that British financiers were loaning money to foreign countries to be used in manufacturing commodities to be sold in competition with English goods. The *National Review*, indeed, definitely attributes unemployment to the financial dependence of the Treasury on the Bank, while Mr. Pethick Lawrence, M.P., frankly said:

The British lion . . . in the shape of British industry allows its tail to be twisted by the Bank of England almost with impunity.

The Labor party was, therefore, on popular ground when it demanded that the relation between the Bank, the Treasury, and British industry should be carefully studied. Despite the very high bank rate (which went up 1% higher a few months later), the Laborites could point to the unexampled prosperity of British banks. The man in the street, proverbially impatient of the esoteric in finance, wondered whether this prosperity might not be due to the high bank rate.

Although other domestic problems interested the people, they did not bulk so large as election issues. The failure of the Conservatives to extend greater educational facilities to the children

of the poor was a sore point with the laboring classes. Temperance advocates cried for a reform of the trade as absolutely indispensable if Britain was to regain her industrial ascendancy, maintaining that a drunken Englishman could not compete economically with a sober American. They pointed to teeming slums of Bermondsey, where every seventh business house was a public house, and one-fifth of its inhabitants in receipt of poor relief. The Laborites refused to take any firm stand on the liquor issue as they feared to deprive the workingman of his ale. The Conservatives likewise chose to let the trade severely alone because of the voting power of 100,000 public houses and a million holders of brewery debentures.

Disarmament was the leading issue in foreign affairs. The ineptitude of the ministry with reference to Anglo-American naval disarmament and the Anglo-French accord furnished the opposition a plentiful supply of ammunition for the canvass. Even thoughtful Conservative organs such as the *Observer* and the *Spectator* shouted from the housetops their disapproval of a policy which had allowed the two English-speaking peoples to drift into a state of unfriendliness. The same group felt that the Dawes Report had imposed too heavy a burden on Germany, and that the entire programme of payments should be revised. A committee of experts was actually in session reexamining the whole problem while the election campaign was proceeding, and the gist of its findings (the Young Report) was known before the pollings.

The previous election had turned upon Britain's relations with Soviet Russia, so the matter of future relations with Russia was certain to be warmly discussed. This was particularly true because of the summary way in which the Conservative government had suspended diplomatic relations with Russia. The raid on the premises of Arcos, Ltd., was a curious episode. The consequent loss of Russian markets helped, in the opinion of the Laborites, to accentuate unemployment.

Such were the main issues, foreign and domestic. Of them all, unemployment and disarmament played the greatest role. The Laborites in particular made much of the enormous amounts still being spent by Britain on armaments. They even claimed that the Conservative failure to expand its programme of social reform was partly due to heavy military costs, that the government

was, in short, spending all its energies in paying for the last war and preparing for the next.

The party programme as proclaimed were in the main surprisingly full and unusually concrete, although the Conservatives apparently expended little thought upon theirs. In drawing up the party pronouncement they were greatly embarrassed by two things. First, the difficulty of endorsing a strong policy of Safeguarding without increasing the cost of food. Secondly, the intransigence of the Diehards against any modification of the Trade Disputes Act, any change in the dole or poor relief, and social reform in general. The party pamphlet, consequently, was a colorless document, mainly concerned with a defense of the party record and of derating. Both Liberals and Laborites criticised derating. The already prosperous brewers, three firms of whom had recently paid over 25% dividends, tax exempt, were to be subsidized to the extent of £400,000. The thriving Chemical Trust would benefit by half that amount while the ministry was cutting down the milk supply for expectant mothers to £12,000 a year. Mr. Baldwin might claim that "90% of our people are living with a higher standard of life than has ever existed in our country." His opponents only pointed to the million and a half out of work. He might maintain that in the last three years British trade with the Empire had increased nearly 40%, but his political enemies indicated that America was slowly but surely gaining the cream of the trade with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. He might mention, furthermore, that his government had spent £913,000,000 on pensions arising out of the war, a sum greater than the combined expenditures of France and Germany, but the Socialist replied that in both those countries the old soldiers had jobs, whereas very many British Tommies had none.

The Labor programme was more ambitious than that of the Conservatives. It promised as a remedy, not a cure, for unemployment the speeding up of public works and desirable internal improvements; to raise the school age to 15 and lower the age for the receipt of pensions; build a million new homes; reorganize British industry; and reestablish trade relations with Russia. They desired also to nationalize the mines, or at least the royalties pertaining thereto, and return to the seven-hour day in the mines; and to increase the super-tax and the tax on the unearned increment in land to pay off the war debt in this generation. They pledged themselves, furthermore, to pass a new Factory Act,

which had been promised by the Conservatives, to investigate the coal, steel, and iron industries, to reform the dole, and extend the system of widows' pensions. Finally, they promised to work for disarmament and for better relations with Russia. It is milder than some of the earlier Labor programmes, for it says nothing about the capital levy and other suggestions of an ultra-Socialist nature, although it did insist upon an investigation of the relations of the Bank to industrial credit, together with a more stringent control of banking and credit.

Mr. Ben Tillett, Chairman of the Trade Union Congress, admirably summed up the aspirations of Labor:

Two outstanding tasks face the Labor government—world peace and disarmament must be secured and the scandal of unemployment must be removed by the organization of trade on a scientific basis. The dog-in-the-manger policy of the banks, and the high financiers must be dealt with, and the position of the coal industry and electrical development call for drastic action. The oil magnates must be tackled and profiteering by the landowners grappled with. The system of taxation direct and indirect, will have to be thoroughly overhauled. The Labor party stands for a business government . . . We shall no longer permit exploitation by the banks and international financiers, who hold 90% of British plant and equipment in pawn.

The stalwart Tory organ, the *Morning Post*, probably did not have Mr. Tillett in mind when it commented upon the Labor programme, or perhaps it did have him specifically in mind:

With the exception of one or two half-wits probably no "Labour" member of Parliament has any belief in Socialism . . . Labour may shout "Socialist" at the top of its voice during an election, but it will not prevent it from doing all it can to preserve capitalism when in office.

The Labor "Manifesto" is an interesting little political document:

Motto: Work or maintenance. Unemployment is more acute than when Labor left office. International relations are worse. Vast areas of the country are derelict. The government's further record is that it have helped its friends by remission of taxation, whilst it has robbed the funds of the workers . . . [and] thrown thousands of workless men and women on the poor law. The Tory government has added £38,000,000 of indirect taxation, which is an increased burden on the wage earners, shop-keepers, and lower middle classes.

The relative moderation of the Labor policy led the *Western Mail* to remark that the absence of a radical programme left that party in a "state of intellectual sterility." The *London Times*

most unkindly said that it was "the policy of Mr. Lloyd George in the language of Mr. Baldwin." The *Morning Post* feared that the carrying out of such a programme "would involve economic chaos," for to lay impious hands upon Safeguarding would imperil the prosperity of several of "our most important modern industries." The Conservative *Yorkshire Post* sarcastically refers to the "Manifesto" as showing "the cloven hoof of the arch-enemy of national prosperity, under the assumed robe of sweet reasonableness and moderation." The *New Leader*, the organ of the Independent Labor party, described the opposition to Labor as made up of five B's: the bishops, "boodle," booze, the brewers, and big business. In the main, however, the passages of arms between Conservatives and Laborites were marked by universal good humor, but both were severely caustic in their references to the Liberals.

Labor was repeatedly taunted, however, with its record as to disarmament in 1924. A professed pacifist, Mr. MacDonald, had yet laid down five battleships! Labor replied that it was impossible to cut any more drastically the bloated programme left by the Conservatives so long as Labor was in office but not in power. The Conservatives, moreover, had both of their new battleships built in private yards, whereas the Laborites had ordered the construction of three of their five in government shipyards. The Tories, they concluded, "do not believe even in national enterprise in building the national navy."

Although the Labor programme was comprehensive, it sounds positively modest in comparison with the Liberal one. The announcement of the liberal unemployment plan may well be called not only the first but the heaviest gun fired during the election. It made a tremendous impression although it was bitterly assailed by the Laborites, who claimed that it had been stolen out of their lockers, and by the Conservatives who feared that its administration would turn England into one vast relief works. Through a great extension of arterial highways and the construction of a large number of telephone lines the scheme hoped to find work for a large number of men. Railway improvement and a generous development of public utilities were to be stimulated by national subsidies, which were to be financed through borrowing. The plan was worked out in its details, and was professedly an attempt to mobilize the nation's resources to end unemployment as had been done earlier to win the war. The plan received much

attention, and the blessing withal of the popular press controlled by the press barons.

The programme of the Liberals in foreign affairs can scarcely be distinguished from that of the Laborites. It wished a resumption of trading relations with Russia, and ardently desired the cultivation of more friendly relations with America. The Conservatives and Socialists devoted most of their criticisms to the Liberal unemployment scheme when they were not making personal attacks upon Mr. Lloyd George. Sir John Simon called attention to this situation:

Nothing in the whole campaign against the Liberal unemployment policy strikes the ordinary citizen as more futile than the attempt when all else fails to ridicule a policy by jeering at Mr. Lloyd George. In fact, the policy is based not on a personal achievement, but on labor and consistent investigation extending over two years by a body of men of expert knowledge and business experience.

Unfortunately for the Liberals their leader's record was exceptionally vulnerable. From the Conservative viewpoint, Mr. Lloyd George had, during the trying days of the Coalition, transformed their leaders into errand boys, while the Laborites remembered how he had let them down, even with respect to his own budget. In an election speech at Aberavon, Wales, Mr. MacDonald said:

One of the grim jokes of the General Election is the poster bearing the picture of the five Liberal leaders, four of whom during the last ten years had been occupied the whole of their time in damning the fifth one [Lloyd George].

Both Conservatives and Laborites resented the presence of over five hundred Liberal candidates in the field, for they felt that so large a number would serve no useful political service for the Liberals, but that they would bedevil the situation as between the Socialists and Conservatives. The *Western Mail* spoke of the

five hundred candidates, the best portion of them bogus, [who] were being run by the Liberal party for no other purpose than to baffle or confuse the decision and to produce a Parliament which would not have the power to given any decision on any great question.

Mr. Austin Hopkinson spoke caustically of the "five hundred political serfs with which Mr. Lloyd George has undertaken to defile the constituencies." The *Morning Post* described the Liberals as a "kept party."

One of the weakest links in Mr. Lloyd George's armor was his election fund, which alone made the five hundred candidates possible. It was charged repeatedly that this fund had its origins in the wholesale distribution of peerages and honors during the Coalition ministry, when profiteers and many other objectionable personages found their way into the House of Lords. The election fund was not the only vulnerable joint in the armor of the Liberal leader. His budget of a score of years ago made him suspected by Conservatives and Laborites alike, but for very different reasons. Since the election of 1918 he has never entirely recovered from the charge of being an opportunist and a bit of a demagogue, a reputation which increased during the last four years of the Coalition. Labor stressed his failure to keep his promise to accept the Sankey recommendations to nationalize the mines, insinuating that he sacrificed the miners to save his premiership. They hold, moreover, that this breach of faith makes him largely responsible for the present plight of the miners.

In a similar way Dr. Christopher Addison, a member for a time of the Coalition ministry, insisted that the prime minister had sold the pass to the Diehards on housing, though

that surrender was not confined to housing alone. He stopped the Forestry grant in 1922; he repealed the Agricultural Wages Act; he prevented the carrying out of the 1918 Education Act.

Labor maintained, moreover, that as early as 1917 it has called his attention to the crying need for more houses, for new roads, land reclamation, light railways and the like, but that he did nothing in four years of peace, but was now utilizing their programme of 1921 as the basis for his unemployment scheme.

The deflation of the currency was also laid at his door whereby he was held largely responsible for the subsequent increase in unemployment. According to the Labor paper, the *Daily Herald*, the Welsh politician with his silver tongue in a cheek of brass, may have won the war, but he most certainly had lost the peace. He had also

taken more milk from mothers and children than even Mr. Neville Chamberlain had done . . . By direct personal instructions, he wrecked his own housing scheme, and earned the praise of reactionaries like Lord Inchcape for doing so . . . Every school boy knows that he destroyed in 1920 the land-taxing machinery he set up.

In short it became obvious that Mr. Lloyd George did not enjoy the confidence of the working classes as did Joseph Chamberlain or Charles Dilke in an earlier day. Commander J. M. Kenworthy wrote that Lloyd George gave Sir Alfred Mond (now Lord Melchett) "the dagger of Safeguarding to slay Free Trade." The Conservatives suggested that Mr. Lloyd George did not have the respect of his own party leaders, or the rank and file of the Liberals, and called attention to the historic protest against the Celtic statesman signed by Viscount Grey, Sir John Simon, and Walter Runciman, and sent to the Earl of Oxford after the collapse of the General Strike.

The professed Socialists were more trusted than Mr. Lloyd George. "There is nothing about Mr. MacDonald to frighten quiet folk," said the *Fortnightly*. "Mr. Snowden, if a rash speaker, is a conservative financier; and as for Mr. Thomas, Mr. Clynes, and Mr. Henderson, there is not the color of a revolutionary among them."

The uncertain factors in the election were soon shadowed forth in bold relief. Could Mr. Lloyd George regain his political prestige at least in part? On account of their limited funds and lack of a popular press would the Laborites effect a coalition with him to fight the election? How would broadcasting, used on a large scale for the first time, influence the constituencies? With such a great number of candidates in the field, how would each of the parties fare? How would the very large number of three-cornered contests (at least 478) affect the issue? How would the women candidates fare? Last, but certainly not least, how would the "flapper" vote?

In stressing the unemployment issue Labor held a great advantage as it was really fighting for jobs for its constituents. The best summary of the demands of the Liberals and Laborites is probably found in the statements by Eleanor Acland, President of the Women's National Liberal Federation:

But one of the main concerns of Liberal reformers has always been the 'condition of the people.' So long as one and a quarter million insured workers cannot find a job; so long as three million people are stunted and demoralized by the squalor of slumdom; so long as over 3,000 mothers die every year in childbirth; so long as over £360 millions are spent annually on alcohol . . . so long Liberal ideals must be our future goal, not our present resting place.

Labor also made much capital out of the Conservative attitude in the administration of national insurance and old age pensions. Mr. Will John, Labor candidate for Rhondda West, said:

No less than 47,000 women over 65 years of age have been refused pensions merely because their husbands were over 70 at the beginning of last year. In addition 50,000 widows had been refused pensions on various pretexts, and 30,000 work people of 65 . . . had been given a weekly pension of 10s. a week by a beneficent government, which at the same time took away their weekly unemployment benefit of 18s.

To all this the ministry could reply that the amount spent on all social services had increased nearly four-fold since 1914, whereas the amount spent on national defense had risen only one-fifth.

The dispute over Safeguarding gave rise to one of the most interesting clashes during the election. Mr. Morris, the motor-car manufacturer, remarked that if the duties on automobiles under Safeguarding were abolished he might be compelled to shut down his factories. He was challenged by the Labor candidate of the King's Norton Division, Birmingham, and Mr. Snowden suggested that such statements were tantamount to intimidation, and might possibly be actionable. This led to much bickering. The Conservatives maintained that Safeguarding had brought a real improvement in the industries safeguarded, whereas their opponents attempted to prove that Safeguarding had brought in its train an increase in prices. Conservatives quoted figures showing that the acreage in sugar beets had increased some fourteen times since 1924. Some of the protected industries advertised in a few of the more important Conservative papers that Safeguarding had brought work to more than a third of a million people, and had increased the revenues of the state some £50,000,000. The *Morning Post* said that under Safeguarding the production of automobiles had risen 250%, fabric gloves 100%, and gramophones from 100% to 400%. In addition the *Morning Post* said that foreign entrepreneurs, notably our own Mr. Ford, were building factories in England which would give employment to 70,000 British laborers. Labor replied that a standard Ford car in 1913 cost £123 in America and £135 in England, but that in 1929 the respective prices were £78 and £150.

The great Liberal organ, the *Manchester Guardian*, was much concerned with the indirect effects of Safeguarding, which

is the new form of electoral corruption. It vitiates democracy at the core. For where there is Free Trade and a democratic system national

questions come first. Local issues must exert their effect, but sectional ones are swallowed up in the national appeal. Safeguarding puts sectional interests first, and it offers new opportunities for the powerful and highplaced to corrupt the votes of their subordinates. For such influence is corrupt in effect, whatever its intention. It is the duty of the elector and of those who appeal to it to weigh national issues.

The opposition generally sought to show that under the policy of Safeguarding it would be only a question of time until all industries would be protected without any corresponding gain to the people. In fact the Laborites cited figures to show that the value of the home produced safeguarded goods exported from England had fallen from £5,243,000 in 1924 to £4,724,000 in 1929.

Sir Charles E. Hobhouse gave vent to his spleen in the *Contemporary Review*, and tied up Safeguarding with the problems of the Empire:

The government of the Tory party have persuaded themselves that any expansion of overseas trade, unless it is with the Dominions or the Colonies, is undesirable. Maintenance even of existing trade with the rest of the world is more than suspect. Tariffs have been imposed to destroy or restrict it. If they are not sufficiently punitive they are to be increased in number and severity. The theory apparently is that competition with the Dominions is the breath of life, but from elsewhere it is a poisonous exhalation.

As a matter of fact Imperial problems cut little figure in the canvass, although Mr. Sidney Dark referred to the matter in a thought-provoking article in the *English Review*:

Certainly a considerable number of the unemployed could be provided with work and homes in the Dominions, and a thorough-going scheme of Empire emigration might be an important part of the social reconstruction I have in mind. It might be very good business to subsidize the development of Australia, which could support millions more inhabitants. But will the Dominion governments coöperate or even sanction?

In all the discussion of rationalization, the Liberals and Laborites claimed that the Conservative government had refused to use its influence to compel industries with methods little short of medieval to modernize their plants. It was held that the first duty of a progressive ministry should have been to decrease the cost of power in industry. They might, so their political enemies charged, have subsidized projects for the cheapening of power, such as the Severn barrage or the erection of enormous electrical power stations at pitheads. They held, moreover, that nothing

of consequence had been done to increase the productivity of agriculture. As a result there had been a steady drift away from the rural areas and an increase in the importation of food supplies.

The question of rationalization led to another interesting episode in the election. The efficiency of the railways had frequently been called in question, particularly with reference to the handling of freight. Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate, inspired possibly by his earlier experience in Canada, came out plump in the midst of the canvass for rationalization of the rolling stock of the railways, especially the small ten-ton trucks. Day in and day out he used the publicity which the circulation of the *Daily Express* gave him to demand pledges from the leaders of all three parties that they would take the matter in hand. His programme was supported by Mr. J. H. Thomas and by several Conservative candidates, who said that some three-fourths of these trucks were privately owned, and there were about two hundred and fifty different types of them with an average capacity of less than twelve tons. He insisted, moreover, that one-half their journeys were wasted, and that they were used on an average only five days a month. A Conservative candidate estimated that there were about 700,000 of these tiny trucks owned by 10,000 people, and that four-fifths of them were practically worn out, and should be replaced by 20 and 40 ton cars. Mr. MacDonald seemed interested in the possibilities of railway rationalization, and Mr. Lloyd George, because he estimated that it would give work to 50,000 to 100,000 men for a season, favored extending liberal credit facilities to hasten the modernization of the railways. Mr. Baldwin was a little more cautious, favoring an investigation of the needs of the railways before supporting any particular policy. Mr. Churchill was enthusiastic, hinting that it was fundamentally unwise to carry out Mr. Lloyd George's unemployment programme and "boom" the roads to the neglect of the railways. During this flurry in the election atmosphere, the *Spectator*, the *New Statesman*, and the *Nation and Athenaeum* all rallied to the support of Lord Beaverbrook.

A bit of excitement also arose over the publication as a White Paper of an attack on Mr. Lloyd George's programme over the signatures of five of the members of the Conservative ministry. Liberals and Laborites at once attacked it as an unwarranted use of power by the government in the midst of an election campaign. Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Lloyd George vied with each other in

denouncing it. The former inevitably touched upon the moral aspect:

The rectitudes of political life are being destroyed That the political party which happens to be in power should dip its hands into the public purse and publish what is nothing but an election manifesto in the guise of an official publication, is a dereliction of public duty which ought to receive the emphatic censure of everybody.

Questions of foreign policy played a larger role than usual in this election, largely on account of the great interest in disarmament. In a succinct special article in the *Daily Mail* Mr. MacDonald frankly stated his position:

We stick feathers in our caps when we sign a pact of peace; we do the same when we pursue a policy which assumes that there is to be another war. This maddening confusion of mind and policy between the Sunday pulpit and the diplomatic conference is unfitting us either to secure ourselves in peace or prepare in a far-seeing way for a later war. Tragically we fall between two stools. There is also far too much of nerveless fear to accept our opportunities.

He insisted, moreover, that England must show her sincerity by working for peace and not for war, and promised that if Labor were returned to power it would seek in a constructive way to improve Anglo-American relations.

The election was followed with unusual interest in Russia, Germany, and the United States. The Soviets felt that if Labor were successful it would keep its campaign pledge and renew diplomatic relations. The *Morning Post*, meanwhile, sought to recall the close relations of the British Socialists, Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. Smillie with the Russians in May, 1917. The Laborites ignored this, however, and stressed Britain's ambiguous position with reference to the enemies of the Soviets after 1919, and the large loan that was made to the supporters of Wrangel, Koltchak, and Deniken. They also mentioned the growing trade of Germany and the United States with Russia. In 1928 this amounted to seven times that of Britain with the Russians, whereas in 1924 Britain had almost as much of Russian trade as both the others. This, they maintained, explained at least in part the recent increase in English unemployment.

The reparation problem bulked large in the campaign. While it was being studied anew, Germany was greatly concerned to know whether, after the election, she would have to deal with the Conservatives or Laborites. Meanwhile, the whole movement

towards disarmament lagged at Geneva, waiting upon the issue of the campaign. Into this placid situation Mr. Hoover, the new American president, threw a bombshell. Through his spokesman at Geneva, Mr. Hugh Gibson, he came out emphatically not only for the immediate limitation, but rather for a definite reduction of armaments, not only arousing the delegates at Geneva, but awakening new interest in disarmament during the British election. Lord Cushendum, the British representative at Geneva, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, and even the Prime Minister himself came out in favor of a reduction of armaments. Despite their obvious anxiety to capitalize this situation for their own advantage, it is probable that the Laborites gained most from Mr. Hoover's announcement.

For the most part the election meetings were very quiet, although there was a small amount of rioting and disturbance, which was all too easy for the mischievously minded, as so many of the meetings were held in the open air. The popular press complained of the dullness and the apathy of the Conservatives, and expressed a belief that the great bulk of the flappers would never trouble themselves to vote at all. Even the *Observer* suggested that it was the dullest canvass in half a century. The *Spectator* disagreed, however, and referred to the "vigorous electoral campaign," and "Kappa" in the *Nation and Athenaeum*, is more emphatic:

But above all, this is not a dull election, because it is concerned with the real, tragic matter of life; with an heroic effort to stop the rot of unemployment, with housing, a primitive necessity of existence; with the supreme issue of saving civilization, such as it is, from the shipwreck of war. This election in a degree unexampled in living memory, is concerned with things which come home to men's business and lives.

To judge by the large percentage of the voters that went to the polls the election was characterized by a quiet earnestness, which indicates that they had been thinking furiously about the complicated issues of the election as presented by the various speakers and newspapers.

The numerous election forecasts during the progress of the election were varied and interesting. They agreed only in assigning fewer members to the Conservatives, and more to the Liberals and Laborites. The Stock Exchange interested itself in the canvass, and odds were offered the unwary who wished to

wager on the results. In 1923 the Stock Exchange gave the Conservatives a majority varying from 38 to 50, when as a matter of fact they were 50 short of having a majority. The average quotations of the Stock Exchange for three days preceding the election were: Conservatives, 271; Laborites, 247; Liberals, 95. Mr. MacDonald estimated the Liberal strength considerably less, from 40 to 70, and put the question to Mr. Baldwin, whether in case of a stalemate he would request the king to summon the leader of so small a band to form a government. The prognostications of Mr. Lloyd George referred only to the popular vote. He believed that Labor would receive seven and a half million votes, the Liberals seven, and the Conservatives six and a half million. Mr. Baldwin felt that his party would retain a majority of fifty. Neither Lord Rothermere nor Mr. Garvin could be accused of so much optimism, but those two and Mr. Maxse had, throughout the canvass, essayed the rôle of Cassandra. The *Manchester Guardian* felt that the Liberals would win over a hundred seats. Most interesting of all, perhaps, was the estimate of Mr. Sidney Webb (now Lord Passfield). He gave the Conservatives from 280 to 300 seats, the Socialists 250-260, and the Liberals 60 to 80.

The results surprised the most optimistic Laborites. Even Mr. MacDonald acknowledged that he anticipated no such castigation of the Conservatives. It was, in reality, a political landslide for Labor, as the Liberals gained few seats in comparison to the energies put forth. Labor captured almost the entire Celtic fringe of Scotland and Wales. Only in Ulster, and to a less degree in Southern England did the Conservatives save anything from the wreck. Yet they contested every seat in Wales, winning but 1, to 10 for the Liberals and 25 for Labor. In the Glamorganshire mining area Labor had a clean sweep of 16 seats. Although contesting most of the seats in Scotland the Conservatives lost nearly half their seats there. In Ulster local considerations, and the fear that the Socialists might force her into the Irish Free State, caused the people to vote even more strongly Unionist than in 1924. Southern England, however, even including South London, remained steadfastly Conservative, returning only 5 Laborites and 1 Liberal to 51 Conservatives. With the exception of Cornwall, which went solidly Liberal, Western England remained faithful to its old traditions, returning 9 Laborites and 9 Liberals to 30 Conservatives. Durham, another mining area, went solidly for Labor; the West Riding was strongly Labor; Lancashire also

was lost, and the Midlands, even Birmingham going Labor. In fact Sir Austen Chamberlain held his father's old seat there by the narrow margin of 41 votes!

In the entire country, Labor won some 290 seats, the Conservatives 260, and the Liberals 60. The balance of power, consequently lay with the cohorts of Mr. Lloyd George. The popular vote is especially informing, Conservatives, 8,600,000; Labor, 8,400,000; Liberals, 5,300,000. Had the seats been assigned according to the popular vote, the membership of the Commons would have stood: Conservatives, 229; Labor, 222; Liberals, 140. The Liberals then would have occupied a much stronger position. Curiously enough the total number of seats won by the Liberals and Laborites was practically identical in 1923 and 1929. Yet Labor had cast only 63,000 votes in 1900; in 1918 it had two million and a quarter; five years later it had practically doubled, and in 1929 it had almost doubled again. In the same period of less than three decades its membership in the Commons rose from 2 to 290. Nevertheless, a study of the popular vote in this election will show that in comparison with that of 1924 the Liberals gained more numerically and proportionately than the Laborites.

On account of the large number of triangular contests, something like one-half of the seats in the new House of Commons are held by a minority vote. One hundred eighteen candidates forfeited their election deposits, three of them in Brighton alone. The women candidates did well at the pollings, although only one Liberal, Miss Megan Lloyd George, was successful. The Conservatives were able to return but three, Lady Astor, Lady Iveagh, and the Duchess of Athol, all three re-elected. Among the outstanding Labor women elected were Miss Bondfield, Miss Lawrence, and Lady Cynthia Mosley, daughter of the late Marquis of Curzon, and granddaughter of Levi Leiter of Chicago. In all, 14 were elected. The legal profession fared well, as 91 of its representatives were chosen; the miners came next with 41; journalism has 23, and the teachers 15.

Mr. Lloyd George not only has a daughter but a son by his side in the house; Mr. Arthur Henderson has two sons by him; Mr. MacDonald has a son supporting him, but Mr. Baldwin's son was elected by the Laborites. Lady Cynthia Mosley will have her husband, Sir Oswald, to bear her company, the only man and wife combination in the present house. The two sons of Joseph Chamberlain are the only brothers in the Commons. Five members of

the Conservative ministry were defeated, although only one might be considered to be in the first flight. The party, however, lost some of their brighter and more aggressive young men, who will be sorely missed in the present Parliament.

For some days after the results were announced there was considerable doubt as to what would happen. Mr. Baldwin might carry on until defeated by a Liberal-Laborite combination, or he might effect a *modus vivendi* with Mr. Lloyd George. The possibilities of such a coalition for a short time seemed considerable, but the mass of the Conservatives shrank from another alliance with a man whom they so thoroughly distrusted. Another suggestion was found in a little pamphlet, *Robinson the Great*, published anonymously during the election, but now known to be by Mr. Ramsay Muir. He foresaw the election would be indecisive, and intimated that the leader of the smallest group might well carry on the government.

The suggestion that the government should be carried on by a Coalition which would contain Mr. Lloyd George generated much heat. Mr. Maxse had long since made it clear that he infinitely preferred a Socialist régime, as a Coalition could only be temporary, and would be certain to bring the Socialists into office in the end. He could not forgive the canny Welshman for "dishing the Tories" and becoming under the Coalition more absolute than the Czar of all the Russias. The left wing of Labor found the idea equally repulsive. Mr. Fenner Brockway in the *New Leader*, asserted that a Liberal-Labor compact was "intolerable," for it "would destroy our self-reliance and independence," and "would make the attainment of a majority and power in the next election impossible. If the Liberals abstain from voting with Labor in the speech from the throne, we can defeat the Conservatives with our own strength. If the Liberals vote against us, that will mean suicide for the Liberal party."

Such an agreement was tentatively suggested by Mr. H. N. Brailsford, a member of the Independent Labor party, but it was not well received, for the National Council of the party definitely resolved against it as being "fatal to the Socialist purposes for which the Labour Government has been entrusted with power."

The idea of a Coalition, however, was not repulsive to the *Manchester Guardian*, or the *Daily News*, although both agreed with the *New Statesman* that Labor must show more consideration for

the Liberals than it did in 1924, when its treatment of the Liberals was one long series of insults. The *Guardian* insisted that the Liberals could not support Mr. MacDonald, "if at the end of the journey the guillotine shall stand waiting." A Coalition, furthermore, was almost attractive to Lord Rothermere, and by no means objectionable to Lord Beaverbrook or Mr. Garvin. Despite the entreaties of such Conservative leaders as Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Baldwin decided, however, to resign at once. In this he was supported by Mr. Churchill, who felt that Labor as the strongest party should be given its chance. The king immediately summoned Mr. MacDonald to form a government. Mr. Lloyd George, however, served notice that the Liberals must have their price if they were to refrain from opposing Labor policies. One thing he insisted upon was electoral reform. In addition he said,

I assume that the Government will immediately . . . resume diplomatic relations with Russia . . . ; [and] that they will immediately withdraw our troops from the Rhineland . . . [But] the very hour the Ministry decides to become a Socialist administration its career ends . . . It could only then be kept in power by Tory votes or Tory indulgence.

Mr. MacDonald promptly formed a government, which was especially notable for the general high level of ability of its members, and the absence of the ultra-Socialistic group. Labor's victory in Britain had its reverberation all over Europe, and even in America it occasioned rejoicing among the Labor leaders. For the second time in English history the Labor party is in office but not in power. Its position, nevertheless, is far more satisfactory than six years ago, because both the Liberals and Conservatives seem determined to see that Labor is given its day in court.

To account for the Labor victory would be very difficult. It was due in part as in France in 1848 to the fact that the people were bored. There may have been as well something of the reaction against Aristides the Just, as many became weary of the all too placid countenance of the Conservative leader, who had in five years failed to bring Britain out of the slough of economic despond in which she has been wallowing for a decade. The voters, moreover, could not forget Mr. Lloyd George's political fund, although they did ignore, despite Lord Rothermere's thunderings, his great record during the war. Possibly it was the "flapper" that was so insistent upon a change! For its first six months

Labor seems to have done well, and exceptionally so in diplomacy. How it will be able to stand up against the buffeting of the Commons in the future sessions remains to be seen. It is clear that storms are ahead over unemployment, mining, and India.

III

THE MAPLE LEAF CHANGES COLOR CANADA GOES CONSERVATIVE

By BEN A. ARNESON

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When Richard B. Bennett on August 7, as a result of the overwhelming victory of the Conservatives in the parliamentary elections of July 28, became Canada's fifteenth premier, he found his party with 137 seats out of a total of 245 in the House of Commons. For the first time since the war the Canadian House of Commons contains a majority made up of a single party. Beginning with the campaign of 1917 every parliamentary election up to the one just closed has failed to give more than a minority to any party. In 1917 the Conservatives secured 115 seats and Sir Robert Borden, the Conservative war-time premier, was kept in power because the Liberals in the campaign were divided into two groups, the Laurier Liberals and the Unionist, or Coalition, Liberals. The Unionist-Liberals, who received 38 seats, supported Borden. The party line-up of the House after each of the four elections since 1917 has been as follows:

	Lib- eral	Con- serv- ative	Pro- gres- sive	Lib- eral Pro- gres- sive	Unit- ed Farm- ers	La- bor	Inde- pend- ent
1921 _____	117	49	64	—	—	3	2
1925 _____	101	118	23	—	—	2	1
1926 _____	119	91	8	11	11	3	2
1930 _____	88	137	2	3	10	3	2

At no previous time in the history of the Dominion has one party controlled as many seats as do the Conservatives in the newly elected House. The outgoing premier, William L. Mackenzie King, had been in office since December, 1921, except for a few weeks during the summer of 1926 when Arthur Meighen—Conservative—held the office. King was able to maintain a majority in the House through the coöperation of the Progressives.

Even after the 1925 election King, due to the support of the Progressives, managed to continue as premier in spite of the fact that the Conservatives controlled seventeen more seats than did his own party. Since 1926 the Liberals have governed with four votes less than a bare majority. The Progressives were won over by the conciliatory attitude of King who even went so far as to include one of the Progressive leaders, Crerar, in his cabinet.

Like most Canadian national campaigns, the contest which culminated on July 28 was bitterly fought; personalities were indulged in and there were at times more or less concealed appeals to sectionalism. Five hundred and forty-five candidates presented themselves for the 245 seats as compared to 530 candidates in 1926. A candidate for a parliamentary seat is required to make a deposit of \$200. This deposit is forfeited if the candidate fails to receive one-half as many votes as the successful candidate. This requirement, which has been strenuously opposed in some quarters, is very effective in keeping down the number of candidates. There were, nevertheless, 38 triangular contests in the 1930 campaign. Eight constituencies had four candidates while in one (Springfield Riding, Manitoba) five candidates presented themselves. Two seats were uncontested while in 196 districts the fight was between 2 aspirants only, which, except in the Prairie Provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), meant a Liberal candidate against a Conservative.

The Liberals asked to be continued in power on their record since 1921 and pointed to internal achievements, such as old-age pensions, and the successful operation of the Canadian National Railways, and to achievements in external affairs, particularly the development of the new status of Canada in the British Empire and the enviable position attained by the Dominion in the League of Nations. The recently enacted finance law known as the Dunning budget received much attention from both parties. Ardent championed by the Liberals, this budget, providing for countervailing duties to offset the provisions of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill and, what was equally significant, providing for preferences to goods coming from various parts of the British Empire, became a law in May and was violently attacked by the Conservatives during the campaign. Mr. Bennett charged that the Dunning budget in effect left the decision as to Canadian tariffs in the hands of the United States because a change in

the United States tariffs would bring a corresponding change in the countervailing duties. Both parties, however, vigorously insisted that they were antagonistic to the trade policies of the United States. In dissenting from the Liberal policy of Empire Free Trade the Conservatives propose preferential tariffs within the Empire by agreement. Mr. Bennett ventured the suggestion that Canada "blast" its way into trade relations with the home country. The *Toronto Globe* almost daily ridiculed this proposal in its editorials and the word "blast" was construed by it to mean that a Conservative victory might even bring about a tariff war with Great Britain. It would be much more effective, claimed the Liberals, to go on with preferential duties on British goods with the expectation that the mother country would reciprocate. For several days the *Globe* carried a front page streamer using these words "Let Uncle Sam Go His Way—Our Way Is With John Bull." The Conservatives countered by the use of the slogan "Canada First" and could hardly be accused of showing friendliness to Uncle Sam. As in past elections, no political leaders had any desire to be known as an admirer or champion of the United States.

Quite naturally the Bennett forces emphasized the hard times especially the large amount of unemployment in the Dominion and shrewdly tried to lay the blame for this situation on the King government. Bennett promised to call a special session of Parliament to deal with unemployment if his party came into power. King, on the other hand, proposed to call a conference of experts to deal with the problem—a procedure which it was claimed would be more effective and much less expensive than a special session of Parliament. A report, spread through French-Canadian Quebec on the eve of election that a victory for the Conservatives would mean conscription of Canadian soldiers to fight in India and Egypt and vigorously denied by the Bennett forces, is an example of the shrewd tactics used by some of the Liberals. This strenuous campaign ended with Bennett and King alternating on a nation-wide radio hook-up on the evening of Saturday, July 26. In these speeches each leader savagely attacked the policies of his opponent. While each side forecast a decided victory, the Liberals seemed the more confident and prophesied that at least 140 seats in the new House would be occupied by their adherents.

The result of the poll by provinces was as follows:—

	Lib- erals	Con- serv- atives	Unit- ed Farm- ers	Pro- gres- sives	Lib- eral Pro- gres- sives	La- bor	Inde- pend- ent	Total
Prince Edward Island	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	4
Nova Scotia	4	10	0	0	0	0	0	14
New Brunswick	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	11
Quebec	40	24	0	0	0	0	1	65
Ontario	22	59	1	0	0	0	0	82
Manitoba	1	11	0	0	3	2	0	17
Saskatchewan	11	8	0	2	0	0	0	21
Alberta	3	4	9	0	0	0	0	16
British Columbia	5	7	0	0	0	1	1	14
Yukon	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	88	137	10	2	3	3	2	245

In addition to securing a large majority in the Commons, the Conservatives had the satisfaction of sending no less than five members of the Liberal cabinet, who were candidates for reëlection, down to defeat. Especially notable was the defeat of the Minister of Finance, Charles A. Dunning, the father of the famous budget bill, whose Regina, Saskatchewan, constituency by a heavy majority elected a Conservative to take his place. Not quite so heavy was the majority against Thomas A. Crerar, Minister of Railways and Canals in the King cabinet, who sought reëlection in the Brandon, Manitoba, district which had elected him without opposition a few years before. Crerar was the organizer of the Progressive Party in 1919 and it was his acceptance of a post in the King cabinet some years later which reunited the Liberals and the Progressives. In the 1930 election Crerar's Conservative opponent alone polled more votes than did Crerar and a third candidate (Labor) together. Of the two leaders Bennett fared better at the polls than King who, while elected by a comfortable majority in his district (Prince Albert—Saskatchewan), ran behind in the early returns. Bennett's district (Calgary West, Alberta) gave him a majority three times as large as he had secured in the 1926 election. His opponent ran so poorly that he "lost his deposit." The Liberals were to some degree consoled by gains in British Columbia and by the election of a Liberal member from rockribbed Conservative Toronto in the person of Samuel Factor, a Jew, who carried the Toronto West Centre constituency against a strong conservative candidate.

It was in the province of Quebec—the “solid South” of Canadian Liberalism—that the Conservatives made their most spectacular gains. Ever since the days of Sir Wilfrid Laurier—Canada’s eighth premier (1896–1911)—and even before that, French-Canadian Quebec has been a Liberal stronghold. But in 1930 the Bennett forces increased their Quebec seats from four to twenty-four. Only once in recent times has such a record been made in this province and that was in the famous 1911 election when the Liberals championed reciprocity with the United States. This proposal was opposed by the French-Canadians and as a result the Conservatives, who stood staunchly against the proposed agreement, were able to carry about two dozen Quebec districts. However, in the following election, 1917, the number of Conservative seats dropped to two and no Conservatives were elected. In no election since then—until 1930—has there been more than four Conservatives from the Province of Quebec. Previous to the election the Conservatives held three seats from Montreal and one from the nearby county of Argenteuil. Now the Conservatives not only hold these four, but have won twenty more including some from distinctly rural districts.

Various interpretations are already made of the clear-cut Conservative victory in Canada. No doubt the Empire trade policy of the Liberals alienated many French-Canadians who are regularly affiliated with that party and this accounts in part for the heavy losses in Quebec. The same policy very likely accounts for the Liberal gains in British Columbia where there is much British sentiment. As far as trade with the United States is concerned—and Canada has long been our best customer—it probably will matter little which party is in control as the countervailing duties of the Liberals or the Canada First protectionist policies of the Conservatives would in either case increase the duties on American goods. In the long run the Bennett policies may mean higher tariffs than would be imposed by the Liberals but this is by no means certain. Perhaps the best explanation lies in the economic situation including unemployment. The King government was unjustly blamed for these conditions, and voters the world over are more prone to vote for a change of administration during hard times. One clear result of the election is that Canada will now for the first time since the war have a government by a party which is in complete control of the House of Commons. This is a situation highly welcomed by Canadians generally. At the

same time it will mean that the new premier and his party must take full responsibility for things done or left undone.

The recent election further shows that Canada is a two-party country. Third parties have almost disappeared. The United Farmers of Alberta with nine members, augmented by a lone member from Ontario, seem to have no future although they have for several years resisted the temptation of amalgamating with the Liberals. The most formidable third party of recent years has been the Progressive which, born in 1919 as a sectional revolt against the old parties, succeeded, in 1921 under the leadership of Crerar who had been a member of Michigan's Conservative cabinet, in winning sixty-four seats, twenty-four of them from Ontario. The old parties recaptured most of these in 1925 and a year later Crerar joined the Liberal cabinet of King. Today the Progressives group has only five seats. It seems that Canada, unlike the Mother country and her sister dominions in the empire, is emulating the example of the United States and of Japan by avoiding a multiplicity of parties.

Of the ten women who were candidates for office only one, Miss Agnes McPhail, was a member of the last House. Miss McPhail, who is the lone member of the United Farmers of Ontario, will be the only woman member of the new House, the other nine being defeated.

The Communists presented candidates in seven districts scattered in four provinces. In the Winnipeg North constituency, where the Labor candidate was elected, the Communists cast about 2,000 votes out of a total of 14,000. In the other six districts the vote was small and it is clear that Canada is in no danger from this quarter.

The new Bennett cabinet contains fourteen Protestants and five Catholics—nine are lawyers. Under the Canadian law an appointee to the Cabinet must go back to his district within three weeks for reelection. These special elections were held August 25, and, as the Liberals offered no opposition, the procedure was only a formality. A special session of Parliament is already at work at the difficult task of solving the unemployment problem. Revision of the tariff is also on the agenda. Like Heinrich Bruening, the Chancellor of Germany, Premier Bennett is a bachelor and his popular sister, Miss Mildred Bennett, will preside as hostess over the premier's household. This is no innovation to Canadians, as the outgoing premier is also a bachelor.

King and his followers have accepted defeat as good sportsmen. The former premier will continue as a respected party leader. The new premier, aged 60, has been a member of the two Meighen cabinets and enjoys the confidence and admiration of all parties. If, when the time comes, he can retire from the premiership as high in the esteem of his countrymen and of the world as has his opponent and predecessor, and there is no reason apparent why he should not, Canada is to be congratulated.

OVERSEAS MARKETING OF DAIRY PRODUCE IN
NEW ZEALAND UNDER THE DAIRY
EXPORT ACT OF 1923

By ROBERT L. HUNT

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The experience of the New Zealand dairymen in trying to exercise a large measure of control over prices by organization, backed by governmental authority, illustrates many of the difficulties that arise to defeat attempts at price-fixing.

A brief review of the dairy situation in New Zealand prior to the Act in 1923 will help to understand the Act itself. The government early recognized that the climate and land of New Zealand were favorable for dairying, and by numerous legislative acts, dating from 1892, the government consistently offered encouragement to the development of factories for processing dairy products and in promoting dairy herd improvement, mechanical milking, grading, cold storage, etc. Coöperation has been applied to dairying from the first, and ninety per cent of the 445 dairy factories existing in 1925 were owned, controlled, and financed by the farmers. New Zealand has a large number of dairy cows in proportion to its population, and is now one of the leading dairy produce exporting countries of the world. One-fourth of the people are engaged in the dairy industry.

Statistics for 1925 indicate that New Zealand exported 1,245,324 cwt. of butter, of which 1,186,965 cwt. were taken by Great Britain. Export of cheese for the same year amounted to 1,376,754 cwt. and Great Britain took 1,371,986 of this. It is evident, therefore, that Great Britain is the chief consumer of New Zealand dairymen. This does not mean, however, that New Zealand has complete control of the British market. Danes alone furnish one-fourth of the butter eaten by the British.

One of the chief contributing causes for the attempt of New Zealand to control dairy produce exports is found in the great price fluctuations that have occurred seasonally since the World War. The producers claimed they had to sell their produce when prices were low. As a matter of fact, New Zealand did not command the higher prices for obvious reasons. She has only a short dairying production period, October to April. Taking two months

for a sea transport, most of the dairy products reach Great Britain during the period of December or January to June. Something like four-fifths of her total exports arrive in England during these months. Denmark, on the other hand, has her production so scheduled as to give a fairly even flow throughout the year. When dairy products from the southern hemisphere arrive to augment the nearly constant supply from the northern hemisphere, prices naturally tend to fall. In October and November the supplies from northern countries are usually lessened, and prices as a consequence tend to be high. At this time the dairy season is in full swing in New Zealand, but her supplies, on account of the great distance, are still six to eight weeks from the markets. New Zealand dairymen claim, with some reason, that when New Zealand butter does arrive in quantities in England, the buyers tend to hold off, anticipating the usual decline in prices, thus sending the price still lower. When, however, they do enter the market, prices react, and the buyers are able to sell at a large profit. The long period necessary to get butter from New Zealand to England is no advantage to the flavor of the butter. Customers are inclined to prefer butter with a date mark showing the butter recently churned. The Danes have made the most of their location, and never fail to call the customers' attention to their date marks.

The New Zealand Dairy Produce Export Control Act was passed by Parliament in 1923. The Act provided for a Dairy Export Control Board, composed of twelve members; nine representing the producers, two representing the government, and one representing the manufacturers and handlers of dairy produce. The members representing the producers were to hold office for three years, three members retiring each year. The other three members were to be appointed by the government, and were to hold office until removed by the Governor-General. These members could be removed any time by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of the Board. The Act was designed to concentrate the whole of the exportable butter and cheese under the control of the Board. The avowed functions of the Board were: 1. To regulate shipments; 2. to open up and develop markets other than London; 3. to advertise New Zealand butter and cheese; 4. to control distribution with the object of obtaining full market values; 5. to stabilize markets by preventing congestion and speculation; 6. to coöperate with Australia

and Denmark in marketing the butter; 7. to make advantageous freight rates.

The Act created an agency of the Board in London for the purpose of giving the Board representation in the British markets and the duty of this agency is described in the Act as follows: "It shall be the duty of the London Agency to keep the Board advised as to the current prices of dairy produce and as to other matters relative to the disposal of New Zealand dairy produce in England or elsewhere, and generally to act as the agent of the Board in accordance with the direction of the Board." The Board was given authority to prohibit the export from New Zealand of "any dairy produce save in accordance with a license to be issued by the Minister of Agriculture subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be approved by the Board." This authority was given the Board for the purpose of enabling the Board effectively to control the export, sale, and distribution of New Zealand dairy products. The Act empowered the Board to determine for itself as to *when* it should be absolute or limited.

The Board was given authority to make all contracts for the carrying on the sea of all dairy products. It was further authorized to prescribe, by regulation, the charges that were to be paid by exporters of dairy products and could levy on each pound of butter and cheese an amount equal to the amount of the charges prescribed by regulation. This latter amount could be set aside as a reserve fund, but it can never exceed one-fourth of a cent per pound on butter, nor one-eighth of a cent per pound on cheese. Generally, the Board was to handle, pool, store, sell, dispose of, insure, distribute, and otherwise deal with New Zealand butter and cheese as it deemed in the interest of the New Zealand dairymen. The Acts declared the Board the agent of all the owners of dairy products of which the Board assumed control. The Board, it seems, was given considerable power to play with.

The foregoing has only briefly outlined the Act as passed by Parliament. Before the Act could become a law, it had to be passed upon by the producers themselves by direct vote. The producers voted in favor of the Act by a considerable majority in 1924.

It is doubtful if the majority of the farmers realized the real significance of the Act when they voted for it. Some deception

was probably used in coaxing some of the farmers to support the Act. It seems that Tooley Street is to the New Zealand farmers what Wall Street is to the farmers of America. Tooley Street merchants were supposed to be the robbers of New Zealand dairymen. The leaders understood enough of farmer psychology to make the most of Tooley Street "bugbear." Farmers were also led to believe the Danish and Australian dairymen were controlling prices and had the Tooley Street merchants dancing to their tune. Furthermore, there is to be found considerable evidence to prove that the farmers were made to believe the board would not under ordinary conditions take advantage of the authority given by the Act to assume absolute control over all exports. This proved to be the real "Joker" in the Act.

The board in its first two years worked to direct export trade and to obtain favorable terms for freight, insurance, etc., for the producers. During these two years, however, some of the board members were clamoring for absolute control as a means of fixing prices. The board found excuses, not altogether acceptable to the industry, for establishing absolute control over exports in August, 1926. The board "took the bits between its teeth" and plunged headlong in the direction of price fixing. Its action in assuming absolute control was contested in the courts, but the courts held that the board was legally authorized to take control of all butter and cheese made by all factories whether private or coöperative. Once the board took over absolute control, their troubles commenced. It started off by making the mistake of appointing as manager a Mr. J. B. Wright, who apparently never had the confidence of the English dairy produce merchants. This mistake was followed by the issuing of instructions to the merchants how to handle butter and cheese. The merchants were told how they must handle, sell, and finance the butter and cheese controlled by the board. The board decided further that the London Agency should fix minimum prices for finest and first grade butter salted and unsalted, and that no sales to steamers were to be made without instructions from the board. The stocks on arrival, which included the large seasonal consignments of the early months of 1927, were to be held in cold storage until the market price should rise to the level fixed. The holding of this butter was of no advantage to the flavor of butter already several months old. The net result of the endeavor was to antagonize the British dealers seriously, and to start a

boycott of New Zealand butter and cheese, which caused the butter and cheese to remain in storage or to be sold in small quantities and eventually at lower prices than the corresponding period of 1926.

Some of the reasons why merchants boycotted the New Zealand butter might be summarized as follows: (1) They did not like to be told how, when, and for what price they could get New Zealand butter; (2) merchants were asked to handle New Zealand produce on a smaller commission; (3) there were to be no private, confidential purchases; (4) the board demanded the right to audit merchants' books, etc.; (5) British people are looking for cheap food and will buy where they can get it the cheapest; (6) large and small buyers were to pay the same price; (7) buyers never knew when they were buying advantageously, as they could not anticipate when the board might change price levels; for there was nothing like a guarantee that prices would not be lowered; (8) an attempt was made to cut out all brokers handling the New Zealand butter; (9) compulsory control was not a familiar thing to British peoples.

The upshot of it all was that the papers in England were anything but complimentary to the board and its purposes, while the merchants sought new supplies and new sources for their butter and cheese. The brokers who were eliminated from handling New Zealand butter naturally supplied their customers with products from other sources than New Zealand.

Prices fixed by the London Agency for January and February, 1927, which are "peak" months for supplies of southern hemisphere butter, were from 172 shillings to 174 shillings per hundredweight, but it proved impossible to sell at those prices, and from the middle of February to the 12th of March, the prices were gradually lowered to 158 shillings without stimulating demand. During the same period Australian and Argentine stocks were being cleared at prices from 168 shillings to 158 shillings, while Danish butter was commanding prices which remained at 20 shillings to 25 shillings per hundredweight higher than those asked for New Zealand butter, whereas in previous years this difference averaged about 12 shillings. The price-fixing policy completely defeated its own ends. The British merchants demonstrated that they could get along without New Zealand products. The board with absolute control in their hands seemed to have been successful in making mistakes wherever

possible. By March, 1927, the board had accumulated an unusually large amount of New Zealand butter in London by its holding-back tactics to force prices up. At the very time New Zealand butter should have gone into consumption as fast as possible to avoid the severe competition of the high-production period of the northern hemisphere, the board was holding back New Zealand butter to influence prices.

The board was not very successful in stopping speculation. Its policy, some claim, actually led to some speculation. For example, the board in trying to set prices had finally to put prices down low enough to move the butter, whereupon the speculators bought generously. When the board put up prices again the speculators were thus helped in getting a higher price. The chances of success were all against the board in its price-fixing schemes. The British press, merchants, and people were opposed to compulsory control and were not unwilling to make the experiment a failure. If the board had had a monopoly control, the results might have been different, but to try to exercise monopoly control with something like one-fourth of the butter supply was courting failure from the start.

The whole situation in New Zealand was one of uneasiness among the dairymen. They saw their products boycotted in England as a result of the board's actions. New competition was invited from the Argentine and other areas. The farmers saw their produce sold at a greater relative disadvantage than ever before. The board was slow to make advances and final settlements, and this was anything but satisfactory to the farmers. It was freely criticized, but, as usual with such boards, insisted that everything was satisfactory and that none of the troubles was caused by their mistakes. Dissatisfaction grew to such proportion by March, 1927, that the board met March 14 and voted: "That all resolutions and restrictions dealing with fixing of prices are hereby rescinded." Finally, on July 13, 1927, the board met and decided to limit its activities to the following functions: (1) Regulate shipments of dairy products; (2) supervise the loading of dairy products in New Zealand and unloading in England; (3) continuation of a comprehensive insurance system; (4) keep all produce, after arrival in England, in cold storage until time of sale; (5) issue export licenses that permit the board to examine books of the merchants holding such licenses; (6) advertise New Zealand dairy products in Great Britain;

(7) promote the manufacture of the best grades; (8) continue the National Board, but with less absolute control over the dairy industry.

In other words, the Control Board has been forced to abandon its attempts at revolutionizing the dairy produce markets and be content to prove its worth by steady progress.

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SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN URUGUAY

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Uruguay is justly considered the most advanced country in America in the matter of social legislation. Since 1914 the government has undertaken to secure the economic future of the worker, defending him against the risks and dangers that menace him in the struggle for existence. Among the first of these laws passed by our legislators were those covering work accidents and social insurance. The former provided that all employers in industries and in construction work should guard the workers against accidents caused by their machines. The law also provided for indemnification for accidents where employers failed to comply with the protective requirements of the law.

Our work accidents legislation is based on the most advanced developments in this field of law and provide for the safety of the worker in all phases of employment, including factories, maritime employment, railways, and mines. Mining, which is the most dangerous of these industries, is not much developed in Uruguay. Our industrial accidents law follows the universal practice of making the employer responsible for all accidents that occur in the industry.

Since 1915 Uruguay has had an eight-hour day law, believing that better results will be obtained in this shorter period of work than in a longer one where Labor must be less effective because of greater fatigue. This provision also works out for the better health of the workers. The eight-hour law provides in addition for at least one hour of rest in each five for those workers who must give constant attention to their tasks. Although this provision was at first opposed by some labor unions, it has now been made effective in practically all industries.

The eight-hour law has its complement in the obligatory law providing for a weekly day of rest, which was made applicable in 1920 to chauffeurs and drivers and domestic servants. Only those employments are excepted where interruption of work would prove disadvantageous to the industry or to the public interest,

¹Translated from the Spanish by L. L. Bernard, Washington University.

and in these cases compensatory rest periods or money compensations are provided for. This law has been extended to all occupations and finally it has been established even in the tonsorial parlors, where formerly there was no Sunday rest.

A law passed in March, 1918, provides for the suspension of night work from 8 P.M. until 5 A.M. in such occupations as baking, the manufacture of vermicelli, dough, candies, etc., because of their effect upon health. Inspectors are appointed for the enforcement of this and the other laws mentioned. The law providing for seats for employes, urged by Dr. Salgado, was also approved in 1918.

One of the most important achievements of Uruguay in social legislation is her old-age pension law, adopted in 1919. It provides that every person who reaches the age of seventy years, and that every person of whatever age who suffers from total disability, shall have a pension of at least 96 pesos (about \$100) a year, or its equivalent in direct assistance. Immigrants must have been at least fifteen years in the country in order to participate in this benefit. The funds for these pension are secured by means of a tax of twenty centimes per month upon employers for each worker in his employ, by a surtax upon the holders of real property the total value of which is not less than 200,000 pesos, and by a tax of twenty centimes per deck upon imported playing cards, or of ten centimes per deck upon those of domestic manufacture.

The minimum wage law of 1923 aims to make certain that all workers may be free from want while they labor. It provides for a wage of at least eighteen pesos² monthly.

Two fundamental rights to existence are basic to our humanitarian laws: the right to life, which is basic to existence, and the right to shelter. In connection with the former right, it is enacted that the Executive Power shall provide in convenient commissaries, barracks, or locals food for every inhabitant of the country who, for whatever reason, is without work and is unprovided with the means of subsistence. The right to shelter is the well known "Serrato" law which assures to public employes, and to employes of private establishments who have more than ten

²The Uruguayan peso is valued at slightly more than the United States dollar. Tr.

years of service to their credit and who are entitled by law to a pension, that they may have homes of their own. This is taken care of by means of purchases of small holdings (*fincas*) from the mortgage bank, or by means of loans for the purchase of lands from private individuals and for the erection of houses on the same.

Finally, the Popular Assurance law (*Seguro Popular*) makes unattachable in all operations of the Banco de Seguros of the state all capital to the value of 5,000 pesos and all incomes to the amount of 1,200 pesos annually. Recently new social laws have been approved which extend the operation of our advanced legislation. In order to finance increases in minimum wages, which reach as high as seventy pesos among municipal employes, a new inheritance tax upon immovable property in Montevideo to the value of more than 50,000 pesos has been established. The constitutionality of this last law has been called in question.

Our soil, productive of rich harvests, together with our social legislation so favorable to the worker, offer to the immigrant unusual advantages. He is safeguarded in health, in life, in shelter, and in his old age in Uruguay as few countries protect him.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

The University of Texas

Reed, Louis S., *The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930, pp. 190.)

Perhaps no labor movement in history has been as completely shaped and dominated by the preconceptions, points of view, and ideology of one man as was the American labor movement from 1886 to 1920 by the philosophy of Samuel Gompers. The system of ideas, the beliefs, the conceptions as to labor policies, aims, program, and tactics of Samuel Gompers were those of the American Federation of Labor during the four decades of his leadership of that organization. For not only did this man, who glorified the philosophy of "no philosophy," furnish the theoretical foundations of "pure and simple unionism," but he provided the practical leadership as well. He was the head of the Federation in fact as well as in name. As Dr. Reed states, he was by nature "primarily an organizer, a leader of men in action, not a philosopher," and his leadership was not a leadership of ideas but rather a "leadership in tactics, a leadership in the day-to-day activities of the movement" (p. 182). In fact, Dr. Reed believes that the labor philosophy of Gompers is largely to be explained in terms of his intense desire to remain President of the American Federation of Labor. He kept his ear close to the ground, he kept his ideas in line with those of the leaders of the great craft unions, he adjusted his conceptions to the demands of the rank and file, and conformed to the movement even when conformance meant some compromise with his principles. Hence, it was not so much that Gompers converted the Federation to a system of ideas worked out by himself, as Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle constructed the theoretical basis of the German labor movement or the Fabian socialists converted the British labor movement. Rather, he formulated a philosophy and program on the basis of a careful appraisal of existing possibilities for labor in the America of his day. He was the mouthpiece of the skilled craftsman.

Laissez faire or extreme individualism, distrust of the State, emphasis on immediate gains, of more and more, here and now, indifference to ultimate ends,—such were the essentials of Gompers' philosophy. It was a philosophy of self-help and limited objectives. Craft unionism, trade autonomy, action upon the economic field—such was his program. It is Dr. Reed's belief that no other philosophy and program could have served as the basis of a stable labor movement in the United States of the period of the eighties, nineties, and the first decade of the twentieth century.

Dr. Reed has made a comprehensive study and careful analysis of Gompers' ideas and principles together with a judicious appraisal of the quality of his leadership. The exposition is well planned and the material arranged in logical sequence. No essential points seem to have been omitted, though one is struck by the omission of any reference to the support of the Federation and of Gompers given to La Follette and Wheeler in the presidential campaign of 1924. Since the action of the Federation and its leaders in

that campaign amounted in fact to a reversal of the time-honored non-partisan political policy, and since Dr. Reed lays great emphasis on Gompers' fear of the State and his non-political bias, this omission is all the more striking. Gompers' change of front on that occasion would seem to illustrate the thesis that he always attempted to reflect the demands of his organization, though he sometimes failed to recognize those demands correctly. Here was an obvious compromise of principle.

Dr. Reed's study merits the attention of students of the labor movement. Through his editorials in the *American Federationist*, his numerous pamphlets, and his autobiography, Gompers' ideas are well known. Dr. Reed, however, has organized them into a coherent system of thought, has traced their origin and evolution, and brought them into relation with the American economic, political, and social environment. Of particular interest is his estimate of Gompers' leadership. He believes that Gompers' extreme individualism did harm to the American Federation of Labor by making labor a nonentity. Gompers' emphasis on self-help and avoidance of labor legislation and social insurance "left the way open for employers' 'welfarism,' group insurance, old-age pensions, etc.," with the result of strengthening the employers and weakening the unions, of substituting paternalism of employers for state paternalism. Further, Gompers never adjusted his ideas to the changed industrial environment of twentieth century America. He seemed unaware of the change. He never realized that a new epoch had arrived, and that policies and principles adapted to an epoch of relatively small-scale industry with a large place for skilled mechanics and artisans were woefully inadequate for an epoch of large-scale, highly mechanized industry, with continuous technical innovation, obliteration of craft lines, and employers' welfarism. Dr. Reed believes that this blindness and consequent lack of constructive leadership on Gompers' part largely accounts for the impotence of the American labor movement today. This seems to be a justified estimate. Yet it must be remembered that Gompers could not advocate government regulation of the labor contract, industrial unionism, extreme solidarity of labor, and labor participation in management without violating the fundamental principles of the American Federation of Labor, the principles of collective bargaining, craft unionism, craft autonomy, regularity, and limited objectives. The failure of craft unionism is the failure of a labor movement based on antiquated principles and an inadequate philosophy. It is not so much the failure of Gompers' leadership as the failure of a philosophy of "no philosophy," the failure of an ideology. As Dr. Reed implies, what seems to be needed in the American Federation of Labor is a reorientation of principles and program. The new labor policies of management have largely left pure and simple unionism without function or objective.

E. E. HALE.

The University of Texas.

Chinard, Gilbert, *Thomas Jefferson: The Apostle of Americanism*. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929, pp. xviii, 548.)

Chinard, Gilbert, editor, *The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson: His Commonplace Book of Philosophers and Poets*, with an introduction by

Gilbert Chinard. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928, pp. 37, 210.)

It has remained for a Frenchman to present a Thomas Jefferson neither imbued with a blind reverence for Old World institutions nor saturated with the philosophical ideas of French thinkers but as "The Apostle of Americanism." Professor Gilbert Chinard of Johns Hopkins University is eminently prepared for the role he assumed as a biographer of Jefferson. In 1926 he published "The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson: A Repertory of His Ideas on Government." Two years later appeared from his hand "The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson" which is included in this review. Now we have the biography as the most recent contribution to Jeffersoniana by Professor Chinard. It is the result of years of careful and meticulous research in which the author examined thousands of unpublished letters and documents in the two hundred and thirty volumes of Jefferson papers in the Library of Congress.

In view of his previous researches it is not surprising that in this biography Professor Chinard delves deeply into the genesis of Jefferson's political ideas. It is this analysis which constitutes the greatest merit of the biography and the distinctive contribution of the author. Professor Chinard seems to prove conclusively that Jefferson's political thinking is thoroughly Anglo-Saxon in origin and development. A real jolt is given to the heretofore traditional view that Jefferson's creed was built upon the theories of the radical French philosophers. Indeed we are told that during the formative years their influence "was almost negligible." Rather we find that, aside from the Greeks of old, the great English legalists and thinkers were Jefferson's teachers. He was particularly devoted to the writings of Lord Bolingbroke, an exponent of the contractual basis of government, while from the Scottish Lord Kames came ideas of natural rights. There are American students of political philosophy who will consider that Chinard has attributed too much influence to Lord Kames but this should not detract from the main thesis of the author.

Aside from tracing the sources of Jefferson's political ideas, the biography reveals the sage of Monticello as "The Apostle of Americanism." While Jefferson had a due appreciation for European culture, his five years abroad convinced him all the more of America's unique opportunity to develop a new social order, which should consist of an agricultural society, "a sort of Arcadia where every man would live on his own farm, off the products of his own land." To attain this simple democracy America must avoid the pitfalls of the European system with its hereditary monarchies, its privileged aristocracies, its priest-ridden State churches, its inadequate conceptions of social justice.

It is not in this portrayal of Jefferson's bucolic dream that Professor Chinard takes new ground but rather in his insistence that so thoroughly was his subject a one hundred per cent American that his utterances became translated into American traditions. Here we have a statesman who anticipates not only Woodrow Wilson's ideal of reduced armaments, but likewise his system of watchful waiting and unofficial observers. For while political aloofness was to be an aim we must not close our eyes and remain ignorant of European affairs. Jefferson even sounds a note of warning

against unrestricted immigration which was prophetic of the twentieth century. America must remain Anglo-Saxon and her institutions must not be endangered by an unassimilable horde of foreigners.

In another respect many readers will have to lay aside their traditional picture of Jefferson, and that is in his relation to the revolutionists in France. The French leaders are advised not to resort to violence save as a last resort, but rather to buy their liberties from the King. Jefferson did not believe that the French were ready for a truly representative government. With all of his sympathy for them in their efforts to rid themselves of arbitrary government, he did little as Secretary of State officially to further their cause in the United States. He was never swept off his feet by their propaganda and he soon realized that the hot-headed Genet was nothing more than a stupid blunderer who only helped the enemies of France. One of the last acts of Jefferson as Secretary of State was the writing of an official protest against the conduct of Genet.

Admirers of Jefferson will take issue with Chinard's position that the sage was not "such a deep politician." Others will feel that not enough tribute has been paid to his versatility, his inventive genius, and his artistic and literary ability. But no one will question that Chinard has made Jefferson a very great man,—a deep thinker, a thorough Anglo-Saxon, "The Apostle of Americanism."

In the "Literary Bible," which Jefferson compiled, we find the sources of much Jeffersonian philosophy. We learn that Jefferson borrowed from Homer, Herodotus, Euripides, and others among the Greeks. Virgil, Ovid, and Horace figure among the Latin authors whose sentiments he found worthy of recording. Among modern writers, Bolingbroke's influence was outstanding, particularly in Jefferson's critical approach to the Bible. Shakespeare was "essentially a source of moral teachings, a profound observer of human nature." Extracts from French writers are conspicuous for their absence which affords additional support for Chinard's thesis that French thought influenced Jefferson but slightly.

Chinard offers the evidence that the "Literary Bible" was compiled during Jefferson's early life probably as a sort of scrap book during his student days. The misogynistic trend of the excerpts is certainly quite contrary to Jefferson's attitude towards women after his happy marriage, and the sad death of his wife was a blow which stunned him. Although he never seems to have fallen in love again, he continued to enjoy associations with women as the number of his female correspondents seems to indicate. Probably the "Literary Bible" with the possible exception of a few quotations contains "the confessions of his youth," recorded between the time of his disappointing love affair with Rebecca Burwell, his "Belinda," and his marriage some years later.

All must admit the value of this source book which reveals the personality of the young Jefferson and which contains "the maxims and principles which so impressed his still plastic mind, that by them he was to govern the rest of his life."

W. M. GEWEHR.

American University.

Groves, E. R., and Blanchard, Phyllis, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930, pp. vi, 467.)

When one encounters authors such as Groves and Blanchard discoursing on the origin, prevention, and cure of human ills, it is a tutored skepticism that leads to the questions: What consummate egotists are these? With which of our non-scientific sects do they ally themselves? Whereby do they designate their panacea? Since only too frequently the faith we have pinned to cure-alls has been crushed, we look pityingly or damagingly at these mental hygienists who propose a point of view alleged to be applicable to most personal and social discord. Yet we note as we read, that these thinkers are humble—they even claim themselves ignorant—as well as catholic-minded—they extol the tested knowledge accumulated by all disciplines. The essence of their plea is merely that man's mental, physical, and social assets as well as liabilities can be understood and altered to effect the largest credit of happiness and efficiency only if their interrelationships are comprehended. Efforts to relieve human suffering, when they have failed, have usually ignored man's more dynamic qualities or abstracted him from the socio-physico-organismal configuration in which it is necessary to view him.

Although mental hygienists have many times sketched briefly their program or have dealt at length with some detail of it, there has been need of a more extended treatise which would set forth the scope of the endeavor as well as the interrelations of its various phases. Such a treatise have Groves and Blanchard given us in their *Introduction to Mental Hygiene*. Theirs is, as the title reveals, a survey program; and in accord with this, they dwell upon the objectives of the mental hygiene movement, its history, its accomplishments, its methods and fields of work, its agencies, and sources of information. The chapters are organized largely about the problems which arise or inhere in social institutions and about fields of work. The following are the chapter captions: the origin and development of mental hygiene, the psychiatric and psychological background, the problem of mental disease, delinquency as a mental health problem, mental hygiene, and childhood, mental hygiene and adolescence, mental hygiene and marriage, mental hygiene and the schools, mental hygiene in the college and the university, mental hygiene in business and industry, recreation and mental adjustment, mental hygiene aspects of literature, social work and mental hygiene, mental hygiene and public opinion, and the larger aspects of mental hygiene.

Since the authors are in the main content to survey, their descriptions resemble somewhat an objective account of a checker game. Only the gross moves are recounted. Such technical details as those of interviewing, testing, analyzing, and adjusting emotional difficulties, reorganizing the life of a family, etc., are omitted. Hence, one tends to find himself closing the book with the feeling that something ought to and can be done about human suffering, but the details of the methods are shadowy.

The book is not particularly controversial in tone, though the more important positions counter to those held by the authors have at least been mentioned. The attitude of the work is optimistic, as the following confession of faith which constitutes its closing words indicates: "The present movement may be disappointing and may in time even appear to have been

premature. Final failure is, however, impossible unless nature's conditions are so adverse to man that no amount of thought and care and experimental knowledge will aid him in accomplishing that in which he is most interested, the achievement of happiness both for himself and his fellows."

It is clear that Groves and Blanchard have intended the volume for a text book, since a rather extensive bibliography and a case report as well as a series of topics appropriate for written exercises and classroom discussion are presented at the end of each chapter. The book is well constructed, having dull paper, relatively large bold type, few typographical errors, a detailed index, and accurate plentiful footnotes. It contains no illustrations and only a limited number of tables. The style, though possessed of sufficient dignity, is chatty and smooth-flowing. One is loath to lay the volume aside when once started upon its perusal. Since it stimulates interest, is sane, contentful, well-informed, and well organized, it affords a superior means of introducing college students and intelligent laymen to the field of mental hygiene.

HELEN L. KOCH.

The University of Texas.

White, Wilford L., *Coöperative Retail Buying Associations*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1930, pp. 207.)

Coöperative buying has occupied an important and dramatic position in trade journals, business gatherings, and conclaves of economists for some time. Professor White's work is probably the first to reduce the diverse opinions and varied experiences to a quantitative statement and to compare coöperative retail buying associations with service wholesalers and to a certain extent, with large scale retailers. Mr. White also offers substantial comment as to their competitive strength. Of equal value is the fact that this work should serve as a guide to students who are interested in making further studies of coöperative buying or in making studies of coöperation in retailing.

The limits of Professor White's study are set by confining it to drugs and groceries, and by defining a coöperative retail buying association as "an incorporated organization of financially independent retailers which acts as a common, but distinct, wholesale distributor for its members, buys in its own name, and warehouses its purchases." The field covered by White thus eliminates coöperative buying activities in other trades and excludes certain types of collective buying. This does not distort the significance of this study because the chain store, a reason for coöperative action among independents, competes most effectively in the grocery and drug trade.

The book builds up an outline history of retail coöperation and retail buying associations merging into a statement of causes and present strength. The retail buying association results largely from increased competition, and like other forms of coöperative activity is defensive in character.

From the nature of the study two important questions arise: (1) Can coöperative retail buying associations lower distribution costs? (2) Are they effective in meeting the competition of the large scale retailers? Relying principally on factual material, Mr. White offers possible answers to the

above questions. His analysis includes a comparison of costs of doing business as between service wholesalers and retail buying associations and the operation of the association in the performance of such merchandising functions as selling, credit, delivery, buying, and storage. Problems of organization, management, location, and coöperation are discussed with the result of bringing out the strength and weakness of these associations. The last two chapters deal with the present status and the future of coöperative retail buying associations.

In general, it is Professor White's conclusion that the coöperative association in the grocery trade can effect a total net saving of slightly less than two per cent to the retailer and four per cent to the retailer in the drug trade. These associations do not eliminate any functions customarily performed by other wholesale types. They do reduce their own expenses by reducing the cost of performing some functions and by shifting that performance to others who are able to do it more or less effectively. The reduction of selling effort and the limiting of credit extension account for most of the *real* saving so far as the performance of wholesaling is concerned. No savings are made in retailing and in view of the fact that some large scale retailers effect savings in both wholesaling and retailing, retail buying associations cannot meet their competition.

In considering the persons to whom the results of coöperative activity are shifted, the manufacturer who sells to the coöperative association is not affected, either by having to spend large amounts for selling effort, extend unusual credits, or allow an abnormal number of drop shipments. Competing wholesalers, especially service wholesalers, are affected by coöperatives. Coöperatives are located only in the larger cities and most of their sales are limited to the local trading area. Service wholesalers find their least competitive markets in those areas most expensive to reach. The service wholesaler also receives a larger portion of credit business, much of which is from the poorer than average risks and a larger portion of the service business is done on slower moving lines on which the actual net profit is least.

The retailer member is most affected. He must make an investment in the association, on which he generally receives less than the current rate of interest. He has to initiate most of the orders which he places with the association, pay cash within a short period of time, and fill in his lines from other wholesalers.

According to Professor White, the future of coöperative retail buying associations depends upon the future of the independent merchant; however, the success of the merchant does not depend on the association which he has created. The activities of wholesalers resulting in the "voluntary chain" and "contract wholesalers" offer a genuine competitive threat to the retail buying association. Further, the management factor is all important and, as indicated in this study, too much emphasis has been placed upon the reduction of wholesale costs at the expense of management and control.

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Laski, Harold J., *The Dangers of Obedience and other Essays*. (New York, Harpers, 1930, pp. 293.)

Professor Laski's reputation for provocative ideas and brilliant writing are such that any volume from his pen is certain to be received with interest. The present book contains ten semi-popular essays, all or most of which have previously appeared in print. The first three of them deal with political problems, the next three with higher education in England and America, the seventh and ninth with Rousseau and Machiavelli respectively, the eighth with the desirability of greater equality, and the last with the desirability of developing professional rather than exclusively pecuniary standards in business.

One will not find in these papers any particularly new or unusual ideas. They are obviously intended to popularize the gospel, not to present new conceptions. The title essay, for example, is a restatement of the principle which the author elaborated upon in his *Grammar of Politics*,—the necessity of dissent in the state: "A healthy loyalty is not passive and complacent, but active and critical. If it finds ground for attack, it must occupy that ground. For all obedience that has the right to regard itself as ethical is built upon a conscious agreement with the purpose we encounter." In his second essay, "The American Political System," and especially the American interpretation and application of the separation of powers doctrine, is criticized as harshly as one familiar with Mr. Laski's approval of the English political system would expect him to criticize it. More harshly, indeed, for one would probably expect from Mr. Laski somewhat more of accuracy in his historical references, and considerably more of acceptance of the ancient doctrine that political institutions which work well in one society will not necessarily function smoothly elsewhere. And for a man who writes freely of the spirit of government he places surprisingly heavy emphasis upon the design of the machinery. Incidentally, it is doubtful whether "No political system has even been so vehemently assailed as that of the United States." In the third essay, "The Recovery of Citizenship," he urges that the restoration to the individual citizen of his personal initiative and responsibility is to be secured by the extensive development of advisory commissions. These groups of laymen should have the functions "which Bagehot attributed to the English Crown; they should advise, encourage, and warn."

In the essays on higher education Mr. Laski is principally concerned with preaching the doctrine of the great teacher, and of the necessity for close contact between student and teacher. But here, as in certain of the political essays, he seems at times to place undue emphasis upon the reform of systems and of machinery. However, a hearty criticism of foundations for the encouragement of irrelevant research does much to make up for this tendency to capitulate to the mechanistic pedagogues.

The remaining chapters are of too diverse a nature to make brief summary possible. All of them are worth at least a casual reading; none are remarkable for originality or unusual insight.

In this, as in Mr. Laski's previous books, there is a deal of purplish writing. The style is, in the main, very effective for its purpose, but it is sometimes overdone. And the style is not infrequently indicative of the content. In particular his statements of fact are too often either clearly inaccurate

or expressed in misleading fashion. One may agree, as does this reviewer, with many of Mr. Laski's theses, and yet regret that he does not give to the shaping of his arguments a portion of the painstaking search for accuracy, and the keenly self-critical overhauling of logic which are characteristic of the scholars and teachers whom he praises: Acton, Maitland, Turner, Haskins, and McIlwain. But it remains that Mr. Laski is a thinker and writer of significance. Decidedly he is a writer for whom we should be grateful in an age in which there is too little interesting political and educational theory, and not much more of stimulating prose.

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Harvard University.

Blaisdell, Donald C., *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1929, pp. x, 243.)

As the subtitle states, this volume presents "a study of the establishment, activities, and significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt." The author traces in a painstaking fashion the development of the situation that finally compelled the Porte to recognize the necessity of a large degree of foreign control over the debt and over revenues to assure service on the debt. It is the story—often retold since in too many backward states—of a corrupt native government encouraged by competing European financial interests to borrow money at ruinous rates of interest and discount until the vicious circle of deficits, defaults, and new loans could no longer be run. This led to the Protocol of 1878 that envisaged the finances of the Porte by a European commission named by the powers whose nationals held Turkish bonds. Instead of following this plan, the Porte, having reached an agreement with the representatives of the foreign bond holders, issued in 1881 the famous Decree of Mouharrem which created the international Public Debt Council. The European outpost in the Turkish Empire had been established, even though, technically speaking, it was held by representatives of private interests in Europe. There follows, then, an account of the work of the Debt, as it was often called. Efficient, honest, persevering, the Debt performed well its task; hence one is not surprised to note that it gradually amassed to itself an ever-increasing measure of control of policies and services related to its special field. Though its European members were not appointed by their governments, yet they had behind them the support of European diplomacy, and they came to represent their respective governments in the desperate game of imperialism. They used their position to dominate much of the economic life of Turkey: it is revealing to see how a member of the Debt would come from a meeting of railway directors, he himself being a director, to a meeting of the Debt to consider a report and recommendation that as a railway director he had drawn up for the Debt.

Close association of individual members with their respective national interests finally meant the entrance of political factors. During the World War, as a result, the Debt came to subserve the interests of the Central Powers, as it did the interests of the Allies after 1919. Even had this not been the case, it is quite likely that Nationalist Turkey would have curtailed, as, in fact, it did curtail, almost to the point of extinction, the powers of the Debt.

Here, then, is a well written, well documented account of a peculiarly interesting institution that rose, quite naturally, out of the politico-economic relations of Turkey with the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century—the Europe that the industrial revolution was gradually forcing into the new imperialism,—that came, finally, to be the instrument of European imperialism, and that, also quite naturally, lost its grip when the hold of that same imperialism was broken by a resurgent Turkey.

CHARLES A. TIMM.

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Villari, Luigi, *Italy*. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, pp. i, 391.)

Fascism, like bolshevism, is probably not for the present generation to evaluate. It is so remote from the generally accepted political and economic ideology of our time that it is difficult for even scholars to look upon it as more than a passing phenomenon and not infrequently it is regarded as a nightmare. Naturally, Italians themselves are hardly competent to judge it; but, insofar as they give us something of their own souls, as it were, such analyses, whether for or against fascism, afford us probably our most usable material. If one balances Salvemini against Villari, one may, somewhere in between, find the approach to a reasoned judgment. At least it may be said that Villari is the more dispassionate of the two.

There could hardly have been found a more competent apologist for fascism than Professor Villari, a historian and the son of a historian. His earlier work, *The Awakening of Italy*, has already acquainted us with his thesis, but the present book goes further back into Italian history, and not only carries the study down to 1928 but attempts to give a picture of all the currents of progress in Italy of that date. The author's narrative of the antecedents of fascism, while somewhat influenced by his approval of the present régime, is nevertheless illuminating and, in the main, convincing. His exposition of fascism has the merit of clearness, and, as far as the reviewer knows, is factually correct. He is also too much of a scholar not to be fairly moderate in tone, as for instance in his allusions to Salandra and Sonnino. But, without spending much time in strictures, it must be confessed that he fails to credit the opposition to fascism with any decent motive; and his defense of the repression of freedom of opinion in Italy is decidedly lame—especially when he assures us that, if the opposition press were not throttled, some clashes among the youth might result. Moreover, his treatment of foreign relations is so vigorously partisan as to be often misleading. Italy had her wrongs, no doubt (she was inexcusably shut out from Asia Minor), but we get no hint that Austria or Yugoslavia had any case at all in the frontier disputes with Italy following the Peace; we are not informed of her aggressive treatment of Turkey in 1911 or of Greece in 1923 or the anomaly of her present possession of Rhodes; and certainly we cannot believe that her interest in Albania is "purely negative." One also wonders what is involved in fascist imperialism. He does not tell us that Mussolini has bidden his people breed or what is to be the result of the problem of congestion. A more serious omission, however, and one which relates more closely to the fascist record, is the cursory treatment of the

Matteotti outrage. This is enough to make one feel that Villari is consciously and deliberately locking skeletons in the closet.

Yet it seems abundantly clear that fascism has achieved a great deal of good for Italy, and, if such achievements are not worth the price, it is perhaps only for Italians to say so. So far, indeed, there is a fair indication that the majority of the Italian people are content with the present régime. And, if fascism has its evils—well, political liberalism is not without its flaws also.

T. W. RIKER.

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Kohn, Hans, *A History of Nationalism in the East*. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1929, pp. xi, 476.)

Students of international relations have become acquainted with the various manifestations of nationalism in the West. In this volume they will find a careful, unprejudiced study of the rise of a similar phenomenon in the East.

The thesis may be briefly stated. Each epoch has a guiding idea. Right into the eighteenth century the idea was, in the West, religion, to be supplanted during and after that century by nationalism, which, in its turn, seems now gradually to be losing ground before internationalism. The East—and a special study is made of Egypt, the Near East, the Middle East, and India—is going through a social, economic, political, and intellectual development similar in some respects to that through which the West has passed. Religion is still dominant there, but it is no longer difficult to discern the evidences of a rising nationalism. In consequence the whole intellectual life of the East is being transformed. For this transformation influences emanating primarily from England and, since 1917, from Russia are mainly responsible. The revolution is being furthered by two camps: the one, typified by some of Gandhi's preachings, would eject nearly all Western influences as destructive of the spiritual life and native culture of the people, the other, illustrated perhaps best by the new Turkey, would Westernize as Japan did in order better to combat the West with its own weapons. A similar conflict of ideals is present in the field of religion, one group seeking to return to the primitive purity of the faith, and the other looking rather to a liberalized, humanistic faith that could embrace all peoples.

With all its complicated cross-currents and tendencies it is a fascinating story, a story that means much to the West; for when a billion of Oriental people become infected with the virus of nationalism, the rule of the West over the East is doomed. Due, however, to the infiltration of ideas of political justice from England and of social justice from the new Russia, the outcome might be, not a complete revolution against the West, but rather the development of a common consciousness, a kind of syncretization of diverse cultures that would provide a more solid basis for international cooperation than the world now possesses.

The English-speaking world is indebted to the author for bringing out an English edition of this valuable study. After all, it is primarily a story,

well told, critical, and yet not unsympathetic toward the British Empire, of the impact of the Anglo-Saxon system upon the Orient.

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Beale, Howard K., *The Critical Year*. (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1930, pp. ix, 454.)

The period of reconstruction following the Civil War has attracted many investigators, but few have given it a more detailed study or a more interesting and sound interpretation than has Howard K. Beale in his *The Critical Year*. Dr. Beale set out to discover the factors involved in the choice of the reconstruction program offered by the Radicals over that advocated by Johnson and the Conservatives. In his analysis of the policy of Andrew Johnson and his defense of the man, Dr. Beale has kept abreast of the more recent historians who hold that Johnson was the victim of slander and calumny for political ends rather than the victim of his own defects. Nor is his analysis of the motives of the Radicals in their advocacy of reconstruction rather than restoration in order to safeguard their political interests, and in the pretensions of the Radical leaders who aimed to increase the power of Congress at the expense of the states and the other departments of government, entirely novel.

His contribution lies in his analysis of the election of 1866. Was the election a repudiation of Johnson's policy of restoration and the conservatives and a mandate for Radical reconstruction or did it really reveal the popular mind? In a keen analysis of the methods used by the Radicals to discredit Johnson and the issues that were obscured by a Radical smoke screen of slander and political claptrap, Dr. Beale concludes that the election was not fought on the real issues at all. Johnson lost out because of his failure to raise the economic issues in regard to finance, big business, and the tariff that would have split the Radical ranks. The Conservatives were not organized and, with the Radicals controlling the party machinery, the moderate electorate was faced with the alternative of joining the Radicals or voting with the Democrats and being classed as Copperheads. Even then the victory of the Radicals was not as decisive as their pretensions led them to claim, and the election did not reveal the will of the people on restoration versus reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Critical Year is scholarly and impartial and distinctly readable. Its value for historians is enhanced by an excellent critical bibliography.

RHEA M. SMITH.

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BOOK NOTES

Social and Community Problems of Oklahoma (Guthrie, Oklahoma, Coöperative Publishing Company, 1929, pp. 229), by Jennings J. Rhyne, is a distinct departure from the general texts on social and community problems. Unlike most works in its field, it does not deal with social problems as a whole, but only as they appear in the State of Oklahoma. This limitation

of the field enables the author to be much more detailed and specific than would otherwise be possible.

As a reading of the text indicates, Oklahoma is peculiarly in need of a study of this kind. A series of unique events has given the state a set of social conditions not duplicated elsewhere in America. The federal Indian policy, the Negro migrations, and the rush of white settlers have brought into mutual contact three races not yet perfectly accommodated to each other. Nor are the three races completely adjusted within themselves. The Indians, especially, exhibit many cleavages within their own group, due to the variety of tribes represented.

The recency of white occupation, bringing with it the customary dependent, delinquent, and defective classes for which no provision had been made, raises still another problem of unusual import to Oklahoma. Buildings to house these wards of society cannot be instantly provided, much less the organized personnel required to operate them efficiently. Something must be done to improve the institutional care offered by the state; something must also be done in the meantime.

In order to present these problems clearly to the reader, Professor Rhyne utilizes the historical approach. Although we are not accustomed to this method in what purports to be a sociological text, there is, of course, no reason why it should not be used. It presents in the background out of which the present situation has come, thereby enabling the reader much better to understand it. The book should find a ready use in the field chosen for it by the author.

C. M. R.

Dr. Mao-Lan Tuan's monograph, *Simonde de Sismondi as an Economist* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927, pp. 178), is a sympathetic yet balanced analysis of the theoretical conceptions and reform proposals of this early, outspoken, but neglected critic of *laissez faire* and the competitive régime. Sismondi, indeed, was a critic of the industrial régime, of the rural organization of his day, and especially of the classical political economy. Dr. Tuan claims that he "furnished the arsenal from which most of the socialist writers of the nineteenth century drew their weapons." Yet he went beyond criticism and developed at length his own theories of the rôle of the state, of economic organization, of crises, of population, of taxation, and of private property. Above all, he had a complete and detailed system of reforms for eliminating economic maladjustments, political evils, social misery, and human unhappiness. He was an ardent advocate of state intervention and control, and urged legislation to regulate hours of labor, to limit the employment of children, to establish minimum wages, and to provide for social insurance. In view of these various proposals, Dr. Tuan gives Sismondi credit for "being the precursor of much of our present-day social legislation." Dr. Tuan believes that Sismondi pointed the way to an acceptable compromise between the program of *laissez faire* individualism with its sacrifice of ends to means, and the scheme of socialism, which is held to sacrifice "all practical means to an unattainable end." Sismondi's various theories and proposals of reform are analyzed carefully and fully, with attention to their shortcomings and inconsistencies as well as to their merits. There is an excellent bibliography.

E. E. H.

Wilson Leon Godshall's *Tsingtau Under Three Flags* (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1929, pp. xi, 580), not only tells the story of Tsingtau under China, Germany, and Japan, but also prepares the way for that story by discussing the more important manifestations of the impact of western imperialism upon China. For this the author is generally to be commended, for the history of Tsingtau under Germany and Japan would hardly be understandable were it isolated from other imperialistic ventures in China. At the same time it must be admitted that much of the material presented is rather far removed from Shantung.

After an introductory chapter devoted to a survey of early European contacts with China the author works up to his main theme by presenting studies of Russia in eastern Asia and the colonial expansion of Germany. Then follow chapters on German policy in China, Japanese expansion, Japan in Shantung, the question of Shantung at Versailles and the Washington Conference, and developments in Tsingtau since its restoration to China. It would appear, therefore, that the author's principal aim is to explain the last thirty years of Tsingtau's history in the light of the whole international situation. In this he undoubtedly succeeds. As regards the secondary purpose of describing purely domestic developments in that port and its hinterland—a purpose more in line with the title—he succeeds to a somewhat less degree.

The attitude of the author is generally unbiased, although, as is common with most American writers on the Far East, he is inclined to be rather critical of Japanese policies. While tending to favor the position of China, he, nevertheless, recognizes that the partial decay of Tsingtau under Chinese administration since 1922 might seriously affect the rate and conditions of the relinquishment of other leaseholds. The appendix contains twenty-one documents relating, for the most part, to Shantung. C. T.

Austin F. Macdonald's *American City Government and Administration* (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1929, pp. xv, 762), is the first comprehensive treatment of both American city government and administration in one volume. In conformity with most recent works in political science, considerable emphasis has been placed on the economic and social aspects of the subject. There are thirty chapters in the book, fifteen being devoted to government and fifteen to administration. Part I on Government includes the usual introductory chapters on problems, growth, and history of city government, two chapters on city-state relations, and one on metropolitan government, chapters on the mayor, council, commission government, and the city manager plan, a chapter on the courts, and two chapters on nominations and elections, and direct legislation and the recall. In a final chapter on municipal politics the author discusses the boss and the machine and outlines the mechanics of reform. Part II on administration is quite conventional. Following introductory chapters on municipal administration and the merit system are chapters on the more important phases of city administration. Separate chapters on expenditures and indebtedness, and revenues, give these two financial topics more nearly adequate consideration than they usually get. The separate treatment of planning and zoning is also to be commended.

The book is quite readable, the style being lucid and straightforward. An extended list of select references at the end of each chapter will be of considerable value in advanced courses. While not original at all, the well-balanced and comprehensive treatment of the subject will make this book welcome to teachers of municipal government and administration.

M. R. W.

The report, *History and Functions of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, Thomas Skelton Harrison Foundation, 1930, pp. 102), made by Clarence G. Shenton is the first and introductory one of a series of reports to be published on the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research conducted the survey, begun in 1924, as the agent of the Thomas Skelton Harrison Foundation. Mr. Shenton is director of the foundation and assistant director of the bureau. This is purely a descriptive and not a critical report, giving the history of the court since its establishment in 1913, its organization, and its various jurisdictions—civil, criminal, for juveniles, for desertion and nonsupport, and for misdemeanants. Emphasis is placed on those functions which involve social work. The court, in spite of its name, is a county court, and not a city court, but since the county and the city have the same boundaries, the area covered is identical, though the court is not subject to laws regulating Philadelphia. Lack of coöperation on the part of the court since a change in the president judge in 1927 has made impossible the completion of certain parts of the survey, but those already made will follow this report, and they will doubtless be real contributions in the field, as they have been prepared by specialists brought to Philadelphia by the foundation particularly for this purpose.

F. M. S.

A. D. Lindsay of Balliol College, Oxford, begins *The Essentials of Democracy* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929, pp. 82), by saying that "We are at the present time passing through a certain disillusionment about democracy. Before the war it could almost be taken for granted that democracy—was the only possible government for a civilized country—How different are things now!" The main reason, he believes, for present misgivings is "not simply that the new forms democracy takes on are disappointing to those who knew the old," but "the new tasks thrust on successful democracy are in danger of breaking it down." One of the greatest problems of democracy is that of operating it on a large scale. Public opinion, because of the means by which it is created, is unsatisfactory. Public consent is a fiction. What democracy means, however, is government for the good of the common life, a knowledge of which can only be ascertained by the modern expert administrator or legislator from a healthy discussion on the part of individuals, groups, and voluntary associations into which society is divided. This, in the last analysis, is democracy, and without it no government can meet the needs of modern life.

O. D. W.

Orestes Ferrara in *The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli*, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929, pp. xii, 130), publishes in English a study already published in French and Spanish. At the start

he stresses the essentially dual personality of Machiavelli: his reputed personality, and the real one which is best portrayed in his intimate letters. Not all his epistles were simple outpourings of the writer's soul, for they were sometimes designed to "show off" his learning or ideas; none the less they set forth as nothing else can the intensely human Machiavelli. Farrara analyzes the correspondence with Vettori and Guicciardini as well as the general and intimate letters. Other chapters consider the "Carpi Comedy," "Contemporary Testimony," and "The Great Contrast." O.D.W.

Party Government in the United States (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1929, pp. 68), by John W. Davis is the publication of two lectures bearing the following titles: "The Place of Party in American Life," and "Party Principles, Leaders, and Nominations." As might be expected these show insight into politics and familiarity with some of the standard writers on popular government, but betray no particular originality of thought or suggestions as to remedies for the defects of the American party system. The two-party tradition is praised, and loyalty to party is preached. Willingness to serve one party or the other is enjoined upon the young. In the second lecture the speaker presents among other matters the usual arguments against the direct primary. O. D. W.

The Sociology of the Family (Ithaca, December 1, 1929, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Department of Rural Organization, Mimeograph Bulletin, No. 1, pp. 74), by Dwight Sanderson and Robert G. Foster is one of the most useful outlines and bibliographies on the sociology of the family. It will serve a valuable purpose in the hands of teachers and research workers in institutions with limited library facilities. The research projects suggested are only fairly well selected. If each topic indicated were worked out thoroughly, we should have a kind of compendium of rather unrelated phases of family sociology. The sociology of the family would still be rather choppy. This is not meant as a disparagement, for, as yet, nobody knows just what are the really important things about family life to be studied; and we do not know just what correlation to expect, if any, between the psycho-social and the physico-economic phases of family life. We do not know that sentimental feminism, masculinism, and radical liberalism have retarded a scientific understanding of the family by at least an age. This, the authors regret.

O. D. D.

Thomas Falconer's *Letters and Notes on the Texan Santa Fé Expedition, 1841-1842*, with introduction and notes by F. W. Hodge (New York, Dauber and Pine Book Shops, Inc., 1930, pp. 159), are those of an Englishman who accompanied the Santa Fé expedition. They constitute a very interesting and valuable collection. Mr. Hodge has made scattered materials accessible to those desirous of gaining a contemporary understanding of the expedition from Falconer's narrative. Not only is the collection interesting for its description of the hardships endured by the members of the party dispatched by President Lamar of the Republic of Texas for the purpose of winning the Santa Fé trade and possibly to induce Santa Fé

to join the Republic, but it also provides descriptions of the country and the towns through which Falconer passed.

R. M. S.

In *The Makers of the Unwritten Constitution* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, pp. 156), William Bennett Munro publishes another series of his popular lectures in the field of government. As usual his facility of style and ability to go to the heart of familiar matters in a few words are to be commended. No originality of thought or interpretation is attempted. The leaders presented are Hamilton, Marshall, Jackson, and Wilson. As shorthand sketches of the contributions of these men the lectures are no doubt excellent.

O. D. W.